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Abstract 
 
The myths and rumours that circulated during the First World War originated 
with soldiers and the general public, excepting atrocity stories. The British 
population used these myths and rumours to construct a discourse to explain its 
involvement in the First World War. This discourse reconciled the experience 
and understanding of civilians with the new era of Total War, offering hope and 
consolation in a time of crisis. It also acted as a form of mass, popularly 
produced propaganda which promulgated pro-war views that supported the 
British and Allied causes, while demonising the Germans and their methods of 
warfare. Belief in myths and rumours was equated with patriotism, and 
criticism decried as pro-German and un-British. The myths were widely 
disseminated and widely believed by important sections of the population. They 
drew on concepts palatable to British civilians: ideas of ‘just’ war and a moral 
cause; the nobility of their sacrifices; the bestiality of the enemy; and the 
necessity for the subordination of all else to the war effort. Myths about 
atrocities, spies and the paranormal helped the British public to survive a war 
that surpassed previous human and disquietude, but also experience. They also 
hinted at vulnerability, while expressing the unequivocal support which the 
majority offered the British war effort.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
‘Swift through the Libyan cities Rumor sped. 
Rumor! What evil can surpass her speed? 
In movement she grows mighty, and achieves 
Strength and dominion as she swifter flies. 
Small first, because afraid, she soon exalts 
Her stature skyward, stalking through the lands 
And mantling in the clouds her baleful brow… 
Feet swift to run and pinions like the wind 
The dreadful monster wears; her carcase huge 
Is feathered, and at the root of every plume 
A peering eye abides; and, strange to tell,  
An equal number of vociferous tongues,  
Foul, whispering lips, and ears, that catch at all… 
…She can cling 
To vile invention and malignant wrong, 
Or mingle with her word some tidings true’.1 
 
Throughout history myth and rumour have been politically and socially 
significant. Nero’s rumoured involvement in the fire that destroyed Rome in 
AD 64 has become immortalised in proverb.2 Since the twelfth century, Jews 
have been accused of ritually murdering Christian children and desecrating the 
host – a myth that sparked the massacre of twenty-one Jews in Röttingen in 
                                                  
1 Aeneid, Book IV, quoted in G. Allport and L. Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York, 
1948), p. i.  
2 Allport and Postman, p. 160. 
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1298.3 In the fourteenth century, rumours abounded that Jews were responsible 
for the outbreak of the Black Death in an attempt to wipe out Christendom.4  
The Indian mutiny of 1857 was sparked by rumours among the sepoys 
that rifle cartridges to be issued to soldiers were greased with a mixture of pork 
and beef fat. This offended both Muslim and Hindu religious doctrines, leading 
to accusations that the British officers were trying to subvert Indian beliefs in 
order to force Christianity on the Indian soldiers.5  
In the twentieth century ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ was used 
as a tool by anti-Semites to justify the persecution of Jews, most infamously by 
the Nazis. Despite having been exposed as a blatant forgery, this work and its 
myth of a Jewish conspiracy of world domination is still promulgated today, 
most notably in the Middle East where it is a component of the Hamas charter.6  
In 2003 the United States and her allies invaded Iraq on the pretext that 
‘the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal 
weapons ever devised’.7 Protests from several other countries pointedly 
remarked that the evidence overwhelmingly suggested Iraq no longer possessed 
such weaponry, and it is now generally accepted that she did not. 
 These myths and rumours did not exist in a vacuum, nor were they 
simply ‘stories’. There were discourses that surrounded each. Ritual murder and 
                                                  
3 R. S. Levy, Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution 
(California, 2005), p. 602; W. Brustein, Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the 
Holocaust (Cambridge, 2003), p. 57; S. Jacobs and M. Weitzman, Dismantling the big lie: The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New Jersey, 2003), p. xiii. 
4 J. Marcus and M. Saperstein, The Jew in the medieval world: a source book, 315-1791 (New 
York, 1999), p. 49. 
5 G. Fremont-Barnes, The Indian Mutiny, 1857-58 (Oxford, 2007), p. 28.  
6 Brustein, p. 142.  
7 D. Dionisi, American Hiroshima: The Reasons Why and a Call to Strengthen America’s 
Democracy (Victoria, 2006), p. 59. 
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the ‘protocols’ justified anti-Semitism, persecution and even murder. Rumours 
of Jewish responsibility for the outbreak of the plague explained the disease in a 
manner contemporaries could understand, as well as drawing on the prevailing 
stereotypes of the time. These myths and rumours were latent exhibitions of 
hidden emotions and attempts to understand potentially threatening situations. 
At the same time the myth about weapons of mass destruction provided 
justification for an invasion that was arguably being fought for reasons that 
neither the American public nor the international community would have found 
acceptable.  
 This study will demonstrate how myths and rumours were used to 
construct political and social discourses on the British home front during the 
First World War. These discourses reflected the fact that British society in this 
period was a dyslexic mix of tradition and modernity as industrialised societies 
transitioned into the era of Total War. Traditional ideas of ‘gentlemanly 
conduct’ and the ‘laws of war’ were abandoned as modern methods and tactics 
shattered conventional perceptions of conflict. In the domestic sphere the 
evolution heralded by the First World War invariably dragged civilians into the 
battle. On the one hand their participation and support was vital to national 
success, whether by voluntary enlistment or buying war bonds; on the other, 
civilians found themselves systematically targeted by the enemy.  
As governments recognised the importance of the home front, morale 
became an essential commodity. Popular support was not inexhaustible and had 
to be cultivated to ensure the collaboration between state and the masses could 
be sustained for the duration of the conflict. The most effective method of 
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mobilising popular sentiment was through propaganda to convince people on 
the domestic front of the importance of the cause for which they were fighting. 
Historians, though, have largely conceded that British propaganda on the home 
front in the First World War was piecemeal and disorganised and Gerard 
DeGroot has concluded that propaganda efforts of the government had no 
discernible impact.8 The fortitude and stoicism displayed by the population is 
better explained by their ‘steadfast patriotism’ and an ‘unquenchable faith in 
eventual victory’ than by a ‘propaganda effort so chaotic [it] could not have 
contributed to mass mind control’.9 It will be the contention of this thesis that 
myth and rumour, seldom sponsored by the government, played a vital role in 
maintaining this will. It acted as a form of mass propaganda by creating 
discourses that demonised the Germans, marginalised dissenters and took for 
granted the virtues of the British and the justice of their cause. 
Some myths and rumours were omnipresent for much of the war, while 
others circulated for only a few weeks or months. Because of this, it is 
necessary to restrict this thesis to the study of a selection of these myths. A 
complete assessment would prove too extensive and would not allow for 
detailed examination. This study will focus on three of the most prevalent types 
of myth and rumour: atrocity rumours linked to the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’; 
myths and rumours about enemy agents and spies; and finally, myths about the 
supernatural.  
                                                  
8 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British society in the era of the First World War (London, 1996), pp. 
195-6; J. M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War (London, 1989), p. 202; G. S. Messinger, 
British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (Manchester, 1992); C. Haste, Keep 
the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War (London, 1977). 
9 DeGroot, pp. 195-6. 
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In order to investigate these myths and rumours thoroughly, I will focus 
on three things. First, I will examine the origins of the myths and rumours, and 
the methods of their dissemination. This is important as it will show how these 
rumours were introduced into popular discourse, and also indicate whether their 
origin and dissemination was popularly driven and whether they were given 
official sanction.  
Secondly, I will assess how the rumours were received at both the 
popular and official levels. Only rumours which had a useful explanatory 
function or were meaningful would have gained importance in the domestic 
discourse, because ‘no other discourse [than rumour] better reflects […] 
contemporary issues and attitudes’.10 My conclusions here will be tentative, 
because the evidence is fragmentary. 
Finally, I will examine the function of the myths and rumours, and look 
at why they spread as they did. Examining the meaning – both implicit and 
explicit – will shed light on popular responses to a war that has been portrayed 
in the primary and secondary literature as an event that prompted an outburst of 
jingoistic celebration.11  
The secondary literature addressing the home front in the First World 
War has dealt haphazardly with myth and rumour. Historiography has tended to 
address these phenomena in broader discussions of non-governmental 
propaganda conducted by patriotic organisations – such as the strangulation of 
                                                  
10 G. A. Fine and P. A. Turner, Whispers on the Color Line (Berkeley, 2001), p. 6. 
11 Haste, p. 20; for a discussion of popular reactions to the declaration of war in Europe see 
Niall Ferguson’s chapter on the ‘The August Days: The Myth of War Enthusiasm’, The pity of 
war 1914-1918 (London, 1999), pp. 174-186. 
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the press by the censor – and the increasing reliance on rumour and gossip for 
newspaper copy.12 Others have described rumour as little more than ‘counter-
productive’, or as being ‘at all times a social and psychological problem of 
major proportions […] especially so in times of crisis [… when it] saps morale 
and menace[s] national safety’.13 Still more have talked of the ‘folk myths’ that 
‘indicated the irrationality that permeated’ wartime Britain.14 Contemporary 
and post-war descriptions of rumour in World War I were equally as negative. 
Michael MacDonagh referred to ‘[t]hat jade Rumour’, while Philip Gibbs wrote 
of the ‘wild perversions of truth’, and Arthur Ponsonby, spoke of the ‘hysterical 
hallucination on the part of weak-minded individuals’, and ‘the lie heard and 
not denied, although lacking in evidence and then repeated and allowed to 
circulate’.15 
Scholarly investigations of myths and rumours have tended to be narrow 
in their focus. Several historians have studied atrocity stories from different 
perspectives. Some, such as Read, have concentrated on their use as a tool of 
official propaganda. Others have detailed the reality of atrocity stories and the 
differing Allied and German perspectives on wartime atrocities. While these 
studies have discussed some of the myths surrounding atrocities, their analysis 
excludes the other genres of myth and rumour. These studies have also 
                                                  
12 Haste, pp. 30-1. 
13 P. M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the 20th Century (Edinburgh, 1999), p. 154; Allport and 
Postman, p. vii. 
14 P. Gibbs, Adventures in Journalism (London, 1924), p. 217; T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of 
War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 740-1. 
15 M. MacDonagh, In London during the Great War: The Diary of a Journalist (London, 1935), 
p. 15; P. Gibbs, Adventures in Journalism, p. 217; A. Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime, p. 20. 
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neglected to place atrocity stories within a wider, popular discourse on the 
war.16 
Studies on spy rumours have been sparse. Historians who have touched 
on spies tend to discuss them within two contexts: pre-war spy novels and 
literary contributions to the spy mania of the pre-war decades and the First 
World War; or official responses to the threat of espionage. The predominant 
theme seems to be demonstrating the irrationality of these rumours, rather than 
an investigation of their role in a popular discourse about the war.17  
The treatment of the supernatural has also been negligible, although 
there has been one in depth study by David Clarke. He has studied the angel of 
Mons myth in detail, and its use in justifying and explaining the war, but seems 
                                                  
16 Studies that emphasise the propaganda use of atrocity stories are: J. M. Read, Atrocity 
Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven, 1941); T. Wilson, ‘Lord Bryce’s Investigation into 
Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-15’, Journal of Contemporary History, 14:3 
(1979), pp. 369-83; N. Gullace, ‘Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and 
International Law during the First World War’, The American Historical Review, 102: 3 (1997), 
pp. 714-747; S. de Schaepdrijver, ‘Occupation, propaganda and the idea of Belgium’, in 
European Culture in the Great War: The arts, entertainment and propaganda, 1914-1918, 
(eds.) A. Roshwald and R. Stites (Cambridge, 1999). For investigations on the reality of 
atrocities, and the differing perspectives regarding atrocity stories see: J. Horne and A. Kramer, 
German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial (London, 2001); J. Horne and A. Kramer, 
‘German “Atrocities” and Franco-German Opinion, 1914: The Evidence of German Soldiers’ 
Diaries’, The Journal of Modern History, 66: 1 (1994), pp. 1-33; J. Horne and A. Kramer, ‘War 
Between Soldiers and Enemy Civilians, 1914-1915’, in Great War, Total War: Combat and  
Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, (eds.) R. Chickering and S. Förster (Cambridge, 
2001). 
17 For discussions of the literary contributions to the spy mania see: N. Hiley, ‘Introduction’, in 
Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England, W. Le Queux (London, 1996), pp. vii –
xxxii; D. Stafford, ‘ Spies and Gentlemen: The Birth of the British Spy Novel, 1893-1914’, 
Victorian Studies 24:4 (1981), pp. 489-509; J. Symons, ‘Introduction’, in Riddle of the Sands, 
E. Childers (London, 1984), pp. ; T. Boghardt, Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations 
in Great Britain during the First World War Era (Houndsmills, 2004); Haste, pp. 7-10. For 
discussions of the official reactions to the spy menace before and during World War One see: 
DeGroot, pp. 157-60; Haste, pp. 108-38; D. French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’, The 
Historical Journal, 21:2 (1978), pp. 355-70; N. Hiley, ‘The Failure of British Counter-
Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914’, The Historical Journal, 28:4 (1985), pp. 835-62; N. 
Hiley, ‘Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War’, The 
English Historical Review, 101:400 (1986), pp. 635-70. 
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to mention other rumours only as they provide context to his main study.18 
Similarly, James Hayward’s Myths and Legends of the First World War offers a 
detailed insight into the variety of rumours, but fails to assess their significance 
in any great detail or place them within the broader context of reactions to the 
war.19 Paul Fussel acknowledged that the Great War was ‘especially fertile in 
rumor’, but focuses on the post-war remembrance of the war and the ‘general 
human impulse to make fictions’.20 Other historians have mentioned the 
rumours in passing, seeing them as little more than reactions to the conditions 
created by the war.21 
This study is based on primary sources, as far as possible. For the most 
part it has relied on newspapers, diaries, memoirs, letters and popular 
publications to gauge both popular and individual reactions to the myths and 
rumours of the time. The accusation levelled at the papers by contemporaries in 
the post-war years – that they were relying on rumour, hearsay and gossip – 
recommends them perfectly to this study.22 Three newspapers have been used 
consistently: The Times, Daily Express and News of the World. Other papers, 
including the Manchester Guardian, The Observer and the New York Times 
have been consulted when necessary. The relationship between the papers was 
somewhat incestuous, and they often published similar news items. 
                                                  
18 D. Clarke, The angel of Mons: Phantom soldiers and ghostly guardians (West Sussex, 2004); 
D. Clarke, ‘Rumours of Angels: A Legend of the First World War’, Folklore, 113:2 (2002), pp. 
151-73; D. Clarke, ‘Rumours of Angels: A Response to Simpson’, Folklore, 115 (2004), pp. 
99-104. 
19 J. Hayward, Myths and Legends of the First World War (Thrupp, 2005). 
20 P. Fussel, The Great War and modern memory (New York, 2000), p. 115.  
21 P. Haythornthwaite, The World War One Sourcebook (London, 1992), pp. 372-76; P. Liddle, 
Voices of war, front line and home front 1914-1918 (London, 1988), pp. 63-7; J. Terraine, The 
smoke and the fire: Myths and anti-myths of the war 1861-1945 (London, 1980), pp. 19-30. 
22 Gibbs, Adventures in Journalism, p. 217. 
  
14 
Studies on other countries have shown that press representations were 
not necessarily reflective of the popular mood, but sometimes represented the 
class-based interests of their proprietors and editors.23 However, newspapers are 
vital to this study. They were arguably the most important source of 
information that people on the home front had about the war. While opinions 
expressed about some issues may not have reflected the popular mood 
accurately, the most important factor here is the information that the papers 
were providing the population in regards to key myths and rumours. Because 
the newspapers contributed so much to the dissemination of myth and rumour, 
it seems unlikely that they vastly misrepresented the character of the reports 
that were in circulation.  
This dissertation will be structured around the three main categories of 
rumour identified during the course of research. It will dissect each category to 
establish the origins of the myths and rumours, their means of dissemination, 
and their reception by the British population. The first chapter will deal in detail 
with atrocity rumours and the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’. It will demonstrate 
that these rumours were a mixture of both fact and fiction and that they 
provided a vital medium through which the British public defined its 
involvement. The second chapter will examine the myths surrounding enemy 
                                                  
23 G. A. Parsons, ‘The Christchurch Community at War 1914-1918: Society, Discourse and 
Power’ (M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2003). Although this thesis focuses exclusively 
on the discourse of a single New Zealand city during World War One, her argument that 
newspapers represented class based discourse – primarily that of the ruling elite – applies to 
Britain. One example of this is the relationship between press barons such as the Lords 
Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, who also possessed substantial political clout. This view is 
supported by Alice Goldfarb Marquis, who outlines the intertwined relationship of government 
and press lords. See ‘Words as weapons: propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First 
World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13:3 (1978), pp. 467-498. 
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aliens and the ubiquitous German spy. It demonstrates that this rumour category 
reflected widespread anxieties linked to the advent of Total War, and that it also 
reflected some of the political and social tensions of British society. The final 
chapter will examine reports of a supernatural or paranormal character, 
revealing how they were not only reactions to the staggering losses suffered by 
Britain, but a way to prove that the British cause was ‘just’. All three chapters 
will reveal how, through myths and rumours, the British public attempted to 
make sense of a war that transcended previous experience, creating a discourse 
that not only explained their involvement but justified their sacrifices.  
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Chapter 2. Atrocity stories and the 
myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ 
 
 
‘The conquering hero […] is a throw-back to an ancestral type far more remote 
than Attila, who was a comparatively polished person. He is the […] Urmensch, 
a veritable monster, gross, bloated, abominable, compact of evil’.24 
                                                  
24 Arthur Shadwell’s commentary on Louis Raemaeckers’ cartoon, ‘See the Conquering Hero 
Comes’, in Kultur in Cartoons (New York, 1917), pp. 160-1. 
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Atrocity stories were not an innovation of the First World War. Tales 
establishing the bestiality of the enemy were an old genre, long established in 
the annals of conflict. Atrocities invariably drew on both real and fabricated 
events which were decried as proof of the iniquity of the enemy. The First 
Crusade of 1098 was accompanied by pogroms against Jews and accounts of 
the atrocities committed by the Muslim ‘infidel’. Horrific reports were also 
inspired by the Mongol hordes of Batu who collected sacks of the ears of their 
enemies, and by Vlad Tepes, who was known for impaling his enemies on 
pikes. The Napoleonic and Franco-Prussian wars were also renowned for 
brutality, including sometimes well-founded accusations of castration and 
mutilation.25 During the Irish Rebellion of 1641 there were rumours of 
cannibalism levelled against Catholics, one woman reportedly ‘grow[ing] fat 
from the eating of many Protestants’.26 
The viciousness of war and the terrorisation of civilians were by no 
means unique to the experience of 1914-1918. What differentiated the Great 
War from its predecessors was not the incidence of atrocities, but a greater 
awareness of the suffering that modernised war could inflict. Viewed in the 
context of the history of war, the experiences of the civilians of Belgium and 
                                                  
25 R. Kastenbaum, On Our Way: The Final Passage Through Life and Death (Berkeley, 2004), 
pp. 195-6; T. Asbridge, The First Crusade, A New History: The Roots of Conflict between 
Christianity and Islam (New York, 2004), pp. 33; 84; D. Dutton, The Psychology of Genocide, 
Massacres, and Extreme Violence: why “normal” people commit atrocities (Westport, 2007), 
pp. 1-13; for a detailed account of the atrocities committed during the Peninsula Wars see G. 
Fremont-Barnes The Napoleonic Wars: The Peninsula War 1807-1814 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 56-
8.  
26 J. M. Read, ‘Atrocity Propaganda and the Irish Rebellion’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 2:2 
(1938), pp. 232-3.  
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France were not exceptional or unprecedented. An increasing humanitarian 
consciousness simply made the brutality of warfare more apparent. 
While atrocity stories were present throughout the history of conflict, 
they were particularly important in World War I. The atrocity stories – 
stemming from actions taken by the German army during the assault on 
Belgium and Northern France – that emerged over the course of the Great War 
became the foundation for arguably one of the most popular tropes of myth and 
rumour. It was the basis of much official and unofficial propaganda produced 
during the war and was used to motivate involvement in – and the ruthless 
prosecution of – the war.  
Many of the atrocity stories that were recounted were entirely mythical, 
evinced by their parallels with stories from earlier conflicts. Others were based 
on the true events of the invasion of Belgium and Northern France – such as 
Louvain and Dinant – which were then blown out of all proportion or 
selectively recounted. But all stories, irrespective of whether they were partially 
true or entirely fabricated, served to construct the collective and omnipotent 
myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’.  
This myth proved very useful to proponents of the British cause as it 
was evident in much of the jingoistic rhetoric used to describe and justify the 
war. For the government the ‘Bestial Hun’ was used primarily for soliciting 
domestic and foreign support through propaganda. For civilians the quickly 
adopted stereotype was of social and psychological significance: not only as 
one of the primary motifs seized on to explain Britain’s involvement in war, but 
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as a means of reconciling the newfound, xenophobic anti-German stance, with 
the traditionally cordial relationship between the two Anglo-Saxon countries.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ 
in detail and to establish the origins of the rumours, their dissemination, 
reception and, most importantly, the political and social functions. The structure 
of this chapter is to look first at the reality of atrocities in the First World War; 
this will be restricted to the atrocities committed by the German army in 
Western Europe, as it was these stories which were most extensively 
promulgated. From this, the myths and rumours of atrocities will be examined, 
their dissemination, reception and the function investigated. 
 
The German invasion of Belgium and Northern France 
On 4 August 1914 the German army violated the neutrality of Belgium in direct 
contravention of the Treaty of London and commenced their drive towards 
Paris. There were three aggregate causes that from the beginning suggested the 
invasion was likely to lead to atrocities: the diktat of the Schlieffen Plan, fear of 
the franc-tireur, and the adoption of the Schreklichkeit (‘frightfulness’) policy. 
The combination of these three factors predisposed the German army towards 
panic and revived phantasms that in reality had little role in the war.  
 The course of the war for Germany was theoretically dictated by the 
Schlieffen Plan. The underlying aim was to prevent the calamitous possibility 
of a two front war with France in the West and Russia in the East. Schlieffen 
allowed the German army only six weeks to defeat France – during which time 
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Russia laboriously mobilised its armies – before turning its attention eastward. 
To do this, the German army had to outflank French fortifications by passing 
through Belgium.27 Any disruption to the progress of the army made the spectre 
of a two front war more imminent.28 
 However, expectations about the course of the invasion, and the reality, 
proved to be diametrically opposed. From the beginning the German army 
began to fall behind schedule, it leaders underestimating the resistance that 
would be offered and encountering huge logistical and tactical problems that set 
them at a severe disadvantage. While the Germans trekked on foot, the Belgian 
and French armies were able to move men and resources quickly along their 
extensive rail systems. Without motorised transport or rail, the German army 
overstretched its supply lines. Its slow advance allowed time for defenders to 
destroy bridges, only threatening the timetable further.29  
 Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan also had meagre provisions to cope with 
the impact of substantial advances in weaponry. The magazine rifle and 
machine gun gave defenders a distinct advantage, something that was 
demonstrated very early in the war by the outnumbered British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) at Mons, and the German attempts to take the Belgian forts.  
The concerted resistance by the Belgian and French forces caused 
further pains for the invaders. The Schlieffen Plan provided no advice on how 
to cope with the rear-guard actions and retreats which hampered the German 
                                                  
27 M. S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History (Harvard, 2005), p. 12.  
28 Wilson, The Myriad Faces, p. 39. 
29 S. Tucker, The Great War, 1914-1918 (Bloomington, 1998), p. 22; Wilson, The Myriad 
Faces, p. 39. 
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advance and frustrated soldiers responsible for overrunning strategic points.30 
The Belgians’ tactics were especially frustrating, as rather than face the 
Germans in concentrated battles, they used small contingents which were easily 
concealed, and could escape quickly.31 
The fort of Liège exemplified this lacklustre foresight. To take it, the 
Germans needed more time and more men than had been anticipation in pre-
war preparations. These plans had reckoned on the fort having a defensive 
strength of approximately 10,000 men. However, the garrison was bolstered, 
and in actuality the Germans faced a force of about 32,000 men. The German 
attackers had to be reinforced, swelling their numbers from 39,000 to 99,000 
and effectively weakening their forces elsewhere. The one division designated 
by Schlieffen had proved totally inadequate.32  
 The pressure of adhering to an impossible timetable – with the many 
setbacks which could so easily disrupt it – affected German treatment of 
civilians and enemy troops. German units had to place the timetable above all 
other considerations and this left no room for the soldiers to respect the niceties 
of war. There were multiple cases of civilians being used as leverage to induce 
compliance or to stymie resistance – often as human shields marched in front of 
German units, or as hostages to ensure good behaviour. At Liège, several 
influential citizens were taken hostage and threatened with death if the German 
                                                  
30 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities 1914, p. 117. 
31 F. van Langenhove, The Growth of a Legend: A Study Based on upon the German Accounts 
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troops, charged with taking nearby forts, came under attack.33 The anxiety was 
also apparent in proclamations issued throughout Belgian towns. One notice, 
issued at Hasselt on 17 August 1914 by the Burgomaster, warned the villagers 
in no uncertain terms: ‘to abstain from […] all acts of hostility which might 
bring terrible reprisals [… above] all [villagers] must abstain from acts of 
violence […] In case the inhabitants fire upon the soldiers of the German Army 
a third of the male population will be shot’.34 Another proclamation, issued by 
the Germans at Namur, warned of the retaliation citizens could expect in the 
event of resistance: ‘German guards […] will seize 10 [sic] hostages in each 
street which is under their charge. If any hostile action is attempted in the street 
the 10 hostages will be shot’.35 This punitive attitude was applied equally to 
enemy combatants. In 1915, a staff order dating from 1914 was revealed, 
allegedly instructing German soldiers to take no prisoners: ‘[from] today no 
more prisoners will be made. All prisoners will be put to death. The wounded, 
with or without arms, will be put to death. Prisoners, even if taken in large 
numbers, will be put to death. No living man must be left behind us.’36  
 Taken on its own, the Schlieffen Plan, although problematic, did not 
mean atrocities were to be expected. A second – and powerful – reason for the 
predisposition towards atrocities was fear of franc-tireurs. Franc-tireurs were 
dangerous because they were anonymous; operating in small bands and civilian 
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attire, partisans could disappear easily among villagers after attacks and it could 
be difficult to distinguish the culprits from innocent civilians.37 Their objectives 
were to harass the enemy, destroying communication lines, food supplies, 
roads, rails and bridges, and they also inflicted casualties. 
 By 1914, franc-tireurs had a long history in warfare. Two of the more 
notable examples were the Peninsula and Boer wars. The Peninsula wars in 
particular were exceptionally brutal. The partisan warfare was continuously 
punctuated with atrocities on both sides which merely fuelled mutual 
recrimination. The activities of the guerrillas, though, were ultimately 
successful. Indeed, R. Ernst Dupuy has argued that the efforts of the partisans 
ensured Napoleon’s forces only ever controlled the land they were encamped 
on.38  
 The example of which the German army of 1914 was most aware, 
however, was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, during which franc-tireurs had 
been a major problem. The casualties they claimed had been negligible, 
accounting for only 1,000 German fatalities. The primary achievement of the 
40,000 or so French partisans had been tying down a significant number of 
troops – 150,000 of the 450,000 German infantry – to protect the 250 miles of 
vital supply lines to Paris.39 The German retaliation had been ferocious:  
 
Bismarck [… exhorted] the army to hang or shoot all 
suspected franc-tireurs and burn the villages that sheltered 
                                                  
37 R. Dupuy, ‘The nature of guerilla war’, Pacific Affairs, 12:2 (1939), p. 144. 
38 Ibid., p. 143. 
39 Ibid., p. 143; Terraine, p. 23. 
  
24 
them. Varice, Ourcelle and Ablis, near Orléans, were 
burned to the ground in November after villagers cut 
German telegraph wires or aided franc-tireur ambushes 
[…] Bismarck never went so far as his wife – “shoot and 
stab all the French down to the little babies” – [but] he 
insisted that there be no “laziness in killing” so long as 
France continued its futile resistance. If a French village 
refused German exactions, Bismarck wanted every male 
inhabitant hanged. If French boys spat at German troops 
from bridges or windows, Bismarck wanted the troops to 
shoot them dead. When French women and children picked 
through the trash or scavenged for potatoes on the fringes 
of Paris, Bismarck wanted the German gunners to fire into 
them. When 400 crudely uniformed franc-tireurs overran a 
Prussian outpost near Toul in January, the Prussian 57th 
Regiment furiously counter-attacked and burnt the nearest 
village, Fontenoy-sur-Moselle. Finding few “citizen 
soldiers” there, they went on a killing spree, spearing the 
inhabitants with their bayonets and heaving them into the 
flames.40 
 
 During the invasion of 1914 the German army and leadership seemed 
genuinely, if incorrectly, to believe that franc-tireurs would again be a major 
obstacle.41 Given the historic success of such groups, the damage that civilian 
opposition potentially could inflict on the German timetable was significant, 
and worthy of concern. There is little question, however, that the German 
soldiers and civilians were indoctrinated with an irrational fear of the franc-
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tireurs. The army was warned about treacherous civilians while it was still 
amassing in Germany and was told that the civilian population was being 
impelled to violence by the Belgian government and the clergy.42 In the very 
early days of the war German newspapers already were reporting atrocities 
allegedly committed by civilians. Sentries were reputedly discovered with their 
eyes gouged out and tongues cut off. Troop supplies were endangered by 
poisoned well water and nuns were rumoured to be poisoning the food of 
German invalids. Belgian women and girls were castrating wounded men, while 
priests fired on soldiers from behind their altars. One German soldier averred 
that several young girls were discovered cutting off ‘the ear lobes and upper 
parts of the ears of the most seriously injured’.43 A boy was purportedly caught 
gouging out the eyes of a wounded soldier, and in Aix-la-Chapelle there was 
said to be an entire room filled with men – blinded – with their eyes torn out. 
Reports from the Eastern Front alleged that German children in East Prussia 
were being crucified before their mothers, who were themselves mutilated and 
murdered. These allegations against the Russians, however, were said to be 
surpassed in brutality by the actions of the Belgians. The rumoured atrocities 
were casting ‘the deeds of 1870 into the shade’.44 The summation of the 
indictment of Belgian crimes in the German White Book alleged that in 
Belgium there were many occasions on which ‘the eyes of German wounded 
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were torn out, their ears, nose, fingers and sexual organs cut off, or their body 
cut open’.45 
 What matters is not whether the stories were true or not, but the fact that 
the German soldiers believed them to be true. This belief pervaded the German 
army from its lowest ranks, right up to its nominal commander-in-chief, the 
Kaiser, who remarked that ‘the population of Belgium […] behaved in a 
diabolical, not to say bestial, manner [… they] tormented the wounded, beat 
them to death, killed doctors and medical orderlies, fired secretly […] on men 
harmlessly standing in the street – in fact by prearranged signal, under 
leadership’.46 General Ludendorff also abhorred the franc-tireurs arguing 
‘[such] action was not in keeping with the usages of war; our troops cannot be 
blamed if they took the sternest measures to suppress it’.47 
The apprehension among regular soldiers dealing with the civilians was 
palpable. Many German sources – such as diaries and letters – authored during 
the war exposed the obvious and pervasive fear of civilian resistance. A 
German officer holding Belgian hostages informed his prisoners that they 
would be shot in retribution for crimes committed by fellow civilians in 
Andenne, who ‘tried to poison our soldiers’. There were also allegations that 
the townspeople were guilty of ‘cut[ting] off our soldiers’ noses, ears, eyes and 
fingers’.48 The village of Francorchamps was attacked by German soldiers on 8 
August on the supposition the locals had opened fire from a nearby railway 
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embankment. This incident culminated in fifteen people being killed and the 
buildings burned. At Louveigné on 7 August, seventeen hostages were shot, 
purportedly for cutting the ears off a German major.49 A soldier’s diary exposed 
other rumoured cruelties carried out by Belgians. The man had heard that at 
Liège a surgeon general, invited to tea by the Oberbürgermeister, had had his 
throat slit when he sat down to dinner. He had also heard that in a hospital 
treating Germans, a Red Cross attendant found the wounded combatants with 
their eyes ‘put out’, and that one aide was found in the possession of several 
fingers he had cut off an officer to rob him of his rings.50 There were also 
reports that German Red Cross nurses were being mutilated by franc-tireurs – 
one had her breasts cut off, the other her hand.51 
 Further evidence that the German troops were suspicious of Belgian 
civilians is demonstrated in the memoirs of Walter Bloem, a German officer 
who participated in the preliminary invasion. Bloem was adamant that there 
were no unprovoked atrocities committed by German forces, an assertion 
repeated by other primary evidence.52 In his eyes, taking hostages was a 
cautionary measure designed to ensure good behaviour of local villagers and 
discourage franc-tireur attacks. He excused the execution of civilians by saying 
that only franc-tireurs were punished in this way. He wrote that marches that 
pushed the troops to the brink of exhaustion were driven by ‘the thought of the 
repeated tortures awaiting them at the hands of marauding bands of armed 
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civilians’, and that ‘falling into the hands of the Walloons was worse than sore 
feet’.53 
 The third factor contributing to German atrocities was the policy of 
Schreklichkeit or, as it was known among the Allies, ‘frightfulness’. Even 
before the German invasion, the High Command was expecting opposition 
from franc-tireurs and instructed troops to have no mercy in dealing with them. 
The German war book prescribed that ‘certain severities are indispensable to 
war’, while von Hartmann, a General and member of the German General Staff, 
believed that ‘war in the present day will have to be conducted more recklessly, 
less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past’.54  
Reports of franc-tireur activity, however inaccurate, made the Germans 
even more determined to stamp out the problem with the utmost ferocity. 
Urgency prescribed that the German army would have to be prepared to go to 
any lengths to ensure a quick victory in France; consequently the High 
Command was willing to endorse methods of warfare that were hitherto 
unimaginable in a war between civilised nations.  
In response to the threat of civilian resistance, and because of the 
necessity of a lightening war, an official policy of ‘frightfulness’ was adopted. 
Theoretically it dictated making severe examples of a few to prevent the 
majority from resisting. After war broke out the Kaiser allegedly wrote to the 
Emperor Franz-Josef explicitly outlining the adoption of the use of terror to 
subjugate the population: ‘My soul is torn asunder, but everything must be put 
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to fire and blood.  The throats of men and women, children and the aged must 
be cut and not a tree nor a house left standing’. The aim of this policy was 
explicitly announced: ‘[with] such methods of terror […] the war will finish 
before two months, while if I use humanitarian methods it may be prolonged 
for years’.55 This letter does need to be treated with caution as it was published 
by the French government in 1919, but the adoption of a policy of frightfulness 
was acknowledged by Germany in August 1914 when it broadcast its intentions 
over the wireless. The Daily Express publicised the stratagem on 29 August, 
informing readers that the German army intended to quell civilian resistance 
‘with unrelenting severity and to create examples which by their frightfulness 
would be a warning to the whole country’.56  
 
Real-life atrocities and the British press 
The fundamental reality of the German invasion of Belgium and Northern 
France was that atrocities did in fact take place, and were widely reported in the 
British press. Estimates of the casualties suggest that 5,500 Belgian civilians 
and 900 French civilians were killed, while 15,000 to 20,000 buildings were 
destroyed.57 Two particularly infamous atrocities were the razing of Dinant and 
Louvain. 
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Dinant was the scene of a fierce battle between French and German 
forces. The Germans took the town from the French forces only with difficulty. 
Assuming that local civilians had been involved in the resistance, the Germans 
fell on Dinant and conducted ‘a systematic, premeditated elimination of 
presumed civilian resistance’.58 
In response to this presumed participation, the German forces killed 
civilians and destroyed much of the town. Six hundred and seventy-four people 
were shot, in both scattered hunts and systematic executions, while another 400 
people were deported into Germany. Many civilians sought refuge in the wool 
factory and when they surrendered themselves in the late afternoon the women 
and children were sent to the abbey while the manager and thirty-one men were 
summarily executed. At Tschoffen wall, 137 people were lined up and shot in a 
single incident.  They were killed, not necessarily for their individual 
complicity, but under the assumption that as civilians were collectively 
responsible for any franc-tireur activity. The town was systematically pillaged 
and its public and historical buildings burned while its population was 
sacrificed as an example. Hundreds were deported and the city was left in 
ruins.59 The German troops arriving in Dinant had been primed to expect franc-
tireur resistance and they acted as though they had found it. 
It was a similar story at Louvain. The Germans entered the city on 19 
August and were met with a nervous, but peaceful population. Rumours of 
atrocities had reached the town’s citizens from refugees, and the city had been 
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warned in no uncertain terms by its own civic leaders to refrain from any 
violence against German troops. Alongside these existing warnings, the 
Germans posted further admonitions that any hostile action taken by civilians 
would be met with callous penalties. To further reinforce their point, and to 
ensure the good behaviour of the population, many leading townspeople were 
taken as hostages to be shot in the event of any hostilities.60  
Six days after the arrival of the Germans, chaos erupted. Historians have 
agreed, as did contemporaries, that the likely catalyst for the event was a case of 
accidental ‘friendly fire’. After shooting their comrades, and in a desperate 
attempt to cover this blunder, the Germans probably intentionally blamed the 
townspeople for inciting the shooting.61 Whether or not this was true, the costs 
of the subsequent rampage through Louvain were enormous. Two hundred and 
forty-eight civilians were killed, 10,000 were expelled under threat of 
bombardment, and 1,500 were deported into Germany. 62 One-sixth of the 
historic municipality had been reduced to ashes or rubble. 63 
That the Germans were cruel and intemperate in their treatment of 
Louvain’s population is unquestionable. Men and women were dragged from 
their homes and shot in the street, or were forced to perish in their burning 
homes. Exhumations that were carried out a year after the destruction indicated 
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that some of the civilians had been tortured.64  It is probable that many of the 
German troops involved were sincere in their belief that had been under attack. 
However, there was no attempt to establish the guilt of the people executed, and 
random victims unfortunate enough to fall into German hands were often shot.65 
Louvain and Dinant were particularly infamous because of the number 
of civilian casualties, but there were many other documented examples of real 
atrocities. The town of Barchon was razed after the surrender of a nearby fort, 
with 110 of 146 houses destroyed and twenty-two inhabitants executed.66 In 
Battice, thirty-six villagers were killed and 146 houses burned. Over a ten day 
period in Herve forty-four people were shot, while in Tintigny forty hostages 
were executed and many others perished in the wild shooting, or were trapped 
in their burning homes. The men of Tintigny were then marched ahead of the 
German troops as a shield against French artillery and the town was largely 
destroyed.67 Nine civilians were killed at Micheroux and forty-one in Retinnes. 
At Aerschot 156 civilians were slaughtered and eighty-six houses destroyed. 
The Germans took 412 men of Fécher as hostages, forcing them to shield the 
Germans advance between Belgian forts. In Namur thirty civilians were killed 
and 400 taken hostage.68 At Les Rivages seventy-seven were killed, half of this 
number was women and children, including seven infants.69 
Atrocities were not confined to civilians. There were also recorded 
incidents of Allied prisoners of war and wounded being killed. At Aerschot 
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twenty Belgian soldiers were executed and thrown into the river Demer.70 In 
Herstal, Belgian prisoners of war were shot alongside civilians in retribution for 
a costly Belgian counter-attack.71 One hundred and fifty wounded French 
soldiers were massacred at Gomery after the Germans alleged they were fired 
on from the Red Cross station; several prisoners of war had also been executed 
as they were marched to Gomery as a human shield.72 
It took a while before most of these atrocities were reported in the 
British press. The initial weeks of the war were demonstrably void of reports of 
atrocities, which can be explained by the lack of information coming from the 
front and the fact that early reports of atrocities were met with some incredulity. 
On 14 August 1914 the Daily Express wrote that it was ‘still reluctant to believe 
the worst of German methods of waging war’, although it had printed reports of 
the burning of Visé, the stripping of the invaded territories of food supplies, 
some isolated shootings of civilians charged with espionage, and the taking of 
hostages at Liège.73 
The turning point in the reporting on atrocities was the destruction of 
Louvain, which entered the headlines on 29 August: ‘Town Reduced to Ashes – 
Louvain Destroyed by the Germans’.74 The news of the fate of Louvain 
coincided closely with the publicising of the German policy of ‘frightfulness’, 
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published in the press only one day before.75 It is a reasonably safe assertion 
that news of the policy of ‘frightfulness’, followed so closely by the destruction 
at Louvain, served to demolish any doubts the British press had regarding the 
atrocities. It is possible to see from this time a burgeoning in atrocity reports 
being published in the newspapers, and by September, the Daily Express was 
carrying accounts of atrocities in every issue.  
It is fair to say that the reporting of atrocities was at first fairly accurate. 
In the report on Louvain, for example, the only substantial inaccuracy was the 
claim the entire city had been destroyed, and this was apparently the result of 
misinformation supplied to a representative of the Daily Express by the Belgian 
Commission.  
Not surprisingly, one matter the press did not report on was atrocities 
that were committed against German troops, and indeed Belgian civilians, by 
Allied soldiers. Representations of the merciless murder of any prisoner or 
wounded soldier by Germans were misleading. The simple reality was that this 
type of atrocity was committed by both sides. The instances when prisoners or 
wounded were killed on the Western Front were motivated partly by pragmatic 
reasons, as neither side could afford to guard or feed unnecessary mouths 
without compromising its own supplies and security. 76  
However, the killing of some German prisoners was less pragmatic in 
its motivation. Some British soldiers killed their prisoners after losing friends in 
battle. After the first gas attack there were few prisoners taken as the allied 
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soldiers took their revenge for such a use of weaponry. Likewise, those who 
were considered to be ‘particularly detested opponents’ were often killed out of 
hand; in many cases this meant the snipers and machine gunners. Alan Hanbury 
Sparrow reported that his battalion was given an order to kill these men on the 
assumption that ‘the only way to stop it is to let these fellows realize [sic] it 
means certain death’.77 One soldier reported that a young German who made 
his way to the British lines to surrender was shot.78 There were even 
implications of orders not to take wounded – something that the German army 
was reviled for. Private Arthur Hubbard, fighting on the Somme, shot three 
badly wounded Germans who emerged from their dugout: ‘We had strict orders 
not to take prisoners, no matter if wounded […] My first job was […] to empty 
my magazine on 3 Germans […] They cried for mercy, but I had my orders’.79 
Robert Graves also mentioned the frequent killing of German soldiers for 
pragmatic as well as emotional reasons. The wounded were killed because it 
was easier than trying to get them back behind the lines; others were killed in 
revenge for the alleged atrocities committed by the Germans.80 This was, of 
course, an aspect of the Tommy’s behaviour that was kept from the home front.  
 
The myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ 
Although the press coverage of atrocities was at first fairly accurate, this soon 
changed. Already by September 1914, there was a move towards more lurid 
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tales that had little or no factual grounding. These were more common still 
from 1915 onwards and gradually replaced the reality of the Belgian 
experience. This tendency is particularly evident in the headlines, which used 
evocative and sensational language. The News of the World charged the 
Germans with being ‘savages’, and accused them of committing an ‘Orgy of 
Horrors’.81 Another aspect of the creation of the ‘Bestial Hun’ was the 
increased focus on brutality against individuals rather than the generalised 
reports of mass killings, although these were still publicised.  The charges of 
‘setting houses on fire, resorting to reprisals after the cessation of fighting, and 
shooting on peaceable citizens’, together with the ‘burning of Belgian cities and 
villages […] the massacring of thousands of inhabitants, old and young […] the 
carrying of the survivors into bondage’ was progressively supplanted by ‘the 
outraging of helpless women and girls [and] the unnumbered acts of bestiality 
and torture’.82 In 1914 one story accusing the Germans of intentional mutilation 
carried the description of the body of an elderly woman: ‘throat gashed with 
bayonet; two wounds on right hand, a bullet in right leg, end of nose cut off’.83 
While these injuries were horrific, it is not impossible to believe that they were 
sustained during panicked fighting. Only a few weeks later the public were 
being informed that bakers were pushed into their ovens to burn alive, people 
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tortured, their eyes gouged out, and even a woman shot when she refused to 
consume the blood of her dead husband.84 
The increasing tendency was to characterise the experience in terms of 
mutilated women and dismembered children. Stories of mutilation, rape, torture 
and brutalisation held the public enthralled and redefined the discourse of 
German atrocities. The assertion that ‘the whip is a German national institution’ 
was only compounded by claims that the destruction of towns was only a 
backdrop for the real horrors. The main performance was ‘devoted entirely to 
the torture of old men, of women, and of children’.85 
 
 
[Source: Daily Express, 22 December 1914, p. 5] 
This cartoon illustrates one of the underlying ideas of atrocities against 
women and children. While it does not portray any of the sadistic elements, it 
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shows the commonly held belief that the war the Germans were fighting was 
directed specifically against the vulnerable. 
 
 There were three main subjects of the atrocity rumours, some of them 
false, that circulated in the press and helped to establish the myth of the ‘Bestial 
Hun’: atrocities committed against Belgian and French women and children 
during the course of the invasion; the treatment of prisoners of war and 
wounded soldiers; and atrocities against British civilians.  
 The coverage of stories of the victimisation of Belgian women and 
children stressed their innocence and vulnerability. The reported violation of 
young women and girls portrayed them as ‘tender maidens’ and ‘stainless’, 
made martyrs for their country.86 In many of the rumours, women were subject 
to brutal rapes, often followed by torture, mutilation and death; indeed it was 
alleged that ‘German military usage inevitably orders rape or violation as a 
preliminary’.87 J. H. Morgan’s investigations of the conduct of the German 
army in France led him to conclude that ‘[there] is very strong reason to suspect 
that young girls were carried off to the trenches […] and there abused by hordes 
of savage and licentious men’. The ordeal did not end there. After hearing the 
terrified screams of a young woman for most of the night the British soldiers 
testified to finding her the next morning ‘lying naked on the ground ‘pegged 
out’ in the form of a crucifix’.88 One report alleged that an elderly woman of 
eighty-seven, and an eleven year old girl had fallen victims to the lascivious 
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German soldiers.89 A French officer told Philip Gibbs that if he were to return 
to his home he would find his ‘wife and daughter both expecting babies whose 
fathers are German soldiers’.90 A fourteen year old girl was driven ‘half mad’ 
after being raped by seven German Red Cross men.91 A seventeen year old girl 
was raped by three soldiers who then murdered her.92 One source alleged that 
‘[n]ever within the last four hundreds [sic] years or more have any women ever 
been so brutally abused, so extensively raped by violence, often accompanied 
by murder in a Jack the Ripper fashion’.93 This was an accurate description of 
the content of the rumours, even if the stories themselves were often dubious in 
their reliability. 
 One recurring motif in many stories was the particular focus on women 
having their breasts cut off. A Belgian soldier testified to finding a young 
woman with her left breast cut off and nailed to the floor in the form of a 
crucifix. She had been stabbed several times in the chest.94 Another reportedly 
found the bodies of six women in a German trench; they appeared to have been 
violated. While the soldier could not tell definitively how they had been killed 
he reported that it looked as though their throats had been slit and their breasts 
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cut off.95 Phyllis Campbell reported seeing ‘a naked girl of about twenty-three 
or four [… who] was saturated with blood from her cut-off breasts’.96                  
 The fixation on this particular form of punishment is interesting as it 
obviously evoked sexual-sadistic images. There are some connotations 
associated with the specificity of mutilating the breasts. It could be interpreted 
as an attempt to strike Belgium at the very fount of its progeny, ensuring that its 
women would be unable to nourish and nurture their babies. A similar 
symbolism was conveyed by reports that pregnant women were ‘unfailingly’ 
bayoneted in the womb.97 This could be construed as a radical – though implicit 
– expression of Germany’s well publicised belief that Belgium had no right to 
existence.  
Another explanation is that this imagery was simply used to further the 
denigration of the German soldier into the ‘Bestial Hun’. Murdering innocent 
women was terrible, but it could theoretically be explained as retribution for the 
women’s participation in civilian resistance. However, the portrayal of victims 
being mutilated so horribly ensured that the perpetrators were perceived – not 
as frightened soldiers – but as perverted sexual-sadists who committed acts 
beyond the pale of humanity.  
 Other rumours that were especially popular involved the brutal 
mutilation and killing of children. The cruelty meted out to children could have 
no military justification. This was taken as further evidence of the bestial nature 
of the Hun. What threat could children really pose? To be sure, German 
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allegations of atrocities committed by Belgian civilians included stories 
involving children as young as eight, but no one in Britain believed these to be 
true. Besides, an infant was no threat to a soldier; perhaps the interest lay in the 
fact that it was easy and natural for British readers to attribute a very different 
motive to the Germans who were said to have singled out very young victims: 
infants ‘can be tortured and will tell no tales’.98 Popular rhetoric seized on this 
idea and the press increasingly referred to the Germans as ‘baby-butchers’ and 
‘baby-slayers’.99 
An infant, allegedly only a few days old, was purportedly thrown from a 
window onto the point of a bayonet.100 Another account alleged that a German 
soldier stabbed a toddler standing in the doorway of its house, before hoisting 
the bayonet back onto his shoulder with the baby still impaled on the end.101 In 
another incident, a Belgian soldier reported finding the bodies of a boy and his 
mother. The woman had been ripped open, and her son had been mutilated; his 
nose, lips and both hands had been cut off.102 A Sergeant-Major found a seven 
year old youth nailed against a door, and in the same town saw a German 
soldier thrust his bayonet out of window with an infant impaled on the end.103 
One six year old girl was allegedly butchered alive, the Germans systematically 
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cutting off her foot, hands, forearm and eventually her head, which was stuck 
on the point of a lance.104 J.H. Morgan also alleged that children were also 
subjected to sodomy and rape, saying that it ‘did undoubtedly occur on a very 
large scale’.105  
The particular focus on atrocities against children revolved around the 
idea that German troops systematically cut the limbs off infants and 
adolescents: ‘[their] little hands […] are delightfully easy to cut off’ and ‘[their] 
feet are barely attached to their legs at all’.106 It was widely believed that 
children had their limbs severed and there were many reports – never verified – 
that there were hundreds of child refugees in Britain who had survived this 
dismemberment.107 One refugee reported seeing a German soldier hack off the 
arms of a child as it grasped its mother.108 In September 1914 the Daily Express 
recounted the alleged fate of a three year old boy who had ‘his arms […] cut 
off’ and was then ‘bayoneted to death’ for crying ‘Vive l’Angleterre’ as the 
Germans entered the town.109  
Stories about chopping off the arms of children served the purpose of 
maximising the perversity of the perpetrators. Mutilating children in such a way 
inflicted maximum suffering and left the victims to bleed to death, and the 
German soldiers were said to have taken pleasure in meting out this atrocity. 
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The stories reinforced the assertion that Germans were ‘a race that is something 
apart from Humanity’.110 
One story demonstrates particularly well the methodical, callous and 
brutal treatment that was said to be reserved for defenceless women and 
children: 
 
I saw the Germans seize the baby out of the arms of the 
farmer’s wife. There were three German soldiers, one officer 
and two privates. The two privates held the baby and the 
officer took out his sword and cut the baby’s head off. The 
head fell on the floor and the soldiers kicked the body of the 
child into a corner and the head after it […] After five or six 
minutes the two soldiers seized the woman and put her on the 
ground. She resisted them and they then pulled all her clothes 
off her until she was quite naked. The officer then violated 
her while one soldier held her by the shoulders and the other 
by the arms. After the officer each soldier in turn violated 
her. […] After the woman had been violated by the three the 
officer cut off the woman’s breasts. I then saw him take out 
his revolver and point it at the woman on the ground.111 
 
The focus on women and children is strong evidence that these reports, 
collectively, were a myth that did not represent reality. Most of the victims of 
the well documented atrocities seem to have been men – they were the most 
likely sources of organised resistance to the German invaders. This contention 
is supported by comparing the incidence of German atrocities in Belgium and 
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France. During the initial invasion phase of the war, there were 129 incidents in 
which ten or more civilians were killed. Of these killings, 101 were in Belgium 
and the remaining twenty-eight were in France.112 This can possibly be 
explained by the respective military conscription systems of the two countries. 
Belgium had no universal conscription in place at the outbreak of the war so 
men of military age were still residing in towns and villages rather than fighting 
off the invaders as part of the regular army. These men all represented potential 
franc-tireur resistance. On the other hand, France did have conscription, and 
experienced significantly fewer atrocities.113 This suggests that men were 
perceived as the greatest threat to the German invaders, although their atrocity 
myths did make women and children a secondary concern.  
 However, once the British rumour mills got under way, adult civilian 
males seem to almost disappear as victims. It appears unlikely that this 
represented the actual incidence of atrocities, as adult males of military age 
continued to represent the main threat to the German soldier. The focus on 
women, children and babies in the reports did not reflect the actual pattern of 
atrocities. Instead, these reports were selected, or invented, to propagate the 
myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’.   
The second theme of the atrocity stories was crimes against prisoners of 
war and the wounded. As with the myths and rumours surrounding women and 
children, the vulnerability of these victims was stressed. With the insolence 
shown to people supposed to remain physically untouched by war it could only 
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be expected that the Germans would have no qualms dealing out similar or 
worse treatment to combatants. There were accusations that wounded prisoners 
were being subject to intentional but unnecessary surgeries; one soldier 
reportedly had his leg amputated up to the thigh despite having only a very 
minor wound on his foot. The explanation allegedly was that ‘[he] will be a 
man less against us in the next war’.114 Wounded soldiers found in villages 
were thrown into burning buildings; in another incident they were placed in a 
hayrick and burnt alive.115 One of the more notorious cases was the allegation 
that a Canadian officer was found crucified by the Germans.116 While it began 
with a Canadian, very soon there were reports that several soldiers and officers 
had been executed in such a manner, including Scotsmen and Americans. 
In German prisoner of war camps, inmates were allegedly forced to 
subsist on frogs and clover in lieu of starvation.117 Dogs were deliberately set 
onto prisoners, while others were pinned to the ground and had their eyes 
gouged out and tongues cut off.118 
Rumours circulated in Britain that there would be few wounded or 
prisoners returning home because they were being killed by the Germans, or 
they were taking their own lives to avoid being captured. The rumours even 
went so far as to allege that those who were already prisoner in Germany were 
destined to be butchered.119  
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The veracity of these stories is thrown into some doubt by the reality 
faced by British soldiers in German prisoner of war camps. Demonstrably, the 
Germans did kill many prisoners, mostly soon after taking them. However, 
there is also good evidence that once they reached the prison camps British 
soldiers were not killed, except for a crime like trying to escape, and generally, 
they were well treated. Prisoners were allowed to receive packages from home 
which supplemented the often poor prison fare, which tended to mirror the 
scarce provisions also supplied to the German troops.120 Most of the stories that 
have been mentioned were false, fed by a lack of information, fears for loved 
ones, and the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’. In turn, these stories contributed to the 
myth.  
Much propaganda was made out of the final theme – atrocities against 
British civilians. These reports were true, but presented in distorted terms of 
gratuitous and cruel destruction. Aerial and naval warfare joined the ranks of 
poisonous gas and the ‘flammenwerfer’ (flamethrower), as treacherous and 
brutal methods of warfare engineered by the Germans. It was yet another 
example of technological advancement being bastardised and forced to serve 
the bestial motives of the Hun.  
U-boat forays against shipping were denounced as piracy. The Germans 
were believed to intentionally target trawlers which could not fire back, thereby 
reinforcing the idea of the intentional attack on innocents. When a German 
submarine sunk a liner the News of the World accused the Germans of ‘taking a 
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fiendish delight in murdering defenceless men and women’, calling it ‘[their] 
Crowning Infamy’.121 The most infamous sinking carried out during the U-boat 
war was by far the sinking of the Lusitania. The American (and therefore 
neutral) ship was sunk on 7 May 1915 with the loss of over 1,000 lives.  
The U-boat war was an attempt to blockade Britain, but the U-boat 
crews were accused of being ‘pirates’. However, the attacks on merchant and 
neutral shipping were presented in terms of the loss of human life, rather than 
as a German attempt to disrupt British supplies. The attack on the Hesperian in 
September 1915 was presented as a deliberate attempt to ‘murder over 500 
unarmed, helpless men, women, and children’.122  
       
[Source: Kultur in Cartoons] 
These two cartoons – ‘Submarine Bags’, and ‘The Satyr of the Seas’ – penned 
by Louis Raemaecker, were a vivid expression of popular sentiment about the 
submarine war being carried out by Germany, and the belief that they 
disproportionately targeted women and children.123 
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Later in 1915, when zeppelin raids became commonplace, they were 
presented in terms of a German desire to kill blameless civilians, particularly 
women and children. Michael MacDonagh, a journalist for The Times, summed 
up the popular attitude in his memoirs: ‘He [the captain of the L31 zeppelin 
brought down over England] did not wound a single soldier or knock a slate off 
a barrack […] He had succeeded in killing and maiming hundreds of women 
and children and elderly men, for no other reason than they were British and 
living in London’.124 After the raids over Bury St. Edmonds a local paper 
scathingly remarked that ‘perhaps the raiders mistook the old brick works for a 
cathedral, church, or possibly they thought it was a hospital or babies’ home’.125 
 
[Source: News of the World, 24 January 1915, p.1.] 
The caption reads: ‘Zeppelin airships this week bombarded peaceful and 
unfortified towns on the East Coast and killed four persons and injured a baby 
girl’. Death rained on the undefended home; men being demonstrably absent. 
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This view was reiterated by Hornaday, who wrote ‘[it] has been the helpless 
women [and] school-children […] who have been blown to pieces’.126 The 
raiders were labelled ‘baby-killers’, and after the bombardment of Hartlepool 
the population was confronted with headlines proclaiming ‘Women and Babies 
Were Slaughtered’.127 The News of the World poignantly spoke of the ‘Kaiser’s 
Child Victims’, and the ‘Dead and Maimed – Women and Children Trapped in 
their Homes’.128 The victims were overwhelmingly portrayed as women and 
children, despite the fatalities of some men. It was the ‘Child Victims of the 
Kaiser’ who were mourned, and in another raid it was reported that there were 
‘Forty Women and Children Killed, Wounded or Missing’, despite the other 
sixteen casualties being men.129  
The imagery, too, reinforced this perception. Several of Louis 
Raemaeckers’ cartoons addressed this theme, as did newspaper cartoons, which 
focused exclusively on the victimisation of women and children:  
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[Source: Daily Express, 28 May 1915, p. 2.] 
A popular depiction of the Hun was to show German airmen being decorated 
for their child victims. 
 
          
[Source: Kultur in Cartoons] 
Louis Raemaeckers’ ‘The Zeppelin Raider’, and ‘A German ‘Victory’’ also 
gave disproportionate attention to the theme of women and children as the 
Huns favourite victims.130  
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Whilst U-boats and zeppelins were presented as evidence of German 
bestiality, the British blockades of Germany, and its consequences, were 
glossed over. The use of blockades was well established in military annals, and 
the British strangulation of German imports during the Great War did little to 
arouse protest, despite bringing great hardship to millions of German civilians. 
Trevor Wilson has argued that this was because responsibility for the starvation 
of civilians could be seen as lying ultimately with the German army.131 The 
soldiers could make the choice to lay down their arms and therefore save the 
civil population. This line of reasoning, of course, was never used to place 
responsibility for the submarine and zeppelin attacks on Britain’s armed forces, 
which could have pre-empted them by surrendering.  
Likewise, there seems to have been no mention of the fact that while 
German aerial attacks on Britain had killed 1,400 people by 1918, British aerial 
attacks on Germany had killed 740, the majority of whom were also 
civilians.132 The targets of British attacks were industrial and military, but given 
that there was no way of ensuring precision bombing with early aircraft, 
civilians were inevitable victims. Additionally, British sources largely ignored 
(if they were indeed aware of it) that the Kaiser had stringent restrictions on 
bombing forays over Britain, restricting attacks to military targets, and sought 
to keep Germany within the bounds of international laws on the subject.133 This 
one-sided view of German bombing was also contradicted in comments made 
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in 1918 by the chief of the Air Staff, Major-General Frederick Sykes, who said 
that ‘[the] wholesale bombing of densely populated industrial centres would go 
far in destroying the morale [of Germany]’.134 
The reporting of German attacks on civilians, but not those of the 
British, contributed to the collective myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’. It was not that 
the attacks were invented, or even radically distorted. However, the one-sided 
and obviously biased nature of the reporting suggested that the Hun 
intentionally waged a war against women and children, and that such ‘brutality’ 
directed against civilians was the exclusive forte of the Germans. 
There were many routes by which these stories found their way to the 
British home front. Largely the responsibility for dissemination of the abhorrent 
and sadistic tales lay in popular channels. The most obvious form was the 
extensive press coverage where the discourse had significantly changed. The 
initial crimes had been met with statements that the papers ‘[were] reluctant to 
believe the worst of German methods of waging war’, which referred to the 
‘evidence of incredible savagery’, including the ‘loathsome conduct […] [of] 
German troops actually [using] prisoners bound together as a human shield’.135 
There was also surprise expressed at the ‘assertions that wounded Belgian 
soldiers were killed’.136 Barely a month later there had been a significant 
departure from the reality of the civilian massacres, into the fantastical where 
the Hun revelled in the very worst crimes. Where once there had been disbelief, 
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there were now assertions that the ‘Germans kill children […] they are worse 
than animals’.137  
The fog of war which descended over the home front and obscured 
much of the news from the continent forced people to rely on accounts that 
were less than reliable. Philip Gibbs, a journalist, summed up the situation 
caused by this censorship succinctly: ‘the British press, as hungry for news as 
the British public whose professional little army had disappeared behind a 
deathlike silence, printed any scrap of description, any glimmer of truth, any 
wild statement, rumour, fairy tale, or deliberate lie, which reached them from 
France or Belgium’.138 This atmosphere created the vacuum in which such 
unreliable tales could take hold. 
Word of mouth was also important. Troops on leave and civilians who 
had contact with soldiers brought back accounts of their experiences from the 
front and passed them on. Robert Graves was told by one wounded soldier that 
he had seen three naked women hanging by their feet in a butcher’s window.139 
Vera Brittain recounted women she worked with ‘try[ing to] outdo one another 
in telling stories of war horrors’.140 Andrew Clark, who kept a detailed diary of 
the life of his town during the war, transcribed many tales he had heard from 
other townspeople. One woman told him that at a nearby convent there was a 
young girl who had her hands hacked off by the Germans.141 A wounded 
soldier told Clark he had met a Belgian family whose daughters had both bled 
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to death as a result of their breasts being ‘hacked off’. His dentist also 
recounted having heard from Belgian refugees that during their exodus from the 
Germans they had passed the decapitated bodies of many children lying on the 
roadside.142 Another man told Clark that he had personally met a Canadian 
officer who had seen one of his men crucified with bayonets, while a man on 
leave from the front told Clark that British soldiers were committing suicide to 
avoid falling into German hands.143 Even a passing tramp informed him the 
Germans had massacred a number of prisoners including interned women and 
children.144 
Letters from the front furnished further material for the rumour mill, and 
they were often reproduced in the press for general consumption. One British 
officer wrote home of there being ‘three girls in the trenches with us, who came 
to us for protection […] having been outraged by the Germans […] Another 
poor girl has just come in, having had both her breasts cut off’.145 Not only was 
the man an officer, but his account was reproduced in The Times, one of the 
most reputable papers in Britain. One might question how these girls had 
managed to get through No Man’s Land without being shot on their journey 
through German lines to the British trenches. Particularly given their condition, 
and the behaviour established in many rumours that professed German soldiers 
often murdered their hapless victims after committing rape and mutilation. 
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Atrocity stories were magnified as they were told and retold, far 
surpassing any reality. Arthur Ponsonby demonstrated the birth and evolution 
of an atrocity story through newspapers. Its inception was innocent, but by the 
time the tale reached French shores it was yet another example of Hun brutality. 
The story began in the Kölnische Zeitung with the declaration that ‘[when] the 
fall of Antwerp got known, the church bells were rung (meaning in 
Germany)’.146 In the next paper, Le Matin, it was alleged that when the city fell 
the priests of Antwerp were compelled to ring the bells. In The Times it was 
then said that the priests were ‘driven away from their places’ because they 
refused to ring the bells. In Corriére della Sera, the priests were said to have 
been sentenced to hard labour for their refusal. In the final stage, when the story 
returned to Le Matin, suddenly the ‘Bestial Hun’ had emerged and the priests 
had been punished by being hanged as ‘living clappers’ inside the bells of 
Antwerp.147 The escalation and distortion that could affect the meaning of a 
rumour, or even a genuine story, is evident.  
Sheer invention of atrocities also had a role. It is difficult to ascertain 
just how many rumours were fabricated, but some certainly were. In December 
1914 a seventeen year old girl went to trial in Edinburgh for ‘concocting and 
fabricating letters declaring that her sister […] had been subjected to brutalities 
at Vilvorde’. The girl said she had received letters from her sister saying her 
final goodbyes. The dying nurse allegedly wrote a note deploring the cruelty of 
the Germans, and a friend of the woman also included a message stating that 
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she had found the sister at the mercy of two Germans in the act of cutting off 
her left breast, the other already having been removed. The story was revealed 
as fraud when the nurse at the centre of the furore wrote to her father from 
Huddersfield where she was actually employed to let him know she was safe. 
The only defence the girl who had invented the story offered was that she had 
not heard from her sister for some time, and having read so much about German 
atrocities against women had imagined a similar fate had befallen her sister.148 
While this case went to trial and resulted in the exposure of the falsehood the 
young woman had invented, there were no doubt similar cases that were never 
revealed. The sudden proliferation of stories featuring women and children as 
victims as soon as the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ took off implies that invention 
and imagination played an important role. Atrocities against civilian adult 
males, which were almost certainly still more common, were almost forgotten.  
A British officer recorded in his memoirs the many fallacies that were 
penned in his men’s letters. Sitting in the trenches in the long spells of quiet the 
men invented farcical battles and encounters that never took place. One man 
wrote to his wife boasting that he had single-handedly killed hundreds of 
Germans in hand to hand combat.149 It is possible that in their moments of 
boredom the men invented stories of atrocities to excite their loved ones at 
home and make their tour of the front seem more exotic. Imaginative invention 
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was certainly not confined to young women confined to the drudgery of the 
home front.  
 
The Bryce Report 
A particularly important vehicle for the dissemination of atrocity stories (both 
true and fictional) was the Bryce Report. The report was commissioned in 
December 1914 purportedly to establish the truth of atrocity stories that were 
rife by this time. It was not the first of its kind, since Belgium and France had 
already produced a multitude of reports investigating German atrocities. The 
publicised aim of the committee was to scrutinise the German invasion, 
particularly concerning the conduct of the army towards civilians, the wounded 
and prisoners of war. It was ‘to [investigate] outrages alleged to have been 
committed by German troops [… such as] cases of alleged maltreatment of 
civilians in the invaded territories, and breaches of the laws and established 
usages of war’.150 It was generally expected that the committee would produce 
a balanced conclusion based on the available evidence. The charges targeted the 
accusations that had smattered newspaper pages: the killing of civilians, the 
targeting of women and children, the use of civilians as human shields, and the 
destruction of property.151   
 It is likely that the real purpose of the Bryce Report was not to ascertain 
the veracity of the atrocity stories but to provide useful publicity for the more 
credible ones. This hypothesis is supported by the actions of the Attorney-
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General Sir John Simon. He took pains to assure the committee that the 
investigative groundwork had already been carried out by Scotland Yard, and 
that the information had already been sorted by barristers. The groundwork was 
so thorough, in fact, that ‘[members of the committee could] pass a judgement 
on it without themselves undertaking the work of interrogation.’152 
James Bryce was selected to head the commission – a prudent choice 
given his credentials. Bryce was a former student of Heidelberg University, a 
recipient of the Pour le Mérite, an advocate of German learning and former 
ambassador to the United States. He had also been firmly opposed to British 
intervention in the unfolding conflict in the final days leading to the declaration 
of war. The transgression of Belgium’s neutrality had served to alter his views 
and he had become a firm advocate of Britain’s cause. His reputation as a 
Germanophile, would add weight to his findings, and his political standing in 
America would ensure a favourable reception there.153  
These expectations were undoubtedly met. When the report was 
published, an assessment of the American press reaction compiled by Britain’s 
propaganda headquarters, was able to state that ‘in papers hostile to the Allies, 
there is not the slightest attempt to impugn the correctness of the facts 
alleged.’154 Masterman, head of Wellington House, Britain’s propaganda 
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bureau, told Bryce ‘even the most sceptical declare themselves converted, just 
because it is signed by you!’155 
The report was based on 1200 depositions that were collected from 
refugees and Allied soldiers and supplemented with extracts from German 
diaries. Their testimony had been collected by a team of barristers who toured 
Britain. The finished piece consisted of two parts: a sixty one page report 
outlining the charges and assessing the evidence, and a 296 page compendium 
of the testimony. In Britain it was supplied to the public for less than the cost of 
a newspaper, ensuring its wide distribution, and it was proposed that a free 
edition be circulated from house to house.156  
Though the report tried to appear objective and factual, it was, in fact 
deeply flawed. The principal issue was that the witnesses be put under oath as 
the barristers had no authority to administer an oath. However, the barristers 
could cross examine witnesses if they believed there were points that needed 
clarification, and they were also encouraged to take notes on the demeanour of 
deponents.  
The committee did use the opportunity to call on the barristers and ask 
for an assessment of the information they had gathered. It was at this point that 
the potentially dubious nature of many affidavits was exposed. When asked 
about two specific cases, the lawyer responsible for their collection said the 
pieces should not be treated as evidence.157 This presented the committee with 
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its first problem: without cross examining each of the barristers involved in the 
collection of the evidence there was no way of knowing how many other cases 
should be disregarded. On page six of the report the committee claimed it had 
rejected any evidence that had not impressed itself on the barristers, along with 
stories that were too sensational to be accepted on the faith of one witness. 
However, because it had not been interviewed each barrister thoroughly about 
individual pieces of evidence there was no way the commission could support 
this assertion. Moreover, depositions which seemed fantastic but had impressed 
the lawyers as intrinsically truthful had been included. Indeed, even testimony 
that the commission declined to use because it seemed dubious was included in 
the appendix, giving it apparent authority and making it accessible to a wide 
audience.  
Bryce and his fellow committee members theoretically had the authority 
to call on witnesses to probe testimony further, but, the Attorney General made 
this avenue of enquiry sound both distasteful and ineffectual. It was asserted 
that the allegedly rigorous conduct of the barristers in determining the validity 
of the original testimony removed any need for the committee members to 
pursue the witnesses in person. Furthermore, the committee was informed that 
many of the witnesses wished to maintain their anonymity to protect family and 
friends still in Belgium from possible retribution. This was perhaps supportable 
given allegations that after the Belgium Committee had published its findings, 
193 priests had been shot, injured, mutilated or taken prisoner because of the 
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evidence they had proffered against the Germans.158 This sounds odd. To give 
evidence the priests must have been in territory controlled by the Allies. To be 
shot – or otherwise terrorised – they must have been in territory controlled by 
the Germans. This was not impossible as rapid German advances may have led 
to their falling into German hands, but it does seem unlikely. 
The report made no mention of the fact that the barristers had tried and 
failed to confirm stories about particularly prevalent rumours. In particular, it 
found no evidence to confirm the hearsay stories that English homes were host 
to hundreds of Belgian girls made pregnant through rape, or the tales about the 
presence in England of a multitude of juvenile amputees mutilated by the Huns. 
Almost every Briton had a friend, relative or ‘friend of a friend’ who had seen 
the wretched victims taken in by English families. As part of the investigatory 
work carried out by the barristers, they had visited addresses where these 
victims were purportedly sheltered. Despite strenuous efforts, they were never 
able to find material evidence to support this widely reported aspect of German 
ferocity.159 
Despite its severe flaws, many of the stories included in the Bryce 
Report were probably true, such as depositions concerned the sacking of towns 
or the carrying out of well-documented executions. But there is reason to 
believe that many, like the stories of pregnant Belgian girls, or limbless children 
were fictitious. Individual stories of macabre and sadistic behaviour by German 
soldiers may have been true, but others were probably told, re-told, embellished 
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and believed because they recounted behaviour that seemed appropriate to the 
‘Bestial Hun’. Stories like the following conformed totally to the stereotype: 
 
We saw the corpse of a man and a woman. We inquired of 
the neighbours and they told us the woman was enceinte. She 
had been violated by German soldiers and had had her womb 
cut open by them in her husband’s presence. He had been 
previously bound to the banisters. They had removed the 
unborn child. We saw the latter half burnt. The flesh was 
more grilled than burnt. They had beheaded the husband … 
They took the man’s head and thrust it into the woman’s 
womb after tearing out her child.160  
 
Another deponent reported finding a child missing both hands and feet, which 
the Germans had taken away with them. The child’s parents had not avoided a 
brutal death: the man had been shot in the face and his genitals had been hacked 
off while his wife had been ‘viciously raped’ before being murdered.161 A 
refugee recounted seeing the body of a newborn infant hanged from a door 
handle; witnesses had told him the child had been placed there and the mother 
forced to watch until the baby was dead.162  
The Bryce committee found the German Army guilty on all indictments. 
It concluded that there had been ‘deliberate and systematically organised 
massacres of the civil population’ and that ‘in the conduct of the war generally 
innocent civilians […] were murdered in large numbers’. From the evidence the 
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committee also resolved that the destruction carried out had not been arbitrary 
but ‘ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army’, and even 
went so far as to allege that ‘systematic incendiarism’ had been planned from 
the outset. The overall picture was one in which ‘[m]urder, lust, and pillage 
prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war 
between civilised nations’.163 Much of this was, of course, true. It was the 
macabre fragments that were doubtful. However, the conclusions offered 
implicit support to the shocking and often doubtful stories in the appendix, 
irrespective of whether they received explicit endorsement in the main body of 
the report. 
The Bryce Report was very widely distributed and widely discussed in 
the press. It was made readily available so the British public could purchase a 
copy of the report and digest the lurid details for themselves. For those who 
were not able to obtain a copy, the various British papers extracted sections of 
the report for republication in their pages. Newspaper headlines had been 
vicious in their accusations of German cruelty before, but with the release of the 
Bryce Report they reached new heights of malevolence. Headlines of ‘Rapine 
and Blood – Women Mutilated and Babies Bayoneted – Satanic German 
Soldiery’; ‘Baby Beheaded – Revolting Scene in Belgian Farmhouse’ and 
‘Bavarian Butchers’, were followed by extracts from the report.164 Needless to 
say, most of what was reproduced in newsprint was both sensational and 
disgusting. The narratives and testimony detailing massacres were overlooked 
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in favour of presenting the public with evidence of German brutality that defied 
belief. The papers published case after case of cruelty. The articles assured the 
readers that the cases had not been published in the report until the testimony 
had been subject to ‘the most rigorous examination and cross-examination by 
trained minds’ and further misled the public by declaring that the depositions 
were ‘irrefutable’.165 Before the report was even released the papers presented 
the atrocities under the blanket umbrella of a German Staff order and further 
asserted that no evidence had been accepted unless it was ‘capable of absolute 
proof’. There were also insinuations that the very worst evidence was in fact 
sourced from German diaries when in fact these only supported reports of mass 
executions and drunkenness rather than sadism, torture and cruelty.166  
The subheadings of the dedicated one page report in the Daily Express 
are enough to give an idea of the stories the public was presented with. 
‘Fiendish Work’, ‘Babies Strangled and Shot’, ‘Hands Cut Off’, were followed 
with accounts of sadism and perverted behaviour.167 The News of the World was 
equally virulent in indulging its readership: ‘Women Mutilated and Babies 
Bayoneted’, ‘Satanic German Soldiery’, and ‘Bavarian Butchers’, were 
followed by reports of disgusting outrages against vulnerable civilians and the 
wounded.168  
It is no wonder that these stories were circulating in public discourse. 
The worst instances of mutilation and torture had been ‘proven’ and given the 
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stamp of truth by the Bryce Commission, and then avidly reproduced for all in 
the pages of the popular press. However, atrocity stories would not have gained 
such significance if there was not some role that they could fulfil in the popular 
imagination.  
 
The political, social and psychological significance of atrocity 
stories 
It is easy to document the fact that atrocity stories were widely disseminated. 
There are substantial physical records in the form of newspaper articles, posters, 
illustrations and personal diaries. What is more difficult to ascertain is how 
widely these stories were believed as the majority of the British population left 
no records of their experiences.  
 There is in fact some evidence to suggest that not everyone believed the 
more lurid of the stories. Jerome K. Jerome believed the executions and 
destruction but questioned the content of other stories in circulation. He 
‘expressed contempt for […] the people who are disgracing the English 
reputation […] by disseminating lies and shrieking abuse’.169 Those who had 
contact with the enemy were especially sceptical. One example of this was Vera 
Brittain who worked as a Voluntary Aid Detachment worker in France:  
 
[It] was somewhat disconcerting to be pitchforked, all alone 
[…] into the midst of thirty representatives of the nation 
which, as I had been repeatedly told, had crucified Canadians, 
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cut off the hands of babies, and subjected pure and stainless 
females to unmentionable ‘atrocities’. I didn’t think I believed 
all the stories but I wasn’t quite sure. I half expected one or 
two of the patients would get out of bed and try and rape me.170 
 
An officer who served at the front, C. E. Montague, also experienced growing 
suspicion of the atrocity stories that had been so freely and authoritatively fed to 
the population. Montague commented that on rummaging through German 
pockets he could never find the ‘poison to put in our wells, [or] practical hints 
for crucifying Canadians; only the usual stuffing of all soldiers’ pockets’.171 
Robert Graves ‘discounted perhaps twenty per cent of the atrocity details as 
wartime exaggeration’, he also stated that many soldiers 
 
[No] longer believed the highly-coloured accounts of German 
atrocities in Belgium; knowing the Belgians now at first-hand. 
By atrocities we meant, specifically, rape, mutilation and 
torture […] French and Belgian civilians had often tried to win 
our sympathy by exhibiting mutilations of children – stumps of 
hands and feet, for instance – representing them as deliberate, 
fiendish atrocities when, as likely as not, they were merely the 
result of shell-fire.172  
  
Generally though, the evidence suggests that the stories, even the most lurid and 
horrific, were widely believed. Vera Brittain, writing to her fiancé at the front, 
was deeply affected by official reports on the atrocities, despite her change of 
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heart in later years: ‘I don’t think I have ever read anything quite so terrible as 
the official report on German outrages in Belgium […] their treatment of 
women and children is worst of all’.173  
 Letters to the editor suggest that belief in these atrocity stories, 
including lewd versions, was not as clear cut. Some found the refutation of any 
charges against the Germans equally as disgraceful as Jerome found the 
promulgation of such stories. A Lewis Jones took exception to Keir Hardie’s 
assertion that many of the stories were the product of ‘the highly imaginative 
and thoroughly unscrupulous inventions of a school of pressmen’, especially 
tales of mutilation, and referred Hardie – a socialist and pacifist – to the reports 
produced by the Belgian commission and various finding of the Belgian 
socialist leader Emile Vandervelde.174 A Miss Aitken also refuted Hardie’s 
claims and suggested he visit a Belgian shelter where the ‘question of 
mutilation at ‘first sight’ could be finally settled’.175 One unnamed ‘Belgian 
refugee’ also took exception those who questioned reports of German atrocities, 
asserting that ‘about a million civilians, men, women, and children […] have 
been tortured [and] slaughtered […] in less than four months’.176 
 Further indications that the stories were widely believed were the riots 
that periodically broke out in England in response to German actions on the 
continent. There were riots in London’s East End in the week that the Bryce 
Report was released, which also coincided with the sinking of the Lusitania. 
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Conversely, the almost palpable fear that a similar fate would befall British 
women demonstrated that not only did Britons believe what was purportedly 
happening in Belgium, but they believed the Germans were capable of much 
worse. One preacher warned his flock from the pulpit that should the Germans 
set foot on English shores they would murder every male child.177 Newspapers 
published German threats that ‘[w]hatever was committed in Belgium cannot be 
called barbarism on the part of the German Army, but once let us get into 
England […] no doubt the world will learn of atrocities being committed such 
as are unknown today’.178 One woman was so concerned about her potential 
fate should the Germans invade, she sought counsel to ascertain whether suicide 
could be doctrinally forgiven if it was committed to avoid being violated by the 
invaders.179 
 The obvious conviction in these accounts raises the question of why 
people believed stories that seem so fantastic. Noticeably, atrocity myths and 
rumours were useful to the government. The government wanted people to 
believe the stories and gave the myths official sanction; they were an integral 
part of the propaganda campaign conducted by the British government during 
the war. Rumours of brutalisation fulfilled multiple roles essential to fighting 
the war to a successful conclusion. Most importantly, though, they impelled the 
British population to hate the enemy. Demonising the foe was vital in any 
conflict, not only to motivate the masses, but to shore up their determination 
when the situation seemed bleak. As Harold Lasswell argued in his seminal 
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work, Propaganda Technique in the World War; every war must be portrayed 
as a war of protection against an aggressor that was murderous and 
threatening.180 Atrocity stories filled this role perfectly.  
 Atrocities were also significant because Belgium defined British 
involvement in the war. The invasion of Belgium and France succeeded in 
removing any obstacles the pro-war British faction of the government had in 
making its case for war. The support of the people and the opposing political 
parties was firmly established when the plight of neutral Belgium was made 
public. The reality of the factors that pushed Britain into declaring war on the 
Central Powers was more pragmatic than acting as the benevolent protector of 
Belgium. Britain’s own interests were threatened by a Belgium under German 
control, with the ports not only compromising British trade but in a more 
sinister vein, offering a potential launching point for an invasion of England’s 
shores.181 The complexities of the situation went beyond a diplomatic breach of 
borders, but it was the unlawful invasion that was used to symbolise to the 
British public the reasons why the government had plunged the nation into a 
continental conflict. Treaty obligations justified any declarations of war, but the 
intricacies of diplomatic manoeuvring and negotiations likely had little 
significance for the lay person with scant interest in politics. Instead, appeals to 
their sense of righteousness and honour were held up in stark contrast to the 
lawlessness of Germany, and firmly cemented public support behind the war. 
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The British cause was ‘bound in honour’ to ‘maintain [Belgium] inviolate’.182 
Atrocities only vindicated this assertion of British Right versus German Might. 
Reports of razed towns and murdered villagers furthered the condemnation of 
Germany while buttressing public support. The blame was laid firmly at 
Germany’s feet, both for the instigation of the war and for the degrading depths 
to which it would sink. 
The myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ was valuable for recruitment. Militarily, 
Britain was reliant on the spirit of volunteerism to fill the ranks of the army 
until conscription was introduced in 1916. Despite the pluck and courage of the 
regular army, it became evident very quickly that it would not be sufficient to 
stem the German onslaught. By the end of 1914 it had suffered massive 
casualties, and, in the atmosphere of democracy and liberalism that permeated 
the British attitude, it became necessary to convince men to enlist. The 
atmosphere of hate persuaded the population to fight and was demonstrably one 
of the most important motivations for men to join the colours.183 Using 
atrocities in this manner possessed a twofold inducement. Not only was there 
the glory and honour of saving Belgium from the yoke of the Hun, but there 
was the also the consideration that they might be saving Britain from a similar 
fate. Philip Gibbs also noted the effect that atrocities had on recruitment. The 
tales of outrages perpetrated against women and children ‘sent many men at a 
quick pace to the recruiting agents’, while Vera Brittain said of the Bryce 
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Report that ‘I don’t know how any man can read it and not enlist’.184 The 
stories’ functional value was also evident at the trials of conscientious 
objectors. One man before a tribunal was asked what he would do if he ‘saw a 
German trying to violate [his] sister’.185 Posters encouraging recruitment also 
made extensive use of atrocities:  
 
              
The emphasis in both of these posters focused on the plight of women and 
children and the need to protect the sanctity of the home.186 
 
 
 The myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ was used extensively in the diplomatic 
campaign to solicit support and participation of other countries in the Allied 
effort, especially the United States. All belligerents courted world opinion in an 
effort to gain military or material support. If this was not possible, then 
discrediting the Germans to limit collaboration from neutral countries was also 
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the goal. While the Germans were somewhat desperate in their accusations 
against the Allied armies, resorting to tales of dumdum and exploding bullets, 
the Allies had an unexpected advantage from having the war fought on their 
territory. German contact with Belgian and French civilians created an 
inexhaustible supply of atrocity stories to reinforce the illegality of the German 
cause and the righteousness of the Allied one. As the stories degenerated it was 
increasingly possible to attribute nearly any behaviour to the German army 
without arousing speculation as to its validity.  
 In 1917 rumours began to circulate that dead German soldiers were 
being rendered into military and domestic products. Glycerine was extracted for 
use by the munitions industry, and in the more disturbing rumours there were 
suggestions that it was going so far as to produce boot polish, soap and even 
margarine.187 This story probably seemed more credible given the British 
blockade of Germany, as the factory would have acted as a means of 
counteracting some of the most vital shortages. Eyewitnesses testified to 
discovering railway wagons filled with corpses bound in bundles with 
extraneous limbs.188 Among soldiers at the front there were rumours that it was 
not just German bodies being rendered into products, but also those of the 
British dead.189 The story was revealed as a fraudulent invention aimed at 
rupturing ties between Germany and the East, where the dead were highly 
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revered.190 The Chinese minister ‘was much horrified’ by the stories, viewing 
the ‘German desecration with a very special horror’.191  
 Likewise, the Bryce Report was designed to sway American opinion, 
although this was already favourable to the Allies in light of German actions. 
How much influence this propaganda actually had in deciding neutral 
involvement in the war is debateable. The combination of the Bryce Report, the 
sinking of the Lusitania – with the loss of American lives – and the first use of 
poison gas occurred within the space of a week, yet the United States remained 
neutral. It was the Zimmerman telegram and the clumsy German attempts to 
foment discontent in America’s neighbours which induced the Senate to declare 
war. However, it is a plausible argument that the propaganda had affected 
American opinion to such an extent that it was highly unlikely that the United 
States would have joined the Central Powers. The case of the corpse conversion 
factory was similar; it was not the deciding factor in China’s declaring war on 
Germany, but if the comments of the Chinese Minister are indicative, it 
certainly swayed them against the German cause.  
 Rumours of German atrocities were useful to garner support for the war 
effort, Allied war aims, and, particularly in the later years, to bolster British 
denials of a negotiated peace. The efficacy of atrocity stories did not dissipate 
as the war stagnated. Even as late as 1918 the National War Aims Committee, 
established to conduct the propaganda campaign on the home front, was using 
the invasion of Belgium and the atrocities of the Germans to further the war 
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aims of the government. Atrocities were used to sustain the push for harder 
peace terms than the population may have been inclined to support. In a 
pamphlet entitled Aims and Efforts of the War, Britain’s Case After Four Years, 
the Committee used Belgium to demonstrate the fundamental differences in the 
causes of the Germans and the British. As the Allied effort supported national 
self-determination and the release of the all peoples in German bondage, the 
Committee fell back on the atrocity stories to prove the hideous nature of 
German rule. Rather than presenting the public with the 600 massacred at 
Dinant or the other crimes ubiquitous in the areas of German occupation, the 
committee defined German domination with descriptions of ‘a baby crucified 
[…] nailed like a rat to a barn […] girls violated again and again until they died 
[and] men mutilated in ways that one man can hardly whisper to another’.192  
 Atrocity myths were also useful to the larger society and to individuals, 
possessing important social and psychological functions. The experience of 
World War I for most civilians was deeply paradoxical. War was both 
omnipresent, yet also remote. On the one hand people were forced to endure 
shortages in foods and fuel, changes of occupation, restrictions on their 
individual freedoms, and above all, the absence or loss of loved ones. On the 
other hand, what they were told about the war was very little. Censorship and 
restrictions on reporters at the front ensured that civilian perceptions of the war 
would be far removed from its true nature. Myths and rumours – in this case 
atrocity myths – filled the vacuum.  
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Atrocity myths served as a justification for the scale of the sacrifices the 
population was making and as proof of the righteousness of the cause for which 
the Allies were fighting. The polemic describing the war – in both official and 
popular discourses – defined the Allied cause as ‘the protection of the weak 
against the violence of the strong’. Britain had entered the conflict with ‘clear 
judgement and clean conscience […] in this bloody arbitrament [sic] between 
might and right’.193 Sylvia Pankhurst, as a well-known pacifist and socialist 
suffragette, recounted the reaction of fellow relief workers to her view of the 
war: ‘‘[what] would you do if you saw a great strong man killing a baby?’ […] 
‘It was them as started it first: are we to let ‘em go on till they’ve killed 
everyone?’’194 British involvement was to protect the integrity of Belgium, 
brutalised by a state sworn to defend it, and to protect her defenceless women 
and children from the murderous German aggressors.  
 The myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ was also useful as a way of drawing a 
distinction between the German ‘other’ – sadistic, domineering, militaristic, 
irreligious and cruel – with the British ‘us’ – honourable, libertarian, noble and 
Christian. Anti-German sentiment had no deep history in Britain; on the 
contrary, Germans were traditionally regarded as Saxon brothers. The animosity 
between the two countries was only decades old, and several notable Britons – 
among them Lord Haldane and Lord Bryce – considered Germany to be their 
‘spiritual’ home.  
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 The traditional enemy was France, now Britain’s ally. The belligerence 
between Britain and France dated from the Norman Conquest. However, no 
matter the historical differences between the two countries, the French were not 
monsters guilty of mass murder. Like Belgium, they had been the victims of 
unprovoked war.  
 By demonising the German army, the British were able to divorce 
themselves from their shared history and, as some believed, their partly 
Germanic ancestry. Increasingly Germans were portrayed as animals and 
sadistic torturers. No longer considered ‘civilised’ in the traditional European 
sense of the word, they were shown to have a ‘Kultur’ which rejected the 
humanitarian conscience, and instead glorified might and militarism.  
 Another, simpler, explanation behind the attraction of these myths and 
rumours was that it gave license to talk about matters that were normally taboo. 
There was an element of vicarious excitement to discussing such topics, 
particularly those that were sexual in nature. This was evident in the fact that 
the plight of Belgium was so often described in terms of the raped and outraged 
women.  
 
Conclusion 
From the very inception of the war, atrocities were likely. The Schlieffen Plan 
exerted enormous pressures on the German army to adhere to a strict timetable 
but failed to take into account the logistical advantage possessed by the 
defending forces. Combined with the legacy of the franc-tireur warfare of 1870, 
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rumours rife on the home front, and the expectation that the ‘People’s war’ had 
re-emerged, the German High Command explicitly sanctioned severe and 
violent repression for any perceived resistance. The combination of these 
factors was a potent concoction which sparked nervous and spontaneous 
reactions from German troops in the face of any perceived civilian resistance.  
 That atrocities did take place along much of the line of German advance 
is historical fact, and many were reported in detail in the British press. Louvain, 
in particular, became synonymous with German devilry and really shattered the 
veil of cautious scepticism that had surrounded initial reporting of German 
atrocities. This coverage was naturally biased; the patriotic press was keen to 
undermine German justification for the atrocities by discounting franc-tireurs 
and particularly through the increasing focus on women and children as the 
victims. This skewed construction was furthered as there was no mention of the 
rape of civilians, or killing of prisoners or wounded that was committed by the 
Allied troops. After Louvain, which coincided with the release of the policy of 
‘frightfulness’, the press barely questioned other reports even as they tended 
towards the sensational. 
 It was also in the early stages of the war that stories of the bestial and 
macabre emerged, which far transcended the bare facts. However, these were 
reported on as though they were not only real, but commonplace. Increasingly 
the plight of Belgium was defined in terms of ravaged women and mutilated 
children while Visé, Louvain, and Dinant – not to mention the multitude of 
smaller incidents – were all but lost amongst the rumours of rape, torture and 
sadistic cruelty.  
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 While the press disseminated these rumours, propagation by word of 
mouth and unofficial reports from the front also contributed to the expanding 
myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’. Word of mouth invariably led to distortion and 
exaggeration of existing stories, while letters and correspondence from the front 
carried the misleading brand of authority through ‘experience’.  
 This promulgation was assisted by the most important piece of 
propaganda of the entire war: the Bryce Report. This contained the same 
mixture of fact, interspersed with fiction, as the unofficial coverage of German 
atrocities. However, its clever packaging and the stamp of being an officially 
sanctioned report gave credibility to stories that before had existed as mere 
rumour. It effectively destroyed any vestigial traces of doubt that some may 
have felt regarding German atrocities. The problems that prevented the report 
from ever being more than an article of propaganda were not revealed to its 
public, although what impact this would have had on popular acceptance of the 
stories is debatable.  
 No matter how unreliable the anecdote, in content or source, atrocity 
stories were widely believed because they were so useful. For the government, 
atrocities provided a means of soliciting foreign support for the Allied cause, 
and domestic cooperation in government drives that were so reliant on 
volunteerism. While evidence that atrocity propaganda actually encouraged 
neutrals such as America to join the Allied cause is negligible, they 
undoubtedly influenced neutrals and opinions against Germany.  
 For civilians they contributed to a larger Discourse on the Bestial Hun 
which provided meaning and significance to their sacrifices, particularly in 
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terms of human life. This discourse and the reports of atrocities made the war a 
moral crusade, not only to free Belgium from Germany’s ‘mailed fist’, but to 
prevent the same fate befalling Britain. They also cast British involvement in 
unambiguous terms. Diplomatic manoeuvrings aside, the British were the 
defenders of right, intervening on the behalf of a small, downtrodden state. 
German and British identities were divorced with the de-humanisation of the 
Hun, and German ‘Kultur’ was removed from that of other ‘civilised’ nations. 
 Atrocity stories provided a way of understanding a war that was both 
omnipresent and remote, allowing people to come to terms with a war that 
required social cohesion and the effort of every individual. Total War was 
entirely new as no other war had been fought which required the complete 
subordination of life to the war effort. The war also had new connotations as 
civilians were increasingly targeted by belligerent nations. With the war being 
so far away, discussion of atrocities allowed Britons to imagine the war in terms 
that people could comprehend and empathise with. It enabled them to relate the 
war to people like themselves – the victims of a hideous enemy bent on the 
destruction of the hearth, home and innocent civilians.  
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Chapter 3. Enemy Agents: Spies, 
Saboteurs and Traitors 
 
The myth of the ubiquitous German spy obsessed the British population. It was 
an idea that had been established for decades in popular literature, entertaining 
the people with tales of dastardly foreign agents and enemies who coveted 
Britain’s vast empire. With the outbreak of war in 1914, it did not take long for 
the idea of the omnipresent, covert spy to possess the masses.  
 Of the stories that circulated on the home front, it is likely that the 
majority of them were purely myth. The early arrests of German spies in 
August 1914 reinforced the idea that espionage was a very real threat. However, 
the constant themes that ran through initial spy rumours were more indicative 
of fictional and imaginative influences than any reality.  
 The idea of the spy was important. While it appears to have had little 
apparent use to the government, for civilians the ubiquitous German agent was 
an important part of the domestic war experience. The rumours surrounding the 
evil machinations of Germany’s malefic emissaries seem to have been an 
accurate reflection of many of the emotions surrounding the war.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore this experience and to consider 
how spy stories contributed to the popular understanding of the war. By 
examining the pre-war antecedents, the reality of espionage in Britain, and the 
various myths and rumours surrounding spies, it is possible to establish not only 
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how these ideas were received by the British population, but how they shaped 
conceptions of the war.  
 
Pre-war backdrop to spy mania  
From the late nineteenth century the British population was thoroughly primed 
for the spy scare that would erupt with the outbreak of war. There were two 
major agents: the burgeoning international tensions in Europe, and the 
increasing popularity of the spy novel in literature. The first created the 
anxieties and suspicions that fed the obsession with the notion of the insidious 
spy introduced into the social discourse by novels and the press.  
European diplomacy had long been divided into traditional allegiances. 
For Britain, this included an amiable friendship with Germany, and cool 
suspicion towards France, Britain’s historical enemy. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, however, this underwent a significant change. With 
the inauguration and subsequent rule of Wilhelm II as Kaiser of Germany, the 
diplomatic map of Europe was redrafted. Arguably the most important factor of 
this realignment was the German adoption of the political ideology of 
Weltpolitik, to secure Germany’s ‘place in the sun’. This policy led to many 
indiscretions and blunders that produced a growing antagonism and suspicion 
between Britain and Germany. In 1896 the Kruger Telegram, which mentioned 
the prospective support Germany would offer the Transvaal government, 
aroused anti-German feeling among Britons.195 In 1906 and 1911, the 
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Moroccan crises further strained Anglo-German relations as Germany 
attempted to barge its way into Africa. The most divisive issue, however, was 
the Naval Act of 1898. Given Britain’s reliance on its dominance of the seas, 
the proposed extension was seen by the British as a substantial threat.  
In this atmosphere of tension and rivalry, there was a further concern. 
Improvements in military technology could mean the difference between 
victory and defeat in the field. New developments were jealously guarded 
secrets, so it is no surprise that there was concern that other countries would 
attempt to discover them. Obviously, naval technology was one such concern as 
Germany and Britain competed to develop the superior navy and gain the upper 
hand.196 
These diplomatic tensions were increasingly palpable and popular 
organs seized on them to great effect. Spy literature was one medium through 
which these strains were exploited and presented to the British public. As early 
as 1871 the themes of various novels had identified Germany as the greatest 
threat to Britain. After the end of the Franco-Prussian War, however, relations 
with Bismarck’s Germany proved friendly, and these concerns ebbed away.197 
As late as 1904 France and Russia were still antagonising fictional heroes with 
their espionage – The Campaign of Douai (1899), The Coming Waterloo (1901) 
and The Death Trap (1907) are all examples of these anti-French sentiments – 
however, this virtually ceased after the signing of the Entente Cordiale.198  
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Perhaps drawing on the idea of Weltpolitik, there was an increasing 
tendency in many spy novels – particularly from the early 1900s onwards – to 
portray the German threat as something more sinister than an external, rival, 
military power. German aggrandisement was portrayed at the expense of 
Britain, a situation wrought from the jealous ambitions of an imperial late-
comer.  
Despite the apparently copious production of novels with an espionage 
theme, there were some which proved more influential than others. Erskine 
Childers’ novel Riddle of the Sands received immediate attention from 
contemporaries, particularly Conservatives and military reformers who 
recognised in Childers’ work support for their own cause.199 William Le Queux, 
a prolific author with an obsession for spies, penned a multitude of novels 
which demonstrably affected popular conceptions and official attitudes to 
espionage.200 
Riddle of the Sands was first published in 1903. The plot revolved 
around the summer maritime adventures of two young British men in the North 
Sea and along the East Frisian coast. During their voyages the men unwittingly 
uncovered a German plot to invade England with a flotilla of barges 
specifically designed to transport German troops to the East Coast. In this 
instance, the spy was an Englishman in the pay of the Germans, supplying his 
employers with information concerning billeting and how to provision the 
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invading army from local supplies.201 Interestingly, Childers’ book was not 
presented as a piece of fiction. Childers opened his novel with a preface that 
gave the impression that the novel was more than a work of fiction:  
 
In October last (1902), my friend ‘Carruthers’ visited me in my 
chambers, and […] told me frankly the whole adventure 
described in these pages […] At the end of his narrative […] he 
added that the important facts discovered in the course of the 
cruise had […] been communicated to the proper authorities, 
who […] had, he believed, made use of them, to avert a great 
national danger.202  
 
Giving his novel the air of credibility, Childers went on to assert that he had 
written the tale at the behest of his friend, who, feeling that ‘the national 
security was really being neglected’, despite the revelations made to the 
relevant officials, decided to make his story public.203 It is interesting to note 
that Childers claimed to have changed the names of the characters because an 
Englishman ‘bearing an honoured name’ would be implicated to the detriment 
of his family.204 This prefigured claims during World War One that important 
British figures were being swayed by German influences to the injury of the 
British war effort.  
It is easy to discount the impact that works of fiction could have on the 
workings of officialdom. But, in the atmosphere of the early twentieth century, 
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Childers’ book resulted in the formation of a parliamentary subcommittee to 
investigate the viability of a German invasion in the manner described in Riddle 
of the Sands. The committee found such an event nearly impossible. For it to 
succeed, the invasion force would need to be 70,000 men strong, with 200 boats 
and a twenty-hour crossing. The prospect that such a crossing could take place 
secretly was negligible, and the British navy would have sufficient time to 
intervene.205 
Another influential novel, The Invasion of 1910, was published in 1906. 
It was the brainchild of William Le Queux, who abandoned his traditional 
adversaries of France and Russia in favour of Germany. His story unfolded in 
London where two journalists discovered early one Sunday morning that the 
telegraph wires were not functioning. Upon further investigation, it was 
revealed that all contact with the continent and east coast of England had been 
interrupted. Speculation was rife that a storm, or perhaps an earthquake, was 
responsible. Conjecture was gradually replaced by fear when a man telephoned, 
reporting that he had seen figures interfering with telegraph wires the previous 
night. While the man thought they were carrying out repairs, his assumptions 
were quashed when they opened fire on him. Other chilling accounts emerged, 
and the realisation dawned that the German army had successfully and secretly 
invaded England, without resistance. By destroying Britain’s communications, 
rendering the British navy useless, Germany deprived England of her most 
powerful defence.  
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The book’s main theme was the extensive preparation of the spy ring 
that made the entire episode possible. This insidious element had been secretly 
at work in Britain, and when the time came to strike the German invasion force 
had all the logistical information needed to ensure that man and beast alike 
could be fed and housed. The spies severed cables and wires, incapacitated 
coastguards and stripped England of any chance to react.  
The book’s salient theme was the threat lingering within Britain, a 
malignant element, silent and unnoticed, prepared to act when given the word. 
The spies had come from Germany, having completed their compulsory 
military service, and taken work ‘as waiters, clerks, barbers, hairdressers, and 
private servants’.206 They were unscrupulous individuals ready, after the siege 
of London, to lead the conquerors among the rubble and ruin to requisition 
goods, and further the advance of the army through the Midlands.207  
Over one million copies of The Invasion of 1910 were sold. The tale 
was also serialised in the Daily Mail, ensuring a wider audience. In order to 
publicise the book, columns of men were sent marching Oxford Street in 
London wearing Prussian uniforms and sandwich boards. This stunt may have 
increased the dramatic effect when the story was released.208 The story was a 
solemn warning of the ultimate consequence of Britain’s naïve reliance on the 
navy. With no army in a viable position to defend against an invader, the capital 
was quickly besieged and the country overrun. In the book’s introduction, Le 
Queux said that he was attempting to  
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illustrate our utter unpreparedness for war, to show how, under 
certain conditions which may easily occur, England can be 
successfully invaded by Germany, and to present a picture of 
the ruin which must inevitably fall upon us on the evening of 
that not far-distant day.209  
 
The details outlined in the scenario led to the formation of another 
parliamentary subcommittee to assess the potential threat posed by a German 
invasion. The conclusions were the same as before: as long as the navy 
remained in charge of the seas there was only a negligible threat to Britain’s 
shores.210  
Le Queux’s compilation of short stories – Spies of the Kaiser – was 
perhaps his most influential. The tales followed the adventures of three young 
English patriots who succeeded in uncovering and thwarting the activities of the 
German espionage network in Britain. Le Queux opened his work with the 
assertion: 
 
No sane person can deny England is in grave danger of 
invasion by Germany at a date not far distant. […] That 
German spies are actively at work in Great Britain is well 
known to the authorities. The number of agents […] [is] 
believed to be over five thousand. […] As I write, I have 
before me a file of amazing documents, which plainly show 
the feverish activity with which this advance guard of our 
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enemy is working to secure for their employers the most 
detailed information […]  as well as the secrets of every detail 
of our armament, our defences, and our newest inventions; 
[…] I have refrained from giving actual names and dates, for 
obvious reasons, and have therefore been compelled, even at 
risk of being again denounced as a scaremonger, to present the 
facts in the form of fiction – fiction which […] will point to its 
own patriotic moral.211 
 
The book was not meant to be treated as a work of fiction. According to Le 
Queux it was presented in this medium only because the information was 
‘politically sensitive’. Whereas in The Invasion of 1910 the advance force of 
agents was insignificant, numbering only one hundred or so, in Spies of the 
Kaiser Britain was host to a veritable army of spies numbering in the thousands. 
Under the guidance of a chief spy in London, the agents conducted a complete 
and detailed appraisal of the country in preparation for the eventual invasion. 
The billeting and supply capacities of towns were scrupulously noted, along 
with available modes of transport. Supplies of ammunition were being 
stockpiled all over the country in preparation for ‘The Day’ to equip the army 
of spies, with several depots laid down in London.212 
There were analogous themes that ran through all three of the novels. 
The first was the exclusive focus on Germany as Britain’s antagonist. This anti-
German sentiment grew from idea that Germany coveted not only Britain’s 
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command of the seas but her extensive and bountiful Empire.213 The Invasion of 
1910 had the Germans demanding the cession of several British possessions to 
Germany, including Malta, Gibraltar and Tasmania. An indemnity was imposed 
to be paid over a period of ten years, and until full payment was made Germany 
was to occupy important English ports.214  
The second theme that ran through the novels was the increasing 
importance of the role played by the spy. In Childers’ tale the spy remained 
comparatively undeveloped with the focus on the idea of invasion. Le Queux, 
however, developed this, focusing on preliminary events that would facilitate an 
invasion. The idea that there might be an army of spies in Britain, concealed as 
civilians, and biding their time until their Fatherland was ready to strike was 
enough to inject fear into many, aggravated by the fact that this threat was 
virtually undetectable. As Bernard Porter put it, ‘This Trojan horse scenario [of 
thousands of German civilian-spies within Britain] seemed plausible enough to 
set to thousands of men and women hunting the menace in their midst’.215 The 
Times observed in August 1908 that the ‘spy mania seems to have established 
itself in our midst in quite a virulent form’.216 
It is easy to discount popular reactions to the German menace as sheer 
paranoia from an excitable population that had little idea of the real diplomatic 
or military situation that existed between Britain and Germany. However, the 
visible impact that spy fiction had on officials shows that they, too, were not 
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immune to the trepidation that gripped many. True, there were those in 
government who were amazed at the belief that was so ardently invested in the 
stories, and regarded the threat posed by foreign espionage rings as little more 
than a fantasy. Others, though, were not as dismissive. One of these men was 
James Edmonds, appointed in 1907 to head MO(5), the army intelligence sector. 
Edmonds was not only a firm believer in the spy menace, but he was also 
adamant that Berlin had an extensive ring operating within Britain. On this 
basis, Edmonds set out to prove his assumptions. He never sought to establish 
the validity of this fundamental aspect of his belief. Instead, he sought evidence 
that confirmed it.217 The investigations of MO(5), then, worked on the 
supposition that a German invasion was an impending threat, in spite of the two 
committee enquiries that had concluded that it was nearly impossible.218 
Edmonds never lacked ‘proof’ to support his assertions, although its 
credibility was highly suspect. He received much of his material from Le 
Queux, who in turn claimed that he had received it from members of the public 
concerned about the spy peril. It was these accounts that were integrated into 
Edmonds’ 1909 report and presented to a subcommittee on foreign espionage as 
confirmatory evidence of the insidious German plot.219 According to Edmonds’ 
enquiries, the spy threat was increasing. Investigations in 1907 had only 
uncovered five cases, by 1908 the number had jumped to forty-eight, and within 
the first three months of 1909 there had been twenty-four cases. A map 
prepared by Edmonds, showing the location of the sources, showed a 
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concentration in the south east of England and London. Not surprisingly, these 
were places established in the literature as the hubs of spy activity, London as 
the capital, and therefore one of the most important cities, and the south east as 
the likely landing place of an invasion force.220 This is probably more indicative 
of local feelings of vulnerability than a reflection of real espionage.  
Edmonds was not the only official concerned. In 1908 Lord Roberts 
claimed in a speech to the House of Lords that there were already 80,000 
trained German soldiers in England, ready to assist in the event of a German 
invasion.221 Sir John Barlow also asked Haldane – a Liberal member and former 
Secretary of State for War and Lord Chancellor during the war – in parliament 
if he was aware of the 66,000 trained German soldiers (men who had done their 
compulsory time in the German military) within England. In a scenario 
reminiscent of Le Queux’s buried ammunition, Barlow also alleged that in 
London cellars there were 50,000 Mauser rifles and seven million rounds of 
ammunition stored.222  
It is possible that these claims made by parliamentarians were simply 
propaganda to support the push for compulsory military service in Britain that 
was going on at the time. It was probably no coincidence that Lord Roberts was 
president of the National Service League.223 This Conservative sect agitated for 
increased military expenditure, the expansion of the army and navy and the 
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establishment of some form of military service.224 Both Le Queux and Childers 
were proponents of this view, believing Britain’s reliance on her navy made her 
weak in light of burgeoning military expansion on the continent. Promulgating 
the view that there was a sinister ‘civilian army’ within Britain, making ready 
for an invasion and subjugation of Britain, probably made the necessity of these 
steps seem more important. In July 1908, The Times carried a letter to the editor 
which indicated that spy stories were particularly popular among those agitating 
for military reform: ‘It is good that the [spy] scare should have made its 
appearance just as […] certain Ministers […] desire to carry out the already 
commenced defence-stripping process still further […] [presenting] us to the 
world as a military “nude”.’225 
Studies investigating the extent of German espionage in Britain in pre-
war years have revealed it to have been insignificant and harmless. The people, 
however, were not aware of this. They only knew what the press and popular 
literature (which had the presumption to assert their tales were, in reality, fact) 
fed them, and they saw the government responding with subcommittees and 
investigations. Newspapers urged people to report suspicious characters, or any 
encounters with ‘spies’. The Morning Post alleged that there were 90,000 
Germans living in Britain, both spies and reservists, for whom there were 
ammunition stores hidden all over the country.226 There was a £10 reward 
offered to people for sharing their experiences with the Weekly News; this 
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material was then passed onto Le Queux so he could ‘supplement his 
investigations’.227  
Some historians, such as David French, assert that it was the increasing 
inclusion of these types of stories in the press which stimulated the public 
imagination, neutralising the fictional basis of the paranoia and progressively 
inculcating the masses with the fear of a real threat.228 The responsibility cannot 
be laid solely on the press though. There was a tendency for authors to make 
their works more important than they really were. As has already been 
mentioned both Childers and Le Queux were guilty of passing their fictional 
works off as ‘fact’ and accusing the authorities of negligence.  
Another incident which caused concern in the pre-war years was the 
‘Prince Henry Competition’, a car tour around Britain. While it was a race of 
sorts, many believed, when considering it retrospectively in light of the war, 
that it had ‘a political purpose’.229 Le Queux took this one step further and 
alleged that the car tour had been organised after a secret meeting at Potsdam in 
which the invasion of England was discussed; the ‘car tour’ was really a front to 
disguise spying.230 
 The turbulence affecting European politics made Britons acutely aware 
that traditional alliances had shifted, a fact reinforced in the spy literature which 
identified Germany as the greatest threat. While Childers and Le Queux 
counted for only a fraction of the popular fiction produced on spies in the pre-
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war years, their works were influential in stimulating ‘awareness’. This was 
particularly evident in the subcommittees that periodically met to redress the 
invasion issue. Unfortunately, the more realistic scenario involving the 
reconnaissance of military or naval developments was largely overlooked in 
favour of sensational fantasies of an imminent German invasion. This 
atmosphere almost ensured that when war broke out the myth of the spy would 
obsess the imagination of the British public.  
 
The outbreak of war: government responses to the spy menace 
To many of those who believed that spies were a very real threat to British 
national security, the government attitude towards enemy aliens and naturalised 
Germans may have seemed negligent. This attitude was starkly obvious in 
newspaper columns which intermittently criticised the government for its 
evident indifference to the spy question, saying that the government was ‘not 
taking sufficiently strong measures to render these alien enemies impotent for 
harm’.231 There was little recognition that officials were, in fact, monitoring the 
situation, irrespective of whether this was apparent to the public. 
 Officials approached the spy threat fully informed and prepared. When 
war broke out the government was not blinkered by the same illusions as the 
masses. Not only were there laws designed to prevent the betrayal of sensitive 
or useful information to the enemy, but agencies devoted to monitoring enemy 
aliens and foreign agents. 
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There were two vital pieces of legislation to combat the threat of 
espionage: the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and the Aliens Restriction 
Act (also known as the Aliens Restriction Order – ARO). DORA was hurriedly 
pushed through parliament in the first days of war. This assortment of laws was 
designed to protect national security. Under its regulations espionage became a 
crime punishable by court martial and death.232 The ARO was intended to 
monitor alien enemies resident in Britain. After ordering all enemy aliens not of 
military age to leave the country by 10 August 1914, it inhibited possible 
espionage activity by those remaining aliens by preventing them from residing 
in prohibited areas or around sites of military or naval interest. Additionally, it 
required that aliens register with the local police and to inform the relevant 
authorities if they moved. The ARO also prevented enemy aliens from 
possessing firearms, vehicles, homing pigeons and wireless sets. Such was the 
nature of the law in later additions enemy aliens were not allowed to send any 
correspondence overseas.233 
In addition to legislative acts restricting aliens’ freedom, there were 
departments dedicated to counter-espionage in Britain. The first was the special 
agency of MO(t) under Vernon Kell, a subsidiary section of MO(5). The second 
was CIDs: the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department at 
Scotland Yard, initially established in the 1880s to combat Irish terrorism.234 
While the responsibility for investigation and arrest ultimately lay with Kell’s 
department, his efforts were assisted by the Postal Censors of the War Office 
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and the Cable Censors which examined suspects’ correspondence, the Military 
Port Control Service which monitored incoming individuals, the Military 
Control Officers in allied and neutral countries, who had the power to refuse 
visas, and also Britons living in Holland who provided the names of suspect 
individuals.235  
The first act of these bodies on the outbreak of war was to shatter the 
German espionage network by immediately rounding up twenty-two known 
agents. This ring had been known to the authorities since 1911, being run from 
a barber shop by a naturalised German Karl Gustav Ernst, and was so closely 
monitored that no useful information had been passed onto Berlin. Another 200 
people were placed under close monitoring.236 Many other suspects were 
investigated vigorously; in the first month of war alone the metropolitan police 
investigated between 8,000 and 9,000 individuals.237 The Daily Express 
reported that by the end of November 1914 over 120,000 reports had been 
investigated with 342 arrests and 6,000 homes searched.238  
After destroying the German spy ring on the outbreak of war, counter-
espionage worked to prevent the re-establishment of new enemy networks. 
Monitoring individuals in neutral countries allowed Kell’s unit to identify 
agents who could potentially restore a system of spying in Britain. Internally, 
using postal and telegraphic surveillance ensured no information was passed to 
Germany and identified any individuals who were potential agents. This 
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method of observation proved effective. In 1914 it uncovered one Carl Hans 
Lody, a German ex-naval officer posing as an American tourist.239 
Counter-espionage was generally successful in preventing the re-
establishment of spying in Britain. Attempts in 1915 to re-establish the network 
proved useless. The seven new agents were rounded up within a matter of 
weeks. The increasing efficiency of Britain’s counter-espionage meant by 1916 
enemy agents could only communicate by travelling to Berlin directly; any 
other method of transmission – be it telegraph, post or invisible ink – was 
intercepted and altered, or held back entirely. Statistics are more instructive: in 
the first months of 1916 there were, on average, ten reports intercepted weekly. 
A year later this had dropped to less than one a fortnight. From 1917 no more 
German agents were being brought to trial as the authorities knew when agents 
were leaving for British shores.240  
 For the enemy aliens who lived in Britain during the war, their freedom 
was subject to the fluctuating emotions of the population amongst whom they 
lived. By September 1914 there were 10,500 enemy alien civilians interned. 
However, there was little room for more due to the demands of supplying 
accommodation and supplies for the new recruits in Kitchener’s army and 
1,000 had to be released.241 The government decided that only those that posed 
a direct threat to British security would be interned, however, the public outcry 
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against this decision pushed the government to reconsider and re-intern all free 
aliens.242 
 
Enemy agents in the popular imagination 
The number of enemy agents actually uncovered was small, but popular fear of 
spies and saboteurs ran riot from the beginning of the war. The public was 
haunted by the visages of an anonymous civilian army hidden in its midst. Until 
the internment of enemy aliens was conducted in a systematic and thorough 
manner, the public was going to continue agitating its concern that potential 
spies were at large. However, the pragmatic reasons of why wholesale 
internment was impossible fell on deaf ears. Measures of space and supply did 
not convince the public that internment of every enemy alien was impossible, 
but only that the Home Office was making weak excuses to explain their failure 
to properly manage the threat.  
Newspapers encouraged vigilance and printed reports of both the real – 
for example Ernst and Lody – and alleged cases of enemy activity. On 3 
August, the day before the British ultimatum to Germany, the first ‘spy’ was 
arrested attempting to photograph the entrance to Portsmouth harbour. Two 
others were arrested at Southampton.243 By the end of the first month of war a 
number of people had reportedly been detained, including territorials and 
several military officers.244 The News of the World warned its readers of ‘The 
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Danger From Within’, telling them it was the ‘duty of the public to warn the 
authorities of any suspected treachery’.245 While they published many stories of 
spies, papers also reported extensively on aliens being tried under the ARO and 
DORA. It is possible that the continued publication of these stories – for 
reasonably minor infringements in many cases – made the presence of enemy 
aliens seem more insidious than it really was. One man was fined £100 for 
failing to register as an alien.246 Another was remanded after a woman 
apparently saw him release four pigeons, while a naturalised German was 
charged with failing to register and acting as a Special Constable.247 
Vigilance was also encouraged by stories coming from the continent 
which suggested that civic awareness had netted several spies. One was 
captured when a passer-by noticed that the man appeared to be affixing a stamp 
over minute writing on the envelope. In this way the agent had been able to 
convey secret information to Berlin, despite the fact he was being monitored.248 
The Daily Express went so far as to emulate the actions of some pre-war 
papers at the height of the spy furore and offer a reward for public ‘vigilance’. 
It offered a £10 reward (later increased to £20) for ‘vigilance [which] enables 
the authorities to discover enemy […] apparatus’.249 Other rumours suggested 
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that the War Office was willing to pay substantial amounts of money for 
information on spies. A woman travelling from St. Andrew’s became 
suspicious of a man in her carriage, and wired his name to York. Six months 
later she allegedly received a cheque for £100 from the War Office for 
‘information received’.250 The cheques seemingly became part of an urban myth 
in Britain. Another woman accidentally trod on the toe of a British soldier as 
she was waiting for a train at a station. When the man swore in German, she 
reported him and six months later, she too, received a £100 cheque.251  
Vigilance was encouraged by popular organisations formed to combat 
the ‘menace’. One of these was the Anti-German Union. This group advocated 
watchfulness, but also reinforced existing stereotypes and irrational suspicions. 
In 1915 the League warned the public of the extent of the menace in a pamphlet 
about its ‘Intelligence Department’ which 
 
[deals] with all cases of suspected espionage […] enemy aliens at 
large, or naturalised aliens whose movements are suspicious. 
[…] HAVE YOU SEEN any Germans at large who are passing 
as Swiss or using English surnames? Any German employees in 
Hotels, Restaurants, factories, etc? HAVE YOU NOTICED any 
suspicious-looking new tenants of long-unoccupied houses? Any 
suspicious-looking packages of cases arriving at lately 
unoccupied premises? Any motor cars travelling rapidly before 
or after air raids? […] IF SO, keep your eyes on them, and let us 
know at once […] EVERY MAN, EVERY WOMAN, can help; 
keep your eyes and ears open for anything in the least degree 
                                                  
250 Clark, p. 110. 
251 Ibid., p. 112. 
  
101 
suspicious […] if we cannot […] go to fight [the enemy] there, it 
is OUR DUTY to fight him here.252 
 
 Politicians, among them Haldane and McKenna – a Liberal MP and 
Home Secretary – were believed to be playing down the threat posed by spies. 
McKenna denounced many of the actions attributed to the spies as ‘unfounded 
rumour’, with no evidence of ‘actual malpractice’ made known to the 
authorities.253 Alarmists, like Henry Dalziel, were more influential and 
obviously in tune with popular sentiment. When confronted with a crowd at 
parliament protesting the freedom of naturalised Germans, Dalziel alleged: 
 
There are thousands of German in London, naturalised and 
unnaturalised, enjoying practically complete liberty, who have 
their allotted posts in case of a Zeppelin attack on London. I am 
convinced that if ever Zeppelins drop incendiary bombs on 
London many of those Germans among us would set fire to the 
city in twenty or thirty different places.254 
 
 Germans – naturalised or not – were the objects of immediate suspicion. 
This suspicion was not itself irrational. Counter-espionage had already 
uncovered an obvious Teutonic influence in the isolated incidences of spying. 
However, the suspicion was often pushed to irrational lengths. One example of 
this was the allegations that there were ‘Zeppelin clubs’ in London. After raids, 
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the rumours went, Germans would converge on secret meeting places to 
celebrate the success of the raids and the casualties they had claimed, and also 
offered advance warning of raids to the members.255 Other ridiculous 
manifestations of anti-German feeling were directed against dachshunds; in 
some instances the dogs were stoned to death, or were put down. After the war 
dogs had to be imported as the bloodlines in Britain had been severely 
diminished.256 
The most unreasonable of these lengths was the sporadic outbreak of 
riots in England, with violence being directed against German shops and their 
owners. There were isolated incidents early in the war. A West-end office of the 
German Steamship Company had its windows broken in August 1914.257 In 
October 1914 several German-owned shops were wrecked by mobs. The 
precursor to this violence was apparently the arrival of Belgian refugees in the 
area which stimulated anti-German feeling.258 The most notorious episode 
occurred in May 1915; within the space of a week the Germans sunk the 
Lusitania, allegedly crucified a Canadian officer, and the Bryce Report was 
released. These also coincided with the first use of gas a month earlier. The 
popular sentiment tended towards outrage. Shops were wrecked, stores looted, 
                                                  
255 ‘Naturalised Treason – Toasting the Kaiser in London – Zeppelin Soup’, Daily Express, 11 
May 1916; ‘Hun Centres in London – Advance Warning of Zeppelin Raids – Secret Haunts of 
Treachery’, Daily Express, 27 April 1915. 
256 Hayward, p. 7.  
257 ‘Germans in London’, The Times, 12 August 1914, p. 3. 
258 ‘Anti-German Riot in London – Shops Wrecked by an Angry Crowd’, Daily Express, 19 
October 1914, p. 6. 
  
103 
property destroyed, and shop vendors chased. Anger was vented against 
anything German.259   
 Not surprisingly, the main categories of suspect Germans were those 
established by pre-war spy literature. Waiters in particular fell under acute 
suspicion. Basil Thomson recounted one incident in which an elderly couple 
reported a suspicious German waiter. The man declared himself to be Swiss; 
however, they suspected that this was simply a cover. The couple alleged that 
the waiter had a drawing which they recognised to be a plan of Kensington 
Gardens and the Palace. Under Thomson’s questioning, the man admitted that 
they were indeed plans, but of the table layout of the restaurant where he had 
recently been employed.260 There were frequent cries in the paper to rally the 
national spirit and sack foreign waiters with allegations that many had proven 
to be ‘first-class spies in the pay of the German Secret Service’. One article 
accused a hotel which employed several foreigners of signalling. It also 
encouraged hotels to display certificates proving they had no foreign waiters in 
their employment.261 The public was implored to verify the claims of any 
waiters professing to be Swiss by asking to see their passports.262 Some 
individuals even claimed that German waiters had betrayed their true 
allegiance; when diners turned to German waiter and asked him at what port he 
was to report when the German invaders arrived, he would inevitably click his 
heels and answer ‘Portsmouth’, or something similar, having been taken by 
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surprise.263 Under the simple headline ‘Waiter!’, the Daily Express informed 
readers that Berlin boasted of having ‘an army corps in the very middle of 
London’ which was apparently doing them a very ‘useful service’.264 A 
concerned citizen – ‘F’ – agitated for all aliens to be interned in concentration 
camps, irrespective of naturalisation. This individual asserted that 
 
[t]hose who behold in this ubiquity [of German waiters and 
hoteliers] not only a network of espionage, but a systematised 
preparation for invasion, may not be far wrong, judging by the 
light of the Belgian and French experience. The French have 
discovered that attached to every German battalion is one man or 
more perfectly familiar with the district where the battalion is 
operating. More often than not he had been employed in a local 
hotel or restaurant.265 
 
Barbers, too, were subject to this distrust. At Aldershot it was rumoured 
that a man who had been a hairdresser in the area for over twenty years had 
been arrested at the waterworks with poison stashed up his shirt.266 Other 
rumours in circulation suggested that barbers slit the throats of their British 
clientele; however, given the arrest of the spy ring being run from a barber’s 
shop, the suspicion was not surprising.267 
Other service occupations came under suspicion too. Bakers were 
suspected of harbouring Zeppelins in their yards. MacDonagh mentioned that 
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his charwoman, along with some of her acquaintances, did not believe that 
Zeppelins could not travel from Germany to England, and back again. ‘Don’t 
you believe it!’, she said, ‘[we] know in Battersea that these ‘ere Zeppelins are 
hidden away in the back-yards of German bakers!’268 Just how the giant 
dirigibles were supposed to be hidden was not revealed. Grocers and other 
‘purveyors of food’ (which quite feasibly encompassed bakers) were suspected 
of putting slow poisons into the commodities they sold.269 Governesses were 
also common targets of rumours. Many a person had a ‘friend of a friend’ who 
had discovered a false bottom in their governess’ trunk. It was invariably 
packed with revolvers, maps, explosives or some other incriminating article.270  
 Although they were obviously the immediate suspects, this suspicion 
was not confined to Germans. Anyone who aroused distrust could come under 
scrutiny. Britons were reported as spies because they ‘looked odd’ or because 
they were seen whispering.271 This was probably inflamed by reports of native 
Britons being charged with espionage. One British subject received a life 
sentence of penal servitude for ‘collecting, recording, and attempting to 
communicate to the enemy information concerning his Majesty’s military 
forces, works, and munitions’.272 Basil Thomson recorded that the cumulative 
effect of the suspicion was that it was ‘positively dangerous [for someone] to be 
seen in conversation with a pigeon’.273 A man in Maldon, Essex, had his house 
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surrounded by a crowd, and searched by police, after a pigeon landed on the 
roof of his house.274 A foreigner walking through a park was arrested simply 
because someone saw a pigeon flying away from him. It was assumed the man 
had released it, and he was detained.275 One German man was sentenced to six 
months imprisonment after a woman claimed she had seen him release a 
pigeon, although she did admit that she never actually saw the pigeon leaving 
his hand.276 
Government workers were subject to frequent harassment; it became a 
form of occupational hazard. Andrew Clark noted the attempts of an ordinance 
surveyor to carry out his work. The man was arrested multiple times – even 
presenting his official documentation was not sufficient to placate suspicious 
locals.277 A British archaeologist was arrested as a spy by an overzealous 
station master suspicious of the number of maps and diagrams the man was 
carrying.278 
Sometimes this scrutiny had tragic results. A forty-year-old professor 
died from an illness caused by stress; rumours had been circulating that he was 
a German spy. A coroner ruled that the stress these unfounded rumours had 
caused resulted in the illness which ultimately took his life.279  
 Early in the war, the fear of a German invasion led to fantasies about 
plans among resident Germans to assist in its organisation and execution. 
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Letters to the editors of various papers betrayed the concern felt by the 
population. Just as authors had imagined in pre-war fiction, many civilians 
believed Britain was infested with a German army silently awaiting the arrival 
of the German army. On 1 September 1914 the Daily Express carried a letter 
written by ‘ex-volunteer’. The anonymous writer alleged that Britain was host 
to an army of spies; under pre-war emigration rules German subjects were 
obligated to move to a Reich protectorate but if they were willing to undertake 
certain duties on behalf of their country they could go where they pleased, and 
at the same time significantly reduce the period of compulsory military service. 
There were three conditions to this arrangement: that they had to learn the 
language of the country so as to pass as a native; that they report on occasion to 
the ‘Chief spy’; and that that they provide in minute detail the particulars of the 
area in which they chose to live, including billeting capacities. ‘Ex-volunteer’ 
went on to allege that ‘every spy of the 30,000 here is a man trained to arms’ 
that has ‘made a thorough study of his district in every single particular’.280 
 One newspaper feature asserted that a spy ring uncovered in France had 
a counterpart in England and proceeded to detail the threat posed by at least 
160,000 Germans within London. These ‘peaceful citizens’ were allegedly 
deployed to strategic points, just as their equivalents had done in France and 
Belgium.281 Another article informed its readers that a force of 200,000 
Germans were to help the enemy in the event of an invasion; 30,000 of these 
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individuals were residing in London. The article used this as evidence to back 
its assertion that all Germans in England should be under close surveillance to 
prevent them assisting the enemy.282 Weapon caches were said to have been 
uncovered and seized in London and several other parts of England. 
Presumably, these were the armaments for the spies when the invasion 
happened and the agents would be called to do their duty. The reason this had 
not been widely reported was to avoid causing panic.283 In August 1914, The 
Times reported the discovery of a significant quantity of arms in London. 
However, the fact they had been abandoned in empty lots and vacant spaces 
suggested that the weapons were dumped by aliens wanting to avoid 
prosecution under the ARO.284 
The numbers offered in these accounts of German misdeeds did not tally 
with 1911 figures which showed there were only 53,000 German born 
immigrants lived in Britain; 27,000 of whom lived in London.285 Obviously the 
public focused their attentions on naturalised Germans too, but arguably 
immigrants would have been the dangerous components of any pre-invasion 
force as male immigrants likely would have undergone their compulsory 
military training, a factor referred to in several of the articles.  
Proof of this civilian army was found everywhere. One Hubert Rhodes 
informed the Daily Express that while travelling by train he found himself 
sitting next to a German. He asked him ‘Wie gehts?’ (How are you?) upon 
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which the German asked Rhodes for his code word.286 ‘A Coast Dweller’ had it 
from the mouth of a naturalised German doctor that all Germans in England 
were to ‘mobilise and march on London’ when the Kaiser’s forces landed on 
the coast. The doctor, and another German in the area, openly signalled out to 
sea and also had family members in the territorials.287 A spy arrested early in 
the war was rumoured to have been found with details of the extensive 
arrangements to be put into place after a German invasion, including a list of 
the people to be taken hostage.288 
Evidence of the fear of invasion was palpable in several other rumours 
and fantasies. Stories circulated on the continent that a German pre-invasion 
force, in preparation for war, had left information on the back of signs and 
advertisements for the German army. In this way spies had been able to 
communicate all the pertinent information about the locality. As the first enemy 
troops arrived in French and Belgian towns, signs were removed and the 
information gathered. When this story reached Britain, London was overrun 
with concerned civilians in screwdriver parties, removing advertisements and 
road signs to ensure German agents had not employed similar tactics to betray 
their host.289 Andrew Clark noted a rumour alleging that road signs affixed to 
the sides of houses in France were found, when removed, to have a loose brick 
or stone behind them. In these cavities agents had stashed information about the 
district including available supplies, roads, and housing. It was revealed that the 
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road sign contract had been won, and undertaken, by a German firm before the 
war.290 
Agony columns were also suspected by some of providing a medium of 
communicating important information to Germany. This was believed to stem 
from the habit of Belgian refugees to correspond with friends abroad in this 
manner. A British man became obsessed with the idea and was convinced that 
many advertisements were actually communications between German 
submarines and their bases, or forewarned of events such as air raids.291 
Another popular expression of the invasion fears was the gun platforms. 
This set of rumours alleged that houses, tennis courts, lake beds and even 
factory roofs were, in fact, reinforced concrete platforms to support the heavy 
Krupp guns to be used against Britain in the event of the German invasion.292 A 
factory – found to have in its employ several Germans – garnered headlines in 
the Daily Express when it was found to have a concrete roof four feet thick, 
capable of holding artillery. The factory site commanded views of London, 
major railways and the Crystal Palace.293 Basil Thomson recounted the effect 
these rumours had: 
 
[given] a British householder with a concrete tennis-court and 
pigeons about the house […] it was certain to be discovered […] 
that heavy cases had been delivered to the house by night, that 
tapping had been overheard, mysterious lights seen in the 
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windows, and that on the evening of the sinking of the Lusitania 
he had given a dinner-party to naturalised Germans.294 
 
The raid on Great Yarmouth – carried out after German mine laying was 
interrupted by the British navy – was believed to have been facilitated by spies. 
The German cruisers had descended on Yarmouth at ‘full speed’ despite the 
harbour being fully mined for defence. Locals deduced that information about 
the town’s defences had been passed to the Germans to enable the success of 
the raid.295 After the bombardment of Hartlepool and Scarborough, popular 
sentiment was convinced that German spies had been responsible for its 
success. Hartlepool was believed to be particularly infested with spies, and at 
Whitby it was rumoured that one well known spy had not been arrested until 
well after the war broke out; he was the spy assumed to be responsible for 
supplying the German navy with information to make the attacks possible.296 
Both of these incidents proved that the German navy could get within close 
range of British shores, aggravating concerns of invasion even more.  
 Fantasies also focused on sabotage, attempted sabotage, and intended 
sabotage. Newspapers and circulating gossip recreated scenarios reminiscent of 
pre-war fiction. Some of these stories carried subtle inferences of preparation 
for an invasion; others – particularly those later in the war – seemed to be 
directed against the war efforts of Britain and her allies. Mysterious figures 
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skulking in the night, attacking sentries and cutting telegraph wires, were 
reminiscent of the actions of Germany’s advance force in The Invasion of 1910. 
One signalman was attacked and found, upon recovering consciousness, his 
telephone had been destroyed and the wires cut.297 A sentry was shot by two 
men loitering near petrol tanks.298 A railway patrol near Aldershot was attacked 
by two foreigners.299 Given that officials declared that no alleged attacks on 
sentries had been substantiated, and that there had been no incidents of sabotage 
in unison with the attacks, these incidents were probably the result of fertile 
imaginations and fictional influences than reality. But there was no admission 
by the Daily Express, which carried these stories, that they were not 
substantiated. The alleged attempts of sabotage were reported as everyday fact. 
When one considers the nature of the alleged sabotage attempts, their 
implausibility seems evident. Attacking a single station, telegraph line or works 
would have achieved little unless they were co-ordinated with other, 
simultaneous attacks, which they were not. 
Other early sabotage reports were more malevolent; Andrew Clark’s 
daughter reported that five men had been arrested attempting to poison 
London’s main water reservoir at Chingford in Essex.300 Interestingly, a similar 
story was in circulation in Germany, with reports of attempts on Berlin’s water 
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supply.301 In 1915 rumours circulated to the effect that people should ‘beware’ 
of the Tubes as they would be subject to a gas attack.302 
 Even after the war settled into the stalemate of the trenches, and the 
immediate threat of invasion had passed, spy stories continued to circulate 
widely. But the role of the alleged espionage activities shifted from facilitating 
an invasion to sabotaging the British war effort. In 1917, the explosion of a 
munitions plant in London fostered rumours that spies had been responsible. 
Although only sixty-nine people were killed – popular gossip had this number 
in the thousands – and an official investigation showed it was nothing more 
than a tragic accident, the public remained convinced of foul play.303 An 
explosion that destroyed a grain elevator in New York was rumoured to have 
been caused by a bomb. While there was no explicit mention of German 
sabotage, the headlines proclaimed otherwise: ‘More German Outrages in New 
York.’304 An incendiary fire in a Pennsylvanian factory destroyed guns and 
other war materials destined for the Allied war effort, worth millions of pounds. 
As a result of this attack five men were ‘awaiting trial […] on charges of 
plotting to destroy ships and factories’.305 Britain’s other allies were also under 
attack. In Canada, German saboteurs were accused of blowing up a club.306 In 
one of the most devastating accidents of the war, a fully loaded munitions ship 
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exploded in Halifax, Canada, on 6 October 1917. Two thousand were killed, 
9,000 injured and two square kilometres of the town were obliterated. Although 
it was the result of a collision between the Mont-Blanc, carrying the munitions, 
and the Imo, British newspapers were quick to question the role spies may have 
had.307 
As the threat of invasion faded, fantasies linked this scenario became 
less common. They began to focus on threats that now seemed more relevant 
like attempts by enemy agents, or traitors, to signal Zeppelins or submarines. 
These were particularly relevant due to the inevitable civilian casualties that 
would result from successful raids, and it proved to be one of the most common 
complaints received by authorities. From the time of the first raid on British 
shores in December 1914, it became an entrenched belief that spies assisted 
raiders by leading them to their targets, or that spies signalled important 
information to German submarines lying off the English coast, just as Le 
Queux’s nefarious spies had in ‘How the plans of Rosyth were stolen’.308 It was 
announced that ‘[every] movement of the Fleet, every military disposition, is 
almost certain to be signalled in one of a hundred ways to the German 
authorities.’309 
In countless incidents that were repeated throughout the war, there were 
reports of roaring motor cars – headlights on full beam – guiding the Zeppelins 
from town to town. Rider Haggard recounted a friend who professed to have 
been followed by a Zeppelin, which mistook the man for its guide, when he was 
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driving home in his motor car; the craft even gave the individual three minutes 
to get away before it started dropping bombs.310  
Basil Thomson heard many of the more ridiculous allegations in his 
work with Scotland Yard; a person was reportedly signalling to submarines in 
the North Sea. However, the suspect light was only visible to the house directly 
across the street.311 The slightest trace of a light fuelled suspicions of enemy 
signalling; an acquaintance of Rider Haggard found the esplanade outside their 
house ‘filled from side to side with a mob who swore that signalling to the 
Germans was going on from the house’, after a light was glimpsed through the 
blinds.312  
 By 1916, potential German spies had mostly been interned or arrested. 
However, the fact that the war continued to drag on with no chance of victory 
in sight caused growing frustration. The need to explain the long stalemate on 
the Western Front led to the scapegoating of two groups: ‘unpatriotic’ elements 
in the British working and middle classes, and alleged traitors amongst the 
British upper classes and ruling party.  
 Labour organisations involved in industrial unrest were said to be 
encouraged by German agents who fostered disaffection among workers, 
wanting them to believe ‘they would be just as well off under the Kaiser as 
under the King’.313 This had immediate connotations of undermining the war 
effort by interrupting vital munitions work needed to supply the front. Anti-
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conscriptionists were also increasingly associated with German espionage. In 
1916 the detective branch of MI5 raided the No-Conscription Fellowship and 
the National Council Against Conscription under the suspicion that they were ‘a 
dangerous weapon whereby the loyalty of the people is being prostituted’ and 
that ‘if they are not for the success of our country it is not unreasonable if they 
are classed as pro-German. That, at any rate, is what the mass of the public 
considers them; and the public is substantially right.’314 
Pacifists and anti-war feminists were also suspected of harbouring pro-
German sympathies. In 1915 the Daily Express warned its readers that spies 
were responsible for carrying out subtle anti-war propaganda in Britain. Agents 
were visiting women’s suffrage societies with their ‘permeation polices’. In 
addition, these anti-British elements were carrying out a ‘campaign of 
insinuation and discord-sowing’, claiming that the cordial relations between the 
Entente Cordiale were a farce. The article warned readers to disregard these 
claims as it was the aim of the agents to undermine recruitment and ensure 
better terms for Germany when she was finally defeated.315 The News of the 
World cautioned the public to be weary of the ‘Masked Treason of Pacifism’, 
arguing that there was a pro-German influence in pacifist groups, accusing 
them of either being ‘intentional traitors’ or ‘dupes’.316  Individuals associated 
with pacifism were subject to police raids; one woman, who became a pacifist 
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after serving at the front as a nurse, was not only raided but accused several 
times of being a German spy.317  
The suspicion of these groups reflected genuine fears that unpatriotic 
elements, perhaps encouraged by German agents, were handicapping the war 
effort. However, they were also an expression of resentment, directed at groups 
that had emerged as threats to the established social, economic and political 
order. Although many Labourites and socialists saw the war as instigated by the 
ruling elite, but fought by the workers, many were willing to put their 
differences aside and support the British cause. Emmeline and Christabel 
Pankhurst and numerous other suffragettes also put their campaigning aside to 
support the war effort in the belief that this was a better way to gain the vote 
than agitating.318 In spite of this widespread support there were elements of 
these groups which were not willing to suspend their efforts – such as Sylvia 
Pankhurst – and it was these elements that came under popular attack. 
Evidence of the sentiment levelled at dissenting ideologies is evident in 
an Anti-German League pamphlet entitled, ‘Are You Pro-German’. The 
pamphlet unequivocally equated pacifism with being ‘pro-German’: 
 
Do you want to help the Germans to conquer England? If you do, 
go and join the Fellowship of Reconciliation, or the Union of 
Democratic Control, or the No-conscription Fellowhip, or any 
other anti-war or peace-at-any-price society […] Don’t listen to 
the pro-German and the peacemonger, but “do your bit” for your 
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Country by joining the Anti-German League […] Britain for the 
British!’319 
 
The consistent insinuations that pacifists worked to undermine the war 
effort bore fruit in March 1917 when four individuals – including two women – 
were arrested for devising a plot to kill members of government. They 
specifically targeted Lloyd George, as he was held responsible for the 
prosecution of the war, and Arthur Henderson, for betraying his socialist 
values.320 Not only did they seek to poison the men with curare, but they were 
also known for harbouring conscientious objectors avoiding conscription.321  
 The suspicion levelled at these groups was also a reflection of anxieties 
about the social stresses and disaffection that emerged as the war went on. As 
the months dragged out, the sacrifices asked of the population increased: food 
economy, rationing, donations, investment in war bonds, and more men were 
all required to sustain the war effort. The possibility of a negotiated peace 
before total victory could be achieved was anathema to many. General Botha 
argued that ‘[the] War must be prosecuted with all determination. Peace at the 
present time could only result in preparations for an even more appalling 
struggle. No lasting peace is possible without complete victory.’322 In this 
atmosphere it was to the advantage of patriots to associate anti-conscriptionists 
and pacifists as ‘pro-German’. Ostracising the dissenting ideologies in this way 
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and vilifying their beliefs made such ideas untenable among the general 
population who considered themselves patriotic.  
 These pressures did not just make people more susceptible to pacific 
attitudes – the prolongation of war and increasing deprivation prompted the 
need to find a scapegoat to explain why the war had not been won.  
 There was substantial agitation about alleged traitors amongst the 
British upper classes. This was most apparent in the ‘Hidden Hand’ accusations 
that supposed influential figures in governmental, political, economic and social 
circles, were betraying the nation to the Germans. There were rumours of ‘high-
placed men in England who have lived for years in the enjoyment of generous 
allowances from a mysterious source.’323 The public was warned about 
suspecting the wrong people for betraying Britain: ‘[people] have been 
suspecting the waiters and servants, whilst the spies are in high social 
positions.’324 The idea of the ‘Hidden Hand’ had been established in the pre-
war spy fiction; the spy in Riddle of the Sands was an Englishman bearing an 
‘honourable name’. Cynthia Asquith also suggested that such stories had been 
in circulation well before the war.325 
Several British figures fell victim to these insinuations. At any given 
time rumours suggested that a sizeable portion of the peerage, including the 
Crown Prince, was locked in the Tower, or had been ‘shot at dawn’.326 Prince 
Louis of Battenberg was forced to resign his position in the admiralty due to 
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rumours of his German birth.327 Highly placed ladies were rumoured to have 
been arrested for passing on military information to the Germans for air raids, 
which led to bombings on days that had military movements.328 
Lord Haldane was a popular target, described by some as a ‘German in 
disguise’.329 His pre-war expression of admiration for German learning and 
culture, and his identification with Germany as his ‘spiritual home’, in 
combination with his objections to introducing compulsory military service 
made many question whether Haldane was actually a pawn of the Kaiser. John 
Schooling expressed this view in 1915, arguing that Haldane had intentionally 
kept Britain’s army weak and undermined attempts to strengthen British forces 
after ‘being duped by the flattery of the German Emperor’. He encouraged the 
Daily Express to ‘continue [its] patriotic endeavour to get rid of Lord Haldane’, 
arguing that ‘his right place is Berlin – not Westminster’.330 Rumours even 
went so far as to allege that Haldane and the Kaiser were actually illegitimate 
brothers.331 Haldane’s chauffer was also said to be German. After the outbreak 
of war he took a holiday to Switzerland where he was suspected of carrying on 
into Germany and transmitting information to the authorities there.332 
MacDonagh recorded that there were many – among them Radical 
member Henry Dalziel – that believed naturalised Germans were occupying 
high positions in government. Dalziel went so far as to allege that these trusted 
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figures were more dangerous than the Germans barbers.333 This allegation of 
high-level corruption emerged again in 1916 after Kitchener drowned at sea. 
Rumours abounded that the wife of a cabinet minister, or a minister, gave the 
information to Germany that a ship was about to sail with important military 
figures on board.334 Interestingly, this suspicion did not affect other members of 
the British ruling class who shared a similar pro-German outlook. Lord Bryce 
shared Haldane’s high opinion of Germany; however, his condemnation of 
German atrocities in the Bryce Report possibly sheltered him from the same 
animosity directed against Haldane.  
 The most infamous incident of the war that fuelled speculation into the 
existence of the ‘Hidden Hand’ was the trial between Pemberton Billing and 
Maud Allen in 1918. Allen sued Billing for defamation and libel after he 
accused her of sexual perversion for her part in Oscar Wilde’s Salome. At some 
point in proceedings, the trial degenerated into a sensationalist farce when 
Billing made the startling revelation of a ‘Black Book’. This book supposedly 
contained 47,000 names – men and women – of influential British figures and 
their spouses; while also listing their particular sexual predilections and 
perversions, exclusively for the purpose of blackmail to extract information. 
The book was said to hold the names of the whole of the Royal household, and 
accused various ministerial wives, including Prime Minister Asquith’s wife, of 
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lesbianism.335 While sensational and seemingly ridiculous, it did offer an 
explanation as to why the war was interminably dragging out. 
 
Popular reception and function of spy rumours 
It is starkly obvious that spy myths and rumours were well established in 
British society during the war. But this prevalence does not necessarily indicate 
widespread acceptance. So, did Britons believe them? An analysis of 
contemporary sources would suggest that the majority did. There was ample 
mention given to spies in memoirs, diaries, and clearly the popular press, in 
which the subject of spies maintained a consistent presence. Michael 
MacDonagh’s memoirs indicate that not only were spy rumours rife, but were 
popular among the public. Even stories that were verbally transmitted – such as 
tales of ‘outrages’ by bands of German spies, and the stockpiles of weaponry 
discovered in the trunks of governesses – were believed as true, but allegedly 
disguised behind the veneer of press censorship.336 The subject of spies, aliens 
and internment occupied a significant aspect of his commentary on the London 
home front which serves as evidence that the myths surrounding the enemy 
agent were generally believed.  
 The commentaries provided by memoirs and diaries also indicate that 
spies were a lasting concern for the population at home. This is supported by 
the incidence of stories, such as those outlined above. Although they underwent 
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significant changes in their themes as the war progressed, the central concern of 
the spy remained static.  
There were times when the spy issue was somewhat diminished in 
importance. However, the stories invariably returned and were not recycled in 
the same manner as atrocities which – even in the later years of war – tended to 
focus on the events of the 1914 invasion of Belgium. This suggests that the 
stories evolved to match the explanatory needs of the British population. 
During the first months of the war while combat was highly mobile, the 
primary concern was of a possible invasion of Britain. This was heightened as 
the German army pushed for the Channel ports in Belgium. However, as the 
danger dissipated, the rumours instead began to focus on sabotage and damage 
to the British war effort. 
Another indicator of the prevalence of belief in the spies, and the 
rumours surrounding them, was the number of people who joined in agitation 
against Germans in Britain. In 1918, the British Empire Union, whose catch-all 
was ‘the Extirpation – Root and Branch and Seed – of German control and 
influence from the British Empire’ had a membership in the region of 10,000 – 
including Conservative member Lord Beresford – and fifty branches throughout 
Britain.337 The National Party, which campaigned for more stringent internment 
of enemy aliens, collated a petition which exhibits just how strongly many 
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Britons felt on the subject. The petition, presented at parliament on 24 August 
1918 held 1,250,000 signatures.338 
It is probable that the prevalence of spy myths was reinforced by two 
things: the pre-war basis laid down in fictional literature, and the few isolated 
cases of espionage that were uncovered in Britain. The popularity of the spy 
genre in the years leading up to World War One can be linked to the spy mania 
that broke out in 1914. There were obvious parallels between the rumours of 
espionage activity and the scenarios fashioned by authors like Le Queux. Many 
of the stereotypes established in fiction were regurgitated during the war and 
cast suspicion on various service occupations. Claims by Le Queux that a 
civilian army lay dormant were revisited in various letters to the editor which 
wove scenarios of a well-trained and well-equipped menace. Le Queux 
continued to exert his old influence as a popular ‘authority’ on spies, possibly 
indicative of the weight his pre-war works carried. In 1915 Le Queux published 
German Spies in England, assuring readers that ‘[few] men […] have been 
more closely associated with, or knew more of the astounding inner machinery 
of German espionage in this country […] than myself’.339 This book, which 
detailed the ongoing espionage, and more pre-war incidents, sold over 40,000 
copies in one week in February alone.340 
Much like the myth of the ‘Bestial Hun’ was supported by the incidence 
of real atrocities, spy rumours were supported by the arrest of real – though of 
insignificant numbers – enemy agents. The first case, which was uncovered and 
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publicised extensively in the first days of the war, involved the arrest of a 
naturalised German barber. While the threat was downplayed by authorities, the 
fact that there was palpable proof of spies within Britain no doubt gave implicit 
reinforcement to the rapidly emerging stories. 
Although rumours of spies were widely believed, there was some 
scepticism. This disbelief was similar to that experienced by atrocity stories – it 
did not question the fact there were spies in Britain, but it did question the 
rumoured extent of the problem, just as others questioned the extent of German 
atrocities. However, primary sources suggest that this scepticism was perhaps 
most notable among those who were affected or those who had access to 
accurate knowledge on the reality of the spy menace. Cynthia Asquith 
expressed her disgust at the rumours of the ‘Hidden Hand’, evidently due to the 
lurid accusations levelled at her mother-in-law, Margot.341  
The myths and rumours surrounding spies did have sociological and 
political roles. The stories fulfilled a function, although it was quite different to 
that filled by atrocities. Where the ‘Bestial Hun’ of the German army united 
Britons against all Germans, spies proved to be divisive in Britain. It not only 
divided it along class lines – as the élite were accused by the lower classes of 
pro-German sympathies – but also rent British society. The idea of the 
ubiquitous spy caused suspicion that was applied to anyone that aroused 
mistrust among British patriots, and undoubtedly caused a great deal of 
heartache for some. Author D. H. Lawrence was forced to endure house 
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searches and was eventually forced to leave his home in Cornwall – considered 
a prohibited area – because he was married to a German.342 
This discordant aspect of the spy genre goes some way to explaining 
why the stories were not promulgated by the incumbent governments. The 
anxiety the rumours caused, and the often baseless accusations against innocent 
people likely proved that there was little positive benefit that could be wrung 
from the trope. Also, the mass belief in the indolence of the government when it 
came to the spy question – springing from a lack of popular understanding 
about the reality of the situation – made it likely that the government could 
derive little positive effect from taking part in their propagation and so chose 
not to stress the problem. Given Conservative members of parliament, such as 
Henry Dalziel, seized on the stories and used them to rouse popular opinion 
against the government this seems likely.  
The link between spy stories and tensions within the British population 
suggests that they were a medium through which people could express their 
discontent at the perceived inertia of the government or the potentially 
demoralising effect of dissenting ideologies, within the confines of a patriotic 
motif. There was a clear anti-government tone to many rumours, particularly 
those of the ‘Hidden Hand’. These articulated the dissatisfaction, felt by many, 
that not only was the government taking insubstantial steps to combat the spy 
menace, but also to win the war. Creating a ‘Hidden Hand’ to explain this was 
effective. It not only described why the British government was not doing 
more, but laid the responsibility for the problem firmly at German feet. These 
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rumours allowed people to express anti-government sentiments in terms that 
still left no doubt of their own patriotic allegiance to the British cause. 
Conservatives were able to vilify and marginalise groups with 
ideologies they found threatening to the social order in wartime. This was 
evident in the warnings the Daily Express – a conservative bulletin – gave 
concerning the suspected ‘pro-German’ influence within feminist groups and 
other pacifist organisations.  
These could be interpreted as implicit expressions of uneasiness at the 
seemingly flux nature of society during the war which saw women leaving the 
traditional confines of the home to work, a great increase in governmental 
powers, and the perception that British society was being threatened by an 
internal enemy that was virtually impossible to detect.  
On a personal level the spies offered the British population on the home 
front a chance to participate in the war. Confined to British shores, the spy 
‘peril’ allowed patriotic Britons to do their bit for the war effort, and to protect 
their shores from the sinister plots being hatched to the detriment of their 
country. This possibly explains the number of reports the authorities received of 
espionage activity, despite them being largely unfounded.  
 
Conclusion 
Paranoia about spies and enemy agents had its more remote origins in the rising 
international tensions that preceded the First World War, and the consequent 
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spate of alarmist literature warning that Britain was vulnerable to spies, 
saboteurs, traitors, and invasion.  
 However, the paranoia also stemmed from the fears, stresses and 
responsibilities of a nation involved in the trauma of ‘Total War’. The extensive 
reporting of German atrocities made people fearful of an enemy that had 
committed such horrific crimes against Belgian and French civilians. The 
British population feared an invasion by Germany and the resultant anxiety led 
people to not only look for threats, but to imagine them.  
 In an era when whole populations were mobilised for war, the British 
people expected German nationals and those with German connections to be 
mobilised by the Fatherland to assist its war effort. This again fed the paranoia 
and motivated calls for widespread deportation and internment.  
The myths and rumours of the German spy amounted to the creation of 
a larger discourse – the Discourse of Hidden Spies – which allowed the British 
to incorporate the enemy agent into a wider explanation of the war, and also 
gave it meaning. It did this in several ways. In an era of nationalism and Total 
War, patriotic Britons wanted desperately to contribute to the war effort. In 
heeding calls to report any suspicious activity, they felt they made their 
contribution to defeating a nefarious enemy.  
 This larger discourse also marginalised dissenting ideologies which 
were identified as ‘pro-German’. As Britain’s Germans were interned, the threat 
from specifically German agents diminished and both patriotic fears and 
paranoid fantasies turned focus on potential enemies within the British nation. 
These fears and fantasies did not focus on the British middle classes, but on 
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groups that recruited disproportionately from echelons above and below them: 
the upper classes, who were targeted with accusations they were concealing in 
their midst a Hidden Hand that protected traitors and betrayed information to 
the Germans; and the lower-middle and working classes, who provided the bulk 
of the disaffected unionists, anti-conscriptionists, pacifists and anti-war 
feminists who seemed to be helping the German cause. In this vision of reality, 
patriotism was predominantly a middle-class virtue, and the claim that Britain 
was beset by spies, saboteurs and traitors carried the stamp of a middle-class 
fantasy.  
Despite the furore that surrounded the myth of the German spy and the 
multitude of rumours of espionage, by 1917 the bare facts show how fantastical 
and unrealistic the popular outcry was. Only twenty-four spies had been tried 
and convicted: twelve were executed; six had their sentences commuted to 
penal servitude from death; and six were sentenced to penal servitude.343 The 
ubiquity of the German agent was exposed as a mirage. 
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Chapter 4. The Supernatural: 
Angels, Ghosts and Prophecies of 
War 
 
‘On that most awful day of that awful time’, at a decisive point on the British 
salient, a solitary English company stood between an army of 300,000 Germans 
and the destruction of the entire British army. For the better part of a day the 
1,000 strong band of soldiers withstood constant bombardment to which the 
British artillery had no reply. When only 500 of the brave troops remained, the 
German infantry began their advance. As the doomed men made their final 
stand against the encroaching sea of grey uniforms, one young soldier uttered 
four words: Adsit Anglis Sanctus Georgius, ‘May Saint George be present to 
help the English’. At that very moment, a shock passed through his body and 
the noise of battle ebbed away. A distant cry of ‘Array, array, array!’ echoed 
over the field as thousands of voices solicited the aid of England’s protector. 
Looking up the young Tommy saw a line of bowmen stretched along the British 
line, loosing their arrows into the seething horde of Germans. The cries to Saint 
George continued and, before long, 10,000 strong German soldiers lay dead on 
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the battlefield.344 This short story, published by Arthur Machen in the Evening 
News in September 1914, spawned one of the most enduring myths of the war – 
the so-called ‘angels of Mons’. 
Stories of the supernatural have often emerged during times of war, but 
in few previous conflicts did they become so firmly rooted in the popular 
imagination as during World War I. These stories can be roughly divided into 
three categories: stories of divine intervention, which told of saints and angels 
fighting with the Allies; stories about the return of the dead, which asserted that 
fallen comrades continued the battle against Germany; and stories about the 
omens, prophecies and portents which, it was claimed, had foretold the coming 
of a cataclysmic war. It will be the purpose of this chapter to explore the 
origins, dissemination, reception and function of supernatural tales to examine 
how they contributed to the construction of a discourse about the war on the 
home front. 
 
Three types of supernatural stories 
The first category of supernatural story consisted of omens and prophecies that 
were made concerning the war. Many of these stories, though current during the 
war itself, actually focused on events that were alleged to have taken place 
before its outbreak. These events were then interpreted retrospectively during 
the Great War, within the context of contemporary events.  
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In the years preceding 1914, there had been several such incidents 
which, once the war had broken out, provided material for the making of myths. 
On Sedan day in 1911, for example, in the town of Arten, the statue of 
Bismarck allegedly dropped its sword. This was followed shortly thereafter by 
the sword arm. The outbreak of the Balkan war soon after this episode 
convinced some that the dropping of the sword was an omen. In Switzerland, a 
small lake near Lucerne was believed to signal an approaching war by turning 
the colour of blood. The lake had turned crimson before the Franco-Prussian 
war, and again before the outbreak of the Balkan wars.345 The significance of 
the Balkans was by no means slight; many contemporaries believed it was a 
direct antecedent of the First World War. Therefore, the omens that were 
originally seen as portents of the Balkan wars were subsequently reinterpreted 
as harbingers of the Great War. All across Europe there had been signs of 
imminent disaster, had anyone cared to take notice. The bell of Rouland in 
Ghent, Belgium, widely held to be a symbol of liberty, had cracked. During 
World War One this was interpreted, with the benefit of hindsight, as a sign of 
the peril that Belgium was to face.346 
Meanwhile, men on the Western Front attached great meaning to a 
statue of the Virgin Mary on the Albert Basilica. The statue at the top of the 
dome had been damaged in January 1915, and hung at a precarious ninety 
degree angle with the ground. Rumour had it that when the Virgin fell the war 
                                                  
345 R. Shirley, Prophecies and omens of the Great War (London, 1914), pp. 46-47.  
346 Ibid., p. 47. 
  
133 
would end, which gradually evolved to whichever side caused the statue to fall, 
would lose the war.347  
During the war there were records of other portents although these 
tended to be based on more natural phenomena. Andrew Clark recorded the 
effects of a cloud formation at sunset – the effect had produced the vision of a 
cross which some in Great Leighs took as a signal of the end of the world.348 In 
1917 several people remarked on a strange phenomenon over the Thames 
estuary. One woman reported seeing a cloud in the shape of a woman – 
something she had never seen before – and, because her husband was away at 
sea, she interpreted it as ‘a wonderful thing’ and its meaning as ‘something over 
the water’.349 
Many rumours circulated during the war about events which had 
allegedly happened before the war, and which were interpreted as explicitly 
foretelling the coming of the conflict. One of these events was a prophecy, 
made 300 years before the outbreak of the First World War. ‘The Antichrist’ 
forewarned the world not only of the approaching conflict, but of the bestial 
nature of the Germans who ‘[would] massacre the priests […] the women, the 
children, and the aged’.350   
A correspondent with the Occult Review claimed that on a visit to 
Belgium in May 1914 he had been accosted by a gipsy who warned him that a 
world war would break out before the year’s end. The man met the story with 
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scepticism and gave it no more thought until July 1914 when the prophecy 
seemingly came true.351 There were various other stories in a similar vein: a 
prophecy giving the date of the outbreak of war, but reassuring those who 
received it that France would be triumphant, and another allegedly foretelling 
the assassination of the Archduke.352  
The second main genre of supernatural story that circulated during 
World War I focused on the return of the dead. Soldiers at the Front reported, or 
were alleged to have reported, seeing the ghosts of their fallen comrades. 
Robert Graves, for example, was adamant that he saw a man – who had been 
killed at Festubert – salute him in a mess hall.353 Vera Brittain noted a 
conversation she overheard between patients in her care. They were apparently 
speaking of comrades lost at the Somme in 1916. One of the men spoke of his 
captain who had been killed, who always promised his aid whenever his men 
were in trouble. When the company of soldiers got into ‘a bit of a fix’, the 
captain returned to help them to safety.354 The second man told of a party of 
stretcher bearers who had been killed in a shell blast. The officer was adamant 
that he, and some of the other soldiers, had seen the men carrying the wounded 
out of the trenches. He even knew of one man who ‘swears’ he was borne out 
by them.355 Another allegedly had shared his biscuits with an ill looking soldier 
on the march from Pérrone. After he had lost sight of the man in the masses of 
troops, he realised that the man was ‘the chap I ‘elped Jim to bury more’n a 
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week agone’.356 British newspapers also reported that the Russian General 
Skobeleff – dead since 1882 – was seen on a white mount riding across the 
battlefield.357 There were even reported sightings of the ghost of a Boer General 
which was significant given that he was seen leading the Allies.358  
At home people reported more indirect, though no less significant, 
encounters with the dead. The Daily Express reported in 1916 that a woman 
had dreamt of her son standing by her bedside. Over the course of the previous 
day her son’s dog had been whining and unsettled. The morning after her dream 
the mother received notification that her son had died at the front.359 There were 
also multiple incidents in which people reported seeing loved ones suddenly 
materialise in lounges and bedrooms. Most often, these apparitions were 
alleged to have coincided with the time of death of the loved one at the front. 
One example cited was of a woman whose husband was serving at the front. 
While she was sitting with a friend, she suddenly saw a vision of her husband in 
the room with them. She was touched by ‘the expression of sadness in his 
eyes’. A few days later, the woman received notification that her husband had 
been killed in the battle of Loos on the very day he appeared in her rooms.360 
While these reports involved the deceased returning apparently of their own 
volition, an additional facet of the return of the dead was the contact with the 
spirits of their loved ones through mediums and séances. An anonymous man, 
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whose nineteen year old son died of his wounds in France, made contact with 
his spirit through a medium. Later, his spirit appeared at his mother’s bedside, 
in an experience ‘of an almost sacred nature’.361 In another case, a young 
woman made contact with the spirit of her cousin – an officer killed at the front 
– using an ouija board. The spirit informed her that she was to give his pearl tie 
pin case to his fiancée, of whom the family had no knowledge. The name the 
spirit supplied was found on letters in the dead officer’s possessions from 
France sent from the War Office.362 
The third and most famous type of supernatural story focused on divine 
intervention. Usually, ‘the divine’ in such tales manifested itself in the form of 
an angel or a saint. Sometimes, however, the Virgin Mary or even Jesus himself 
put in an appearance. The stories, at first, concerned military intervention, in 
which the heavenly body interceded between British and German forces, 
shielding the British from harm. Tales of divine intervention sometimes had an 
angel intervening which gave rise to the title of the ‘angels of Mons’. One 
soldier reported a light hovering over the British lines which gradually took the 
form of three angels.363 Another reported seeing an angel interpose between the 
British and German lines with ‘outspread wings’ after an engagement with the 
Germans that left the witnesses overwrought and ‘dog-tired’.364 Others 
mentioned seeing angels with extended wings and ‘loose-hanging garment[s] of 
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golden tint’.365 The All Saints’ Clifton Parish Magazine printed the account of a 
German officer, passed on through a ‘Miss M.’, to the effect that a ‘troop of 
angels’ had allowed the British to escape the Germans when they were being 
hard pressed during the retreat from Mons. In another episode, the angels caused 
a stampede among the German cavalry that were pursuing the British.366 
Though the stories of divine intervention of angels became more famous, 
it was actually more common for stories to focus on the intervention of saints. 
The most common figure in the tales was Saint George, the patron Saint of 
England. However, Saint Joan of Arc and Saint Michael also made appearances 
for the French, as did the Virgin Mary. A French soldier claimed to have seen 
the ‘Maid of Orleans’ leading French and British forces.367 Russian soldiers at 
Suwalki reported an apparition of the Virgin Mary, and a young British dispatch 
rider claimed to have seen the Virgin in bursts of exploding shells, as well as the 
mysterious apparitions that seemingly protected the Allied forces.368 
Later, as the war dragged out and the hope of a quick victory was lost, 
there were an increasing number of reports about a mysterious stranger 
ministering to the wounded in No Man’s Land. This was a distinct shift, moving 
away from military intervention in battles, to medical intervention. The figure 
was identified by the stigmata on his hands and feet. A story published in Bladud 
detailed a wounded soldier (a sceptic of the stories) trapped out in No Man’s 
Land under intense enemy fire. The wounded man saw a figure advancing which 
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could not have been the medical services due to the bullets. The man lost 
consciousness, and when he revived he was apparently out of immediate danger 
and being ministered to by the mysterious stranger. The soldier noticed the 
man’s hands and feet were bleeding and realised his saviour was Jesus.369 On the 
Western Front there was a story of another inexplicable figure that was seen on 
occasion of gas attacks. The man would walk along the frontline trenches 
offering Allied soldiers a drink of salty water, and all present would testify that 
those who drank from the cup suffered no ill effects from the gas.370 
  
The origins of Supernatural Reports 
The emergence of the supernatural trope in World War One was the result of a 
combination of factors. Some – for example the strong historical traditions and 
the ramifications of Total War – were significant to all three sub-genres of 
supernatural stories. Other factors – such as pre-war trends and particular 
wartime events – were characteristic of only one or other of the sub-genres.  
 The development of many of the stories can be located within a wider 
historical theme which taught that preternatural events were a familiar element 
of chronicled warfare. The Israelites of the Old Testament were often assisted 
by divine hosts, most notably when they were at a severe disadvantage. The 
story of Elisha in the Book of Kings is one example. Elisha was protected from 
the Syrians by ‘horses and chariots of fire’.371 In classical times legend told that 
the battle of Lake Regilus (495 BC) was decided by the intervention of Castor 
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and Pollux, the twin children of Jupiter and Leda. The siblings fought mounted 
at the head of the army and then carried news of the victory to the city.372 In 
later centuries divine intervention began to manifest in battles against the 
‘infidel’. Saint George purportedly appeared to exhausted Crusaders at Antioch 
during the First Crusade in 1098, leading them to victory against the 
Muslims.373 Saint James was rumoured to have appeared to Cortes in several 
battles against the Moors in the tenth and eleventh centuries and at the head of 
the conquistadors in 1519 during an engagement against the native Indians in 
Mexico.374 During the Boxer Rebellion a Chinese insurgent revealed during 
questioning that his compatriots had not fired on the English because of the 
figures in white (the suggestion was ‘angels’) that positioned themselves 
between the Chinese and the British.375 
In military folklore there were legends of apparitions of national heroes 
returning to the battlefield to fight alongside their compatriot armies. During 
the battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War it was rumoured that George 
Washington’s spectre appeared to the Confederate troops, scaring them into 
retreat, and saving the Unionists from certain annihilation.376 Marco 
Kralievitch, a medieval Serbian hero, was said to have led the charge against 
Turkish positions during the Balkan war of 1912. Entire companies declared 
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that they saw him riding up impossible slopes and with his help they were able 
to overrun trenches full of Turks with little effort.377 
Omens were also recurrent. Portents had often occurred before, or after, 
momentous events. The Battle of Edgehill was one of the most famous and was 
recounted by many occultists during the Great War. Rumour had it that two 
months after the battle of 22 October 1642, several local people witnessed the 
battle being re-played in the sky. According to another legend, the battle of 
Mook Heath, when the Dutch fought Spain in 1574, was witnessed two months 
before the actual battle took place. By all accounts the real battle followed the 
spectral presage exactly.378  
It is feasible to argue that contemporaries of the First World War were 
well aware of this aspect of history. Many soldiers, most officers and the public 
at home were far more familiar with the Bible than subsequent generations. 
Additionally, knowledge of classical history and mythology was also 
widespread. Arthur Machen commented in 1915 that ‘all nations and ages have 
cherished the thought that spiritual hosts may come to the help of earthly 
arms’.379 While instances of the returning dead concerned the United States and 
Serbia, there was a mythology long current in Britain that King Arthur would 
return should Britain ever be in peril, although there is no evidence myths of 
this kind were in circulation.380 Ralph Shirley, editor of the Occult Review, 
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cited historical incidents of divine intervention and omens in his works, 
including mention of the Boxer uprising and the phantom Battle of Edgehill.381 
The impact of pre-war social and intellectual trends was also notable. 
These trends were often instrumental in creating a mindset which made rumour 
scenarios seem feasible and were particularly important for the return of the 
dead. The foundation of some of the stories that emerged during the war is 
traceable to the spiritualist movement, which developed in the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
In 1848, in upstate New York, sisters Kate and Margaret Fox claimed to 
have made contact with the spirit of a murdered peddler which purportedly 
communicated with them by rapping on the walls. What differentiated this 
rapping from that generally attributed to poltergeists was the apparent ability of 
the spirit to answer questions.382 This single incident led to the emergence of 
the spiritualist movement.  
After the English civil war of the seventeenth century, an era of 
modernity had emerged. The world was increasingly defined in terms of 
immutable scientific laws and supernatural agency was increasingly dismissed 
as superstition.383 Spiritualism emerged as a way to eschew this gravitation 
towards atheism and rationalism, although it did claim to use scientific 
investigation to prove the existence of the spirit.384 Underpinning the drive to 
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establish the spirit in scientific law was the desire of the educated classes to 
reconcile their traditional religious beliefs with the increasing rational and 
materialist tendencies of the modern age. Religion dictated the spirit survived 
death. Materialism cast doubt on this. Spiritualism offered followers the 
opportunity to establish the existence of life after death in scientific law, and 
therefore abolish residual doubts as to its veracity.385  
This movement became especially important during the war. 
Spiritualism diverged from traditional religious doctrines on one distinct point 
which became particularly significant: communication with the dead was 
possible, and knowledge of the afterlife was not restricted to the understanding 
imparted by the Bible. This explains the popularity of the movement during 
World War One, and the post-war years. Rather than having to wait for the 
afterlife to be reunited with loved ones, spiritualism offered grieving individuals 
a chance to communicate with the lost almost immediately following their 
death. The movement was compared with Christianity by an anonymous man 
who had found solace being able to contact his fallen son through a medium. He 
was ‘no longer satisfied with dogmatic creeds or cut-and-dried phrases reduced 
[…] to a meaningless jangle of words by centuries of reiteration’.386 Sir Oliver 
Lodge, who had written extensively in support of spiritualist matters before the 
war, found personal use for the movement when his own son, Raymond, was 
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killed at the front. He had extensive communications with his son through a 
medium and various séances.387  
It is difficult to ascertain which factor, if any, played a greater role in the 
origin of the supernatural genre. However, one vital component was the 
experience of the war. This was of material significance for all three aspects as 
it was the conditions created by the conflict – affecting both soldiers and 
civilians – which served to generate many stories of the paranormal. For 
Britons remaining at home, despite the material hardships, the most important 
impact of the war was both the scale and destructiveness, and the separation 
from loved ones – either by spatial distance or death. The nature of the war 
meant that the position of loved ones at the front was always tenuous, which 
became apparent through the steadily lengthening casualty lists. News of 
friends and family was often sporadic, particularly when soldiers were heading 
into battles. Vera Brittain succinctly summed up the constant apprehension 
faced by those on the domestic front: ‘[even] when the letters [from the front] 
came they were four days old, and the writer since sending them had had time 
to die over and over again’.388  
At the front conditions affecting military personnel were significantly 
different. The early stages of the war were ones of movement, often over long 
distances, in the heat of the late summer. Frequently such activity was 
undertaken during conditions of extreme duress with enemy forces in pursuit. 
Officers fell asleep riding their horses and men stumbled along the cobbled 
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stoned roads barely conscious of their surroundings. Even when the soldiers 
were not marching their living conditions were trying and weariness was 
prevalent. Soldiers spent their nights skirmishing in No Man’s Land, and their 
days repairing damage to the trenches. Sleep was often interrupted by shellfire, 
a problem that afflicted even those on reserve behind the lines. The nature of 
the war meant that often, men killed in the course of bombardments and battles 
could not be given a proper burial; others were buried alive in trench collapses 
caused by shell fire, or left to rot strung in the barbed wire dividing No Man’s 
Land. In the front lines, the quality of living conditions meant it was not 
uncommon for soldiers to have the bodies of dead comrades close by. It also 
was not unusual for corpses to be used to rebuild the sides of wrecked trenches. 
Death was omnipresent in the life of the soldier. 
In light of these conditions and under such duress, hallucinations were 
common, and men reported experiencing delusions ranging in severity from the 
innocuous to the terrifying. These delusions go someway to constructing a 
picture of how the stories of the supernatural emerged during the First World 
War. C. E. Montague, an officer at the front, recounted that: 
 
Upon a greasy road with a heavy camber I have seen a used-up 
man get the illusion, on a night-march back to billets, that he 
was walking on a round, smooth, horizontal pole or convex 
plank above some fearsome sort of gulf. He would struggle 
hard to recover imaginary losses of footing, pant and sweat and 
scrape desperately sideways with his feet.389 
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One solider recounted constantly ducking to avoid arches he believed were 
spanning the road on a night march, while another mistook copses of trees for 
villages.390  
There were men at the front who believed their experiences were 
genuine instances of divine protection. One colonel detailed his encounter with 
the supernatural in an account published in the Evening News on 14 September 
1915. The colonel’s division fought at Le Cateau on 26 August 1914, from 
dawn until dusk, at which point, under heavy shelling from the Germans, they 
were forced to retire. For two full days the division marched ‘with only about 
two hours’ rest’, and by his own admission by the night of 27 August he was 
‘all worn out [… with] both bodily and mental fatigue’.391 On this evening, he 
and two fellow officers were riding with the column of men, trying to stay 
awake. He became aware of a body of horsemen, cavalry, riding in the fields 
alongside the road. The mysterious figures kept level and continued in the same 
direction as the column for about twenty minutes, at which point they 
disappeared. The colonel did admit that this was by no means remarkable in 
light of his fatigue; what made it so noteworthy was the two other officers 
reported the same phenomenon. His hallucinations could not be discounted due 
to this confirmatory testimony from the other men. A reconnaissance party 
despatched after the mysterious horsemen had disappeared could find no trace 
of them. The observation of the apparitions had not been restricted to the 
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officers; many of the men marching along the road testified to seeing the 
horsemen.392  
It is not impossible that the man believed he had witnessed the ghostly 
accompaniment. The men were under severe strain and many experienced 
delusional mental states, which under more forgiving conditions (where the 
men were rested and not undertaking gruelling marches with little sleep) 
probably would not have occurred. The colonel, however, was quick to attribute 
his experience to an instance of divine protection, believing the horsemen were 
there to safeguard the division as they retreated. This is a crucial point. It was 
his interpretation of an unexplained visual phenomenon that he and many others 
experienced. There are two alternative explanations that are plausible: firstly, a 
troop of real, but unidentified, horsemen actually rode past, only to be 
misidentified by the desperate and credulous as divine protectors; or a type of 
mass illusion spread amongst the exhausted and frightened men, in which one 
soldier’s report of his hallucination led someone else to imagine that he had 
seen something similar, which in turn led to other reports. It is possible that his 
mindset, in making this assumption, was influenced by other reports of divine 
guardianship that were circulating at the front. 
It is interesting to note that a month before the publication of the 
colonel’s letter, a lance-corporal detailed a similar experience on a march. The 
incident took place at dawn after marching for twenty-four hours with no rest. 
As day broke ‘we saw in front of us large bodies of cavalry’. The young soldier 
believed the men were French cavalrymen, but as they approached the men 
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disappeared, to be replaced by ‘banks of white mist, with clumps of trees and 
bushes dimly showing through them’.393 Instead of interpreting the 
hallucination as the appearance of a divine protector, the man attributed it to 
their state of mind; the men were ‘babbling all sorts of nonsense in sheer 
delirium’, so ‘you can well believe we were in a fit state to take a row of 
beanstalks for all the saints in the Calendar’.394  
Interpretation of these episodes, then, was a component important to 
promoting the creation of the supernatural. The experiences of hallucinations 
were no doubt genuine; indeed such stresses seemed common among soldiers at 
the front. What differed, though, was the manner and meaning which the men 
read into the incidents. One man was willing to testify that his cavalrymen were 
divine saviours; the other that he was simply dog tired and seeing things.  
Many at home also interpreted the hallucinations of soldiers to suggest 
that divine intervention had taken place. In a letter sent to a woman in England, 
a young officer detailed his experiences as he alternately marched, and fought a 
rearguard action. The man testified that, on the long marches, he and others had 
experienced ‘amazing hallucinations’ and deduced they were probably fast 
asleep at the time. On successive nights he ‘saw all sorts of things, enormous 
men walking towards me and lights and chairs and things in the road’.395 The 
author who published this account in her book The Crucible, Mabel Collins, 
interpreted the officers’ encounter as the loosening of physical restraints. The 
soldier was able to feel, and experience, another plane of existence. From the 
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man’s seemingly innocent account of exhaustion and delirium, borne from a 
situation of extreme stress, Collins distorted this with her own elucidations into 
proof that during the war the membrane between the planes of existence and 
consciousness was becoming permeable. The ‘enormous men’ of the officer’s 
letter Collins believed were spirit guides who assisted the marching soldiers in 
their hours of need. Whether this was the real meaning intended in the letter is 
difficult to determine as Collins did not reproduce the original in its entirety. 
But, the extract quoted fits into the common and widespread experience of 
hallucinations and delirium resulting from extreme fatigue. In the 1915 edition 
of his short stories, Arthur Machen recognised the likelihood of hallucinations 
as a source of testimony.396 He also mentions that this was a factor suggested in 
various newspaper speculations on the topic, among them the Daily Chronicle 
which suggested the ‘scientific explanation of the hallucination’ as a means of 
understanding reports of the supernatural.397 
Interpretation was also a key factor in genesis of stories about the return 
of the dead. A nurse was told by the soldier that he had heard from a German, 
captured during a charge, that there were ‘thousands of troops’ behind the 
British, when in fact there were only ‘two regiments’. The man could not 
explain it; the nurse, however, who ‘[believed] in life after death, but [… not] in 
angels on earth’ proffered an explanation the dying man found palatable. The 
woman speculated that the spirits of the men who were killed, because of their 
‘angry passions’ being roused before they died, remained on earth for some 
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time ‘unable to tear [themselves] away from the battle’.398 Whether this 
interpretation was, in fact, accepted by the soldier it is impossible to know. 
However, it is obvious the nurse imposed her own attitudes and beliefs on the 
experience of the wounded man, who himself had only heard the story second-
hand (from the German prisoner who likely experienced similar conditions to 
the Allied soldiers, and similar delusional mental states). This goes to show that 
testimony generated from second-hand sources could be very unreliable as the 
experience was manipulated to fit within the instances of which the nurse had 
heard (obviously something of the ‘angel of Mons’), but also manipulated to fit 
with her beliefs. There seemed to be no question that the German soldier may 
have been hallucinating or that in the excitement of battle with smoke and other 
obscuring factors, the conditions may have simply played tricks on his eyes. 
This story had its origins in the interpretation imposed by a nurse on a story told 
by a dying man about what a German prisoner thought he saw.  
Another factor that may have led to the formation of supernatural stories 
was shell-shock. Given the fact that this neurosis caused delusions, as well as 
physical symptoms, it is conceivable that shell-shock may have contributed to 
reports of the supernatural. The number of men afflicted with shell-shock was 
not insignificant. After the war there were still 65,000 ex-servicemen drawing 
pensions for the problem, and of these 9,000 men required ongoing hospital 
treatment.399 Contemporary accounts given by doctors treating the distressed 
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soldiers and officers with shell-shock suggest that stories of the apparitions 
could be the result of delirium induced by their disorder. Among the victims 
doctors treated were those who claimed they had been given occult knowledge 
of the enemy’s plans, and another who asserted that Joan of Arc had personally 
designated him to show the Allies the way to victory against the Germans.400 
Taken in context with the beliefs circulating on the front at the time then it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that shell-shock may have played a role in contributing 
to the mythology of the supernatural, and could perhaps explain why some 
soldiers ardently believed what they had seen was not the tricks of their mind.  
Although the aforementioned factors informed the development of the 
stories and contributed to the emergence, they were no guarantee that the genre 
of the supernatural would originate. There were events – taking place during the 
war – that had particular influence over the emergence of stories of divine 
intervention. The two factors were largely intertwined: the retreat of the BEF 
from Mons in August 1914, and the publication of Arthur Machen’s short story, 
‘The Bowmen’ in September 1914.  
The BEF’s engagement with the German at Mons was the first meeting 
of the two armies and an antecedent to the emergence of the genre of divine 
intervention in World War One. The engagement between British forces and the 
German First Army was remembered as one of the great battles of the war, and 
was a source of great pride for England, not least because it was fought against 
a numerically superior foe.401 Although the BEF was eventually forced to 
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retreat, the ‘contemptible little army’ was by no means shamed by its efforts to 
delay the German advance and withstood the odds stacked against them to 
emerge victorious in spirit, if not in battle.  
The British force landed on the continent on 14 August 1914 with 70,000 
men. The other Allied armies were being forced back under the German 
onslaught; the Belgians were in retreat and the French were faltering in their 
efforts to hold the Germans on the southern point of the front. A significant 
portion of the BEF – 36,000 men – was to stem the German tide by setting up a 
defensive line along the Mons-Conde canal, with orders to hold it for a full day 
to allow the French to regroup and fall back. It was here, after four days of 
marching, that the British met General von Kluck’s First Army: 160,000 troops 
and 600 heavy artillery guns.  
Despite their best efforts, the staunch resistance of the BEF was not 
sufficient to stem the German advance and the British were forced into retreat.  
The British casualties were 1,600 killed, wounded and missing. Although the 
retreat was efficient, the BEF was harassed by rear guard actions and forced to 
march in order to outstrip the Germans.402 
 The plight of the British forces was disclosed to the home front when 
The Times published the ‘Amiens dispatch’. What followed in Britain was a 
report from the mists that had so far obscured the continent. The strict 
censorship that impinged on war news and the knowledge of the army’s 
movements was allowed – by the main censor – to lapse for a brief moment, 
confronting the population with a stark admission that the BEF had suffered 
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heavy losses and was retreating in the face of a far superior foe. Arthur Moore, 
correspondent to The Times, wrote: 
 
with the Germans advancing incessantly [… the] tidal 
wave of German troops […] will spread still further 
unless a miracle happens. Our small British force could 
not stand before a volume so powerful, so immense. It 
has been scattered all over the country. […] I hope I have 
not been guilty of exaggeration. […] I have aimed at 
telling a plain tale of misfortune and defeat. It is a bitter 
tale to tell of British troops, but they were set an 
impossible task. […] England should realise and should 
realise at once that she must send reinforcements [… we] 
want men, and we want them now.403 
 
This account shattered perceptions in Britain. The erroneous belief that the 
British would be able to stem the German advance with little effort was 
destroyed and the reality laid bare. There were some who believed the contents 
of the dispatch were German attempts to spread misinformation and sow 
discontent. However, the bleak announcement of the tribulations of the army 
with ‘exhaustless valour’, who had been set an ‘impossible task’, enforced a 
belief among many that the survival of the army had been nothing short of 
miraculous: 
 
How was it, people asked each other, that, after the 
French line at Mons had feebly crumpled up, our three 
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Divisions had not been completely annihilated by the six 
hundred German guns? That there should have been any 
survivors was one miracle.404 
 
 
Mabel Rudkin, the wife of a clergyman, addressed the myth of the angels 
at Mons in her memoirs, Inside Dover. In 1915, Rudkin met an officer who had 
been present at the retreat from Mons, and her enquiries about the angels 
produced no sound or conclusive evidence. The officer, though, was convinced 
that something was with the men on their retreat because ‘[how] the men had the 
strength to push on […] was the crowning mystery. Everyone was completely 
played out – dead beat – when the order to retreat was given’.405 Just as there 
were those on the home front who were convinced that some supernormal force 
must have saved the BEF at Mons, it would seem that there were those in the 
army who felt keenly the ‘miracle’ of their escape.  
Popular fiction seized upon the courageous stand of the Tommies, and 
from this engagement a gothic author, Arthur Machen, wove a tale of stoicism, 
bravery and heavenly deliverance. He acknowledged that he had drawn 
inspiration from The Weekly Dispatch which detailed the ordeal of the British 
troops in their retreat from Mons.406  
 ‘The Bowmen’ was published in the Evening News on 29 September 
1914. Machen, touched by what he had read of the experiences of the British in 
their first encounter on the continent, wrote a story of the remnants of a 
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battalion of Britons in their final stand against a German onslaught. Narrated by 
one of the surviving 500 soldiers, the young man invoked the assistance of 
Saint George using a phrase he had seen on the edge of a plate in a vegetarian 
restaurant in London. As cries of ‘Ha! St. George! a long bow and a strong 
bow’ rang out, the trench in which the doomed men sheltered was lined with 
the shimmering figures of the Agincourt bowmen, interposed between the two 
armies. The mystical figures wiped out entire regiments as they loosed their 
arrows into the ‘heathen hordes’ leaving the Germans dead, but their bodies 
unmarked.407  
 It is salient to note that Machen unwittingly attributed the story with 
more authority than it deserved by invoking the censor: ‘It was during the 
retreat of the Eighty Thousand, and the authority of the Censorship is sufficient 
excuse for not being more explicit’.408 Machen’s mention of censorship 
authority may have convinced the readership that the article before them was, in 
fact, true.  
 Other ‘true stories’ of divine intervention were not current until after the 
publication of ‘The Bowmen’ in September 1914, and did not become a 
common topic of rumour until April 1915 – a full six months after ‘The 
Bowmen’ entered circulation. The fact that many of the subsequent narratives 
bore such striking similarities to ‘The Bowmen’ – and in all instances seem to 
have succeeded it – suggests Machen’s claim that he had set ‘the snowball of 
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rumour […] rolling’ was astute.409 One story published in a Catholic paper told 
of a party of about thirty men who became isolated in a trench; rather than face 
capture, they decided to make a last ditch sortie in an attempt to escape. They 
ran from their trench yelling ‘St. George for England!’ and apparently, as the 
men continued their dash, they became aware of a ‘large company of men with 
bows and arrows’. In an interview with a German prisoner after this brave 
manoeuvre the officer leading the men discovered that there had also been 
another figure on the battlefield; a man on a ‘great white horse’. The officer 
also felt it necessary to report that none of the German dead had wounds.410 
This story bears a striking resemblance to ‘The Bowmen’: the hopeless 
situation, the prayer to Saint George, the appearance of bowmen, and the 
unmarked German dead.  
A similar story appeared in Light in May 1915. A sergeant, trapped in a 
forward trench with his men, was telling them the story of Saint George. 
Suddenly, there was a ‘charge of grey-coated Germans in greatly superior 
numbers’. The British soldiers advanced on the Germans crying ‘Remember St 
George for England!’ at which point the German advance crumbled and the 
enemy fled in disarray. One German prisoner wanted to know the identity of ‘the 
horseman in armour’ who led the British charge.411 The parallels are evident in 
this testimony, too. The officer had not seen Saint George on a plate in a 
restaurant like the young protagonist of ‘The Bowmen’; he had seen a picture of 
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the saint slaying a dragon in a house of the Young Men’s Christian Association, 
and again, the invocation of the saint was similar to that of ‘The Bowmen’. Yet 
another officer testified to seeing an apparition of Saint George when fighting at 
Mons where he recognised him as ‘an exact counterpart of a picture that hangs 
today in a London restaurant’.412 Although there was a significant departure 
from ‘The Bowmen’ – the fact that Saint George appeared on the battlefield – 
the essentials were consistent with the initial fiction. 
 It has been widely assumed, including by Machen himself, that ‘The 
Bowmen’ was the catalyst for the emergence of this genre of the supernatural 
stories. ‘The Bowmen’ was the first published story of this kind, it received a 
great deal of public attention, and all subsequent stories certainly bore striking 
similarities to Machen’s short story. But there is one small piece of evidence 
that has been taken to suggest that supernatural stories of this kind could have 
originated before the publication of the ‘The Bowmen’.  
Brigadier General John Charteris’ memoir, At G.H.Q, mentioned 
rumours circulating among the soldiers to the effect that the Lord had appeared 
on a white horse, with a flaming sword, forbidding the Germans to advance any 
further.413 The entry in his post-war memoir has been contentious as it was 
dated mid-September 1914, and is therefore significant because it preceded 
Machen’s story. However, the memoirs were not compiled until 1931, and were 
drawn both from letters Charteris wrote to his wife and his post-war 
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recollections. It is entirely possible that the dates were confused and may not be 
entirely reliable.414 What can be said is that Machen’s story was the first to be 
widely publicised, and its publication was followed rapidly by a spate of divine 
intervention stories – several of which mirrored ‘The Bowmen’ on important 
points. No other story got the publicity to act as an effective trigger for the 
stories which suggests further that Machen’s story inspired those that followed 
it.  
Charteris concluded that the story probably originated from a religiously 
minded soldier writing home of his experiences at Mons saying ‘that the 
Germans halted at Mons, AS IF an Angel of the Lord had appeared in front of 
them’. He hypothesised that the letter had then been published in a parish 
magazine and then sent back to men at the front, who in turn sent the story back 
to England with the ‘as if’ omitted.415 This mention of a parish magazine is 
indicative that he confused his dates; the first mention of divine intervention in a 
publication of this sort was April 1915, although his memoir entry was dated 
February 1915.416 
Despite claims of divine intervention early in the war, it did not go well 
for the Allies, and reports of intervention by angels, saints or cavalry seem to 
have dried up after the battle of the Somme. These worsening conditions seem 
to have inspired another work of fiction, ‘In the Trenches’. The themes of this 
story were more appropriate to an army and a population that had to deal with 
the shocking numbers of dead and wounded produced by attempts to break the 
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stalemate on the Western Front. Stories of a ‘Comrade in White’ told of a 
mysterious figure roaming No Man’s Land and ministering to wounded 
soldiers. Like the stories of angels and saints proffering divine aid, the Comrade 
stories had their origins in a piece of fiction produced by William Leathem, a 
clergyman, in 1915. Just as individuals seized on Machen’s work as a narrative 
of actual events, Leathem’s story struck a chord on the home front and were 
accepted by some, as ‘literal fact’.417  
The influence of the work was evident in an account reproduced in Life 
and Times called ‘In the Trenches’ in June 1915. This story was identical to the 
story mentioned earlier, published in Bladud in 1915. Interestingly, while the 
magazine professed the tale to be an account furnished by a soldier, it also 
appears to be a virtually verbatim reproduction of Leathem’s story ‘In the 
Trenches’ – even going by the same name – published in his short story 
compilation, The Comrade in White.418  
The origins and evolution of the myths and rumours concerning the 
supernatural followed the same basic patterns of the other two genres studied 
(i.e. atrocity stories and spy stories). Historical traditions supplied a foundation 
for the growth of such stories during World War I and they implicitly reinforced 
comparable tales that surfaced during the war by suggesting such incidents 
could – and did – happen. The supernatural also shared similarities with the spy 
trope, in that both were significantly influenced by pre-war trends. Although the 
trends were quite different – spy literature versus spiritualism – their ideas 
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suffused the Great War and contributed to their respective emergences by 
providing a template against which the population could compare their own 
experiences. Wartime events – be they the destruction of Belgian cities, the 
rounding up of a solitary spy ring, or the ‘real’ hallucinations of soldiers – also 
provided catalysts which ensured that the public was provided with links that 
would connect history and pre-war circumstances with their own experiences in 
the current conflict.  
Some of the reports of prophecies and supernatural intervention were 
simply inventions – deliberately contrived fictions. This was evident 
particularly with ‘The Bowmen’, the Comrade in White, and the ‘300 year old’ 
prophecy foretelling the war. Other stories had their basis in the experiences of 
the soldiers at the front, but these experiences could always be given a 
naturalistic interpretation, calling them hallucinations, and some commentators 
on the home front gave a similar analysis. Other soldiers gave their experiences 
a spiritual interpretation, seeing them as instances of divine intervention – a 
view that again gained support on the home front.  
There was also a large element of imitation in the reports. Machen’s 
avowedly fictional story produced a slew of reports in which British soldiers 
were saved by supernatural intervention and Leathem’s fictional tale inspired 
the ‘Comrade in White’ genre. In both cases, a well-told piece of fiction caught 
the imagination of the general public. It became both a model for deliberate 
invention and an influence on both the form of and the interpretation of 
hallucinations.  
  
160 
 
Dissemination  
The methods of disseminating the supernatural rumours mostly conformed to the 
patterns established by atrocities and spies. The printed word, and in particular 
newspapers, were central to the dissemination of stories about omens, the 
returning dead, and divine intervention. Although some newspapers, such as The 
Times, made no mention of supernatural stories, others discussed them in detail. 
Both the Evening News and Daily Mail seized on the genre and particular focus 
was directed at the ‘angels of Mons’. Given the Daily Mail alone had a 
readership of over one million people in May 1915 and 10,000 copies were 
shipped daily to the front, it can be safely assumed that through this medium 
alone the stories received a wide audience.419 A mention by Arthur Machen 
suggests that the stories were widely reported in smaller publications and 
‘provincial papers’, although it seems as though a reasonable quantity of the 
mention of angels was given over to discussions of the ‘exact nature of the 
appearances’.420  
This distribution of discussion is indicative of which sections of the 
British public participated in the discourses on the supernatural provoked by the 
war. That The Times – the voice of the highly educated British Establishment – 
refused to touch the stories, suggests that it had no desire to become the subject 
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of ridicule for intellectuals. By contrast, the popular press did not cater to 
intellectuals, and its less educated readership was more credulous.  
While it is difficult to ascertain the extent of reporting on omens and 
return of the dead across the popular press, evidence suggests that the discussion 
of these was not as animated. It is possible that this is due to the fact that 
spiritualism and omens were not as influential as Christianity, which had much 
to gain from stories of divine intervention. The idea of supernatural intervention 
held more universal appeal as people could interpret the apparitions as Britain’s 
national hero, Saint George, or as angels. Outside of intellectual circles, 
spiritualism was still only relevant to those who were bereaved. 
The printed word also encompassed journals and books. The Occult 
Review, Journal for the Society of Psychical Research and Master Mind 
Magazine published articles investigating the phenomena of divine intervention 
and return of the dead. There was also a reasonable quantity of books published 
during the war on spiritualism, which included discussion of the returning dead. 
Arthur Conan Doyle, a proponent of spiritualism for over thirty years, published 
The New Revelation in 1918. Harewood Carrington published Psychical 
Phenomena (1918) which was detailed in its accounts of experiences with the 
spirits of dead soldiers. Sir Oliver Lodge, an author and noted physicist, penned 
Raymond or Life and Death: with Examples of the Evidence for Survival of 
Memory and Affection after Death (1915).  
Phyllis Campbell, one of the main proponents of divine intervention, was 
published in the Occult Review, in addition to producing a booklet of her 
experiences – Back of the Front (1915) – in France which dealt in detail with the 
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appearance of saints to the Allied forces.421 Ralph Shirley published two books: 
one, The angel warriors at Mons, in support of the angels, and Prophecies and 
Omens as a discussion of the signals of the coming of the great conflict. Harold 
Begbie too, wrote in avid support of the stories of the angels when he published 
On the Side of Angels.  
Personal contacts – in the form of verbal and written communication – 
played a vital role in the dissemination, as it had with other myths and rumours. 
Word of mouth and correspondence fed both home and battle front with various 
versions of the supernatural. Vera Brittain’s reproduction of the tales of the 
return of the dead, told to her by invalided soldiers, is an example of the 
channels through which the stories travelled to the public forum.  
Those at the front detailed their supernatural experiences in letters home, 
but few, if any, of these original letters were given up for public perusal. One 
correspondent – who happened to be the Reverend Horton – received a letter 
from one of his ‘young men’ at the front, in which he proclaimed his belief in 
the ‘Companion in White’, although he had not seen the figure himself.422 
However, the letter was not reproduced for the newspaper; the information was 
passed on second hand through the Reverend. Several of the accounts scrutinised 
by the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) also suggest that many stories 
making it into mainstream channels – particularly popular newspapers – were 
demonstrably devoid of the original author’s name and were supplied by 
individuals removed from the actual incident.  
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The dissemination of omen stories is much harder to trace. Their 
mention in memoirs suggests that for some it was a matter of personal 
interpretation that may not have necessarily been a commonly held belief. 
There was discussion of similar phenomena in some newspapers, for example 
the Grays and Tilbury Gazette. However, the tendency in the press was to 
explain them as the result of the Northern Lights, or some other natural 
occurrence rather than as any portent.423 This lends additional support to the 
contention that the meaning derived from omens was largely due to personal 
interpretation. 
One derivative factor was the role played by religious organs. This was 
important for divine intervention which had strong traditional religious 
overtones. However, similar support for omens and return of the dead was not 
shown from the pulpit. Aside from the interest exhibited by parish publications, 
stories of divine intervention were promulgated extensively in sermons. Doctor 
R. F. Horton, for instance, delivered a sermon in which he assured his audience 
that many of the reports on the battlefield had been ‘completely authenticated’, 
including stories of the Comrade in White.424 Reverend W. Muirhead Hope told 
his congregation that the appearance of the angels at Mons was ‘in the highest 
degree probable’.425 Parish magazines such as the Light and the Universe 
published a stream of testimonials from eye-witnesses, or other sources, to the 
phenomena at the front.  
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One aspect of dissemination that is less apparent in the supernatural than 
the other genres was the intervention of the government in the promulgation of 
such stories. Unlike atrocity stories there was no visible government hand in 
their propagation – unlike spies there was no overt and consistent repudiation of 
the rumours. The silence of official sources about the supernatural is not 
necessarily indicative of a lack of interest. On the contrary, its silence can be 
interpreted as an unexpressed recognition of the role that the supernatural could 
play. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the government did originate the 
stories, and no organ identified with the government helped to disseminate them 
or acknowledged them. There is a good reason for this: the government did not 
want to destroy its own credibility with the very large body of educated opinion, 
at home or abroad, that was well-versed in very plausible secular and scientific 
explanations of the ‘apparitions’ seen or imagined by people under severe stress.  
However, the government did absolutely nothing to discourage the 
stories. Had it done so, it possibly would have provoked a divisive quarrel 
amongst its own very patriotic supporters. Instead, it allowed the stories to do 
their work of encouraging hope, consolidating national will, and giving 
consolation to the bereaved in a religious idiom that meant a great deal to many 
and was tolerated by the remainder.  
Knowing how the government made use of rumours, this ambivalent 
attitude towards useful gossip was not uncommon. There are other examples of 
gossip being used by the government to further Britain’s cause, in which the 
attitude was again, one of apparent uninterest. This is demonstrated particularly 
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well by the rumour of the Russians in England which was exceptionally popular 
for a few weeks in September 1914. There was no obvious government hand in 
the dissemination of this rumour, which some authors, such as Richard Deacon, 
have argued played a contributing role in the Allied victory on the Marne.426 
Popular reports that tens of thousands of Russian troops – even hundreds of 
thousands in some strains of gossip – were passing through Britain on the way to 
the Western Front were allowed to filter to Berlin. There is speculation that two 
divisions of the German army moved to the coast were to protect against the 
landing of the Russians, which may have sufficiently weakened the German 
forces to allow the Allied victory. It was only after the Marne that authorities 
released an explicit statement through the Press Bureau that the Russians had 
been entirely mythical.  
The government was probably aware of the benefits of this rumour – 
aside from the confusion and apprehension it could cause German authorities, it 
had obvious morale benefits for the British population. The apathy towards the 
stories lasted for as long as the rumours were useful, and this factor could 
explain why the government and officialdom remained silent about stories of the 
supernatural. As long as they had a socially cohesive and worthwhile function 
the government – while not actively participating in their promulgation – was 
content to allow the rumours to flourish without official interference. 
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Reception of stories of the Supernatural 
Rumours of the supernatural seem, on the whole, to have been quite widely 
believed. Judging the reception of the component parts, though, is a little more 
difficult. Belief in stories of divine intervention was probably confined to a 
smaller quantity of the population than other aspects of the genre. Primarily this 
was due to the fact that belief in this required significant religious faith. 
Invocation and worship of saints was something closely associated with 
Catholicism and possibly smacked of papist idolatry to the predominantly non-
conformist and Protestant population. This also possibly explains why the legend 
evolved into apparitions of angels and moved away from saints – it made it more 
palatable to the rest of the religiously minded population. This idea was also 
postulated by Machen, who said that appealing to saints was ‘held Popish by 
most of our countrymen’.427 The reproduction of stories suggests this was an 
influence. Very few religious publications seem to have reproduced stories of 
saints, focusing instead on the Comrade in White or angels.  
 It is likely that among many of the religiously minded they were well 
received. Certainly, the rumours were seized upon by some members of the 
clergy – for example Boddy and Horton – who then promulgated the stories to 
their audiences, many of whom probably believed them. Boddy may have 
carried particular weight with his parishioners, given that he had spent some 
months at the front investigating the stories of divine intervention. Additionally, 
initial printings of ‘The Bowmen’ by parish magazines proved exceptionally 
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popular and, in the period between late 1914 to early 1915, the proprietors of the 
magazines approached Machen for permission for additional runs of the story.428  
What is interesting, though, is that some clergyman made no mention of 
the rumours of angels or saints. Reverend Andrew Clark, who devotedly kept a 
detailed diary of the various rumours and gossip in circulation, made no mention 
of any form of the stories. This absence, however, does not necessarily imply 
that the stories were not in wide circulation. It is possible that Clark had indeed 
heard such stories but failed to record them because he did not believe them. 
Alternatively, it is also conceivable that such stories had simply failed to reach 
the town in which he lived.  
Though there were certainly many people who believed in the veracity 
of the supernatural stories, there were those who were sceptical of the 
phenomenon in general, and of divine intervention in particular. Judging by the 
promulgation, and the organs which disseminated the stories, there is a 
suggestion of a strong vein of religious interest. Some believers were 
determined to prove that the divine intervention did happen. When Machen 
claimed to have instigated the reports of divine intervention, there were several 
who were quick to refute this. Even though a month lapsed between the retreat 
from Mons and the publication of ‘The Bowmen’ in the Evening News, with no 
interest in any such happenings exhibited before this point, there was 
speculation that Machen had heard the story himself and then passed it off as 
his own.429  
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 Negating Machen’s responsibility for the conception of the legend 
allowed believers to refute the fictional basis of the story, and thereby lend 
support to their own claims that the story was true. Harold Begbie, for instance, 
who was a dogged believer in the appearance of angels at Mons, asserted that 
Machen, ‘when he read with supreme sympathy that “awful account” in the 
newspaper […] may have received from the brain of a wounded or a dying 
British soldier in France some powerful impression of the battlefield at 
Mons’.430 The language used by Machen in his introduction did lend itself to 
this interpretation: he spoke of a ‘furnace of torment and death and agony and 
terror’.431 What had simply been an emotional reaction to the Amiens dispatch 
was reinterpreted as telepathy. Ralph Shirley conjectured the same explanation 
saying ‘if we are to accept the now generally admitted fact of telepathy, nothing 
is more likely than that a record […] might have reached Mr. Machen’s 
subconscious intelligence’.432 This line of argument also conveniently 
explained why many of the stories conformed so closely to Machen’s plot.  
 Machen’s story emerged at the end of September 1914. The efforts of 
interested clergymen notwithstanding, the story could not survive without 
confirmatory evidence from ‘witnesses’ of the apparitions. Seven months later, 
in April 1915, the furore began. At this point an anonymous ‘military officer’ 
came forward and proffered his testimony that supported Machen’s fictional 
thesis that the British had been guarded by some form of divine protection. This 
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story was published in the Light magazine, and Clarke argues that this explains 
the gap in discourse. 
 Proponents of the angels claimed to be able to quote instance after 
instance of testimony coming from men who served at the front, claiming to 
have seen the heavenly bodies. Begbie and Campbell both asserted that there 
were no first-hand stories because the military authorities had issued explicit 
orders forbidding the men from speaking of their experience until after the 
war.433 This seems highly unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, papers regularly 
published letters received from soldiers at the front detailing their experiences. 
Secondly, it seems unusual that authorities would attempt to repress something 
that would be a propaganda coup for the morale of the Allied forces and their 
respective domestic fronts. The Reverend A. A. Boddy of Sunderland 
conducted his own investigations on the continent and concluded the evidence 
was ‘remarkably cumulative’.434 
Those who tended towards scepticism pointed to the lack of definitive 
and reliable supportive testimony. Fundamentally it was not the quantity of 
testimony that was deficient, it was the identities of the men who reportedly 
saw the phenomenon. What is most interesting about these stories is the fact 
that while they were alleged to be the independent testimonies of various 
officers and soldiers, they all reached their publishers through other mediums. 
The story of the three angels hovering over the British lines was related by the 
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nurse who had treated the man, a Miss C. M. Wilson.435 One soldier’s 
testimony was taken by a nurse, who passed it on to her ‘Lady Superintendent 
of the Red Cross’, who in turn submitted it to a London newspaper.436 The 
evidence submitted by A. A. Boddy was based on an account that had come 
from a nurse in a convalescent home, who heard the story from a patient.437 The 
tale of the company of men with bows and arrows who came to the protection 
of the men isolated in their trench was told by a correspondent, not the officer 
in question.438  
There were no men who could be traced through the nurses; even 
interested clergymen who had visited the front could not find any who would 
admit to having seen the heavenly manifestations first-hand. Reverend Boddy 
spent two months working at the front and used the opportunity to try and 
investigate the rumours further. Despite his claims that the ‘evidence [was] 
remarkably cumulative’, he did acknowledge that the evidence ‘was not always 
direct’. Boddy asserted that the ‘channels’ through which he got his information 
‘were entitled to respect’. He never extrapolated on precisely what these 
channels were but his mention of a nurse suggests that this is where his 
confirmatory testimony came from.439 Machen summed up the view of the 
sceptics perfectly: ‘[someone] (unknown) has met a nurse (unnamed) who has 
talked to a soldier (anonymous) who has seen angels’.440 
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The profound interest that was exhibited in the stories of divine 
intervention led the Journal of the Society of Psychical Research to investigate 
the phenomenon more thoroughly. Many of the stories avidly disseminated in 
the popular press and parish magazines were uncovered as springing from third 
or fourth hand evidence. Individuals credited with possessing knowledge of the 
actual witnesses admitted upon further questioning that they ‘[could not] give 
you the names of the men referred to […] as the story I heard was quite 
anonymous, and I do not know who they were’.441 This declaration came from 
the young woman attributed with knowing ‘personally’ the men at the centre of 
the reports of angels scattering German cavalry. Apparently her assertions that 
‘she knew two officers both of whom had seen the angels’, was not entirely 
correct.442 H. Verrall, author of the article, attempted to qualify the validity of a 
few of the multitude of cases presented by Harold Begbie but was met with a 
similar responses. One man cited by Begbie as having ‘first-hand information’ 
replied that he could not help Verrall’s enquiries. A second referred Verrall to a 
friend as the source of the story.443 What is interesting is that the Society of 
Psychical Research took a great interest in such happenings. It was precisely 
instances like the ‘angel of Mons’ that they sought to verify as fact to further 
the investigation of psychical and super-normal phenomena. That the 
investigations of just such a group failed to turn up anything marginally 
conclusive – particularly when they were predisposed to believe – goes to show 
just how tenuous the evidence supporting the apparitions really was.  
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Machen too, conducted his own investigations. He was adamant that if 
the apparitions had in fact taken place, then at least 30,000 men should have 
seen it. Men he wrote to at the front, and who had been present at Mons, knew 
nothing of the occurrence at the time and Machen believed that if even 100 of 
those men had seen the angels then it would have spread through the trenches. 
There were, according to this friend, no stories on the front lines of angelic 
intervention, despite there being an abundance of other rumours and stories.444 
The sceptics were assisted in their views by the obvious cases of 
invention. One such case, published in the Daily Mail on 24 August 1915, 
asserted that a young man, a Private Cleaver, was not only willing to give his 
name (something distinctly lacking from other testimony) but to swear an 
affidavit that he had witnessed an apparition at Mons which caused the German 
cavalry to bolt; had this not happened then Cleaver and his comrades ‘would 
have been annihilated’. The man who had been witness to Cleaver’s claims, a 
Mr G. S. Hazlehurst, wrote to the Daily Mail to share the story with the nation. 
Barely a week later though, Mr Hazlehurst wrote again; he had heard a rumour 
that Cleaver had not been at Mons and so had queried this claim with the 
Salisbury headquarters. The response informed Hazlehurst the Private Cleaver 
had, in fact, landed in France on 6 September 1914. The apparitions at Mons 
had taken place during the retreat of 23-26 August. There was no way he could 
have witnessed what he claimed.445  
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It is interesting that after the story of the three hovering angels was 
published, a French officer wrote explaining that the apparition the captain had 
seen was in fact the Northern lights.446 Even Verrall suggested that the sightings 
might be explained by smoke lingering over the battlefields, combined with 
men who ‘are not likely to be in a state conducing to accurate observation’, and 
it possible that with the type of flares, signals and weaponry being used, that 
this explanation could account for some of the delusions.447  
The wide dissemination of the sceptics’ views and a greater appreciation 
of the prevalence of hallucinations under the stress of battle, combined with the 
worsening situation at the front, potentially help to explain the demise of the 
stories of divine intervention in the later years. Experience with men returned 
from the front – with their nightmares, hallucinations, or psychological 
disturbances – might have made people more aware of the impact of dreams 
and hallucinations could have on the psyche.448  
 A great deal of scepticism was voiced in public about the truth of the 
stories of divine intervention. The accuracy of the stories about the return of the 
dead were not so widely or so publicly questioned. There are a number of 
possible reasons why stories were not attacked so vociferously as stories about 
divine intervention. Firstly, there was substantial public support given to these 
stories by prominent figures such as Conan Doyle. Secondly, there may have 
been an unwillingness to injure the feelings of individuals who had suffered loss 
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but who gained some comfort from their belief in such stories. Finally, ghost 
stories did not require the same degree of religious belief as tales of divine 
intervention. 
A significant section of the clergy backed reports of divine intervention 
early in the war and the reports got a good deal of support from believing 
Christians. The popular press also entered into considerable discussion on the 
subject of divine intervention. All of these are a good indication that they had a 
significant popular following outside of elite circles. What did people who 
accepted these stories get from them? Particularly in light of the decades 
preceding the war being relatively void of such stories? The spiritualists 
acquired far less publicity, but they also acquired a following. There are three 
main factors that explain the popularity of supernatural stories. 
Firstly, rumours of this type seemed to resonate with existing mentalities 
of a ‘just war’. Divine intervention in particular gave implicit support to this idea 
by suggesting that divine aid further reinforced the contention the British cause 
was ‘just’, and therefore right. These stories also, by implication, demonised the 
enemy. By claiming that God was on the side of the British, stories of divine 
intervention inferred that the Germans must be in the service of the Devil. One 
soldier, for instance, warned Campbell and her fellow nurses to leave the front 
with the words: ‘Get awa’, lassie […] They Germans is no men; they’re devils. 
All Hell is open now’.449 As far as Campbell was concerned, it was precisely the 
demonic nature of the Germans (as exemplified by the atrocities they committed, 
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and which she described in detail), which made it necessary for God to intervene 
on the side of the Allies: 
 
Is it strange that that the cries of virgins violated, of 
crucified sons and fathers – of brothers and sons 
carbonized, of nuns tortured and burnt – of priests 
tortured and impaled, of little children done to death in 
such ways that they cannot be spoken of, is it strange 
that the torment of these has dragged at the feet of the 
Ruler of the Universe till He sent aid.450 
 
 Secondly, supernatural stories provided yet another form of moral 
justification for the sacrifices being made, and for the decision of the British to 
enter the war in the first place. This was especially evident in the stories of 
divine intervention. It is probable that, for patriotic individuals, the stories 
provided a medium through which the righteousness of the war could be 
demonstrated. It offered support to the claim that the Allied cause was ‘just’, and 
that their sacrifices were not in vain and encouraged resilience and faith in the 
face of a drawn out conflict. There is support for this in the experiences 
published by Phyllis Campbell in her book, Back of the Front and her article, 
‘The angelic leaders’ printed in The Occult Review. Campbell’s pieces, both 
heavily laced with accounts of divine intervention, were riddled with references 
to the idea of a divine cause: ‘[of] one thing all were assured – that the Germans 
represented the powers of evil, and that so doubtfully did victory hang in the 
balance, that the powers of good found it necessary to fight […] with the Allies, 
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lest the whole world be lost’.451 In the face of the realisation of the enormous 
effort that would be required to win the war, and the already dashed hope that 
the war would be ‘over by Christmas’, the prospect of the sacrifices ahead 
required the support of the population: ‘[the] Allies will win; it may take a long 
time, it must be a pretty hard case for us, when the Almighty sends His best 
fighting man to help’.452 The reassurance that God was on the Allies’ side, and 
that the cause was so important as to elicit divine aid, was one way this 
determination could be assured. 
Finally, on a personal level, the stories offered comfort to those with 
loved ones at the front. The invocation of divine protection not only afforded 
this solace, but buoyed morale at home and the front, something alluded to by 
Campbell: ‘[the] men’s wounds were horrible […] yet not one of them was 
depressed or despondent.’453 She went on to say: 
 
[the] wounded were in a curious state of exaltation – 
they talked not of defeat, but victory, and spoke of Joan 
of Arc and St. Michael riding white horses and turning 
back the foe. Some of the men spoke also of the 
Germans falling dead in their ranks where Joan of Arc 
and her Companion, Michael the Archangel, had 
intervened between the contending hosts.454 
 
This was in stark contrast to the early trainloads of men being treated who ‘bore 
their sufferings with unexampled heroism; but [whose] very dumbness 
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suggested the hopeless silence of defeat’.455 In Master Mind Magazine, 
Campbell asserted that she ‘[believed] these experiences of the Allied soldiers 
have been of great spiritual comfort in thousands of bereaved homes; and I 
want […] to keep alive that divine spark of consolation’. She also doubted the 
patriotism of those who chose to question the phenomenon saying she 
‘[thought] it wicked to write or say anything that may tend to stem the great 
wave of spirituality which these awful days have caused’.456  
The first Total War caused immense fear, and stress, in Britain. The 
Amiens dispatch cast a harsh light on the realities at the front, which were 
gradually compounded by the increasing casualty lists and the failure to achieve 
a quick and absolute victory. The number of deaths inflicted on the British 
forces was greater than experienced historically, and the omnipresent threat of 
the Germans on the channel coast undoubtedly inflamed anxieties. There had 
been massive battles during the first year of the war but they had failed to 
decisively evict the Germans. The 58,000 British casualties at Ypres in October 
1914 had saved the Channel ports but effectively marked the degeneration of 
the war into stalemate and trenches.457 The smaller skirmishes between October 
1914 and April 1915 had achieved little except enormous casualties. On 24 
April 1915, when the story of the ‘mysterious officer’ was published in Light, 
the Germans were preparing to release a second batch of chlorine gas on the 
Ypres salient. The first attack, two days earlier, had caused 15,000 Allied 
casualties including 5,000 dead. The final casualty list for the British when the 
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Second Battle of Ypres ended on 25 May was 60,000.458 The idea that divine 
beings were assisting the Allies no doubt alleviated, for some, a degree of the 
worry and stress they felt about the situation at the front.  
Divine intervention filled a vital role in the war effort by maintaining 
morale and buttressing support for British contentions that they fought for a 
righteous cause. While this was certainly the slant proffered by the likes of 
Campbell and those who were responsible for its dissemination, the 
disappearance of the stories after the Somme suggests that for many the genre’s 
main function was to offer comfort as ‘[neither] the members of the 
Expeditionary Force […] nor those who waved cheery farewells, foresaw the 
inferno which was to swallow up the luckless combatants’.459 The inferno 
continued to consume Britain’s manhood and gradually the concept of divine 
intervention, or protection, could no longer disguise or explain the death and 
maiming of tens of thousands of the nation’s men. 
Stories of divine intervention in war virtually disappeared after July 
1916. This marked the beginning of the battle of the Somme, which resulted in 
20,000 dead British soldiers on the first day alone. The protection afforded by 
the angels perhaps was not as convincing in light of the enormous casualties 
and a further loss for the Allies. It is at this point that Clarke alleges the stories 
of the Comrade in White began circulating in earnest.460 The comfort afforded 
by divine intervention in moments of danger dissipated – there had been no 
miraculous salvation for the 420,000 killed, wounded or missing soldiers – to 
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be replaced with the rumour that a mysterious stranger was ministering to the 
wounded and vulnerable stranded in No Man’s Land.  
A further indicator of the personal comfort the supernatural afforded can 
be seen in the resurgence in spiritualism during the Great War. For those who 
had already experienced loss, and who could not be buoyed by the solace of 
divine protection, an avenue was offered which would salve their grief. Arthur 
Conan Doyle theorised that the extreme loss of life during the war left so few 
people untouched by sorrow that spiritualism provided an opportunity through 
which their anguish could be alleviated through contact with the dead. Doyle, 
like many, had lost a son in the war and he claimed to have found consolation in 
being able to contact him.461 Others followed him in the belief that spiritualism 
would give them a means to grieve their dead and prove that the spirit could 
survive death, offering comfort that the mourners left in the physical world 
would be able to meet their loved ones again.  
There was also the reassurance offered by their comrades. Men facing 
death on an hourly basis, going over the top for their country, probably found 
comfort in the stories of the apparitions. There was obviously some form of life 
after death so it perhaps allowed them to face death with an understanding that 
it would not be the end.  
It is more difficult to identify the psychological and social reasons for 
the popularity of stories about omens and prophecies. They can perhaps be 
interpreted as a form of comfort, although in a slightly different form to that 
provided by stories of divine intervention and the returning dead. Rather than 
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offering proof of heaven’s support of the Allied cause, or the chance of 
maintaining contact with dead loved ones, this aspect of the supernatural 
suggests that people were attempting to embroider their lives with a sense of 
predetermination and meaning. Omens, be they clouds or some other 
occurrence, suggest that individuals sought to find meaning in their 
surroundings which would enable them not only to understand the war, but their 
place in it. When Reverend Clark recorded the unusual sunset of 29 October 
1916 – ascertained by many of his fellow villagers to be an impending signal of 
the end of the world – it is possible this was because they interpreted the sight 
within the context of current events. At the time, the battle of the Somme had 
been raging for three months, which claimed hundreds of thousands of 
casualties among the British with no demonstrable gain, let alone decisive 
victory. Prophecies, particularly those made 300 years before the outbreak of 
the war, implied that the course of events had been decided and therefore, 
perhaps could not be averted. This fatalism was also evident on the front among 
soldiers. There was an erroneous, but undoubtedly comforting belief that if 
one’s time was up, nothing could be done to avoid death. While this seems 
macabre, it can be seen as an attempt to remove the sense of randomness from 
the slaughter. 
There were striking similarities between the genre of the supernatural 
and the other genres studied. Like atrocities and spies, the supernatural meshed 
well with existing mentalities. All three offered explicit and implicit 
opportunities with which to demonise the Germans and create an ‘other’, 
rejecting the previously close relationship between the two countries. That the 
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country which professed to be Britain’s friend secretly coveted her Empire and 
worked towards its downfall with foreign agents and plots, that its soldiers 
raped and pillaged their way through an guiltless population, and that God was 
on the side of the Allies, only completed this segregation further as it made the 
Germans the antithesis of all things to do with the British cause. 
Again, the supernatural also fulfilled the quest for justification. This was 
not exclusively confined to justifying going to war, but also reconciling the 
massive sacrifices the population had to make with the seemingly endless 
nature of the conflict. In this the supernatural and atrocity stories worked 
particularly well. Atrocities established an enemy that was so bestial it could 
only be beaten by an absolute military victory. The idea of the supernatural 
supported this by not only bolstering morale, but suggesting that as God was on 
Britain’s side, it must eventually be victorious. 
But, there were also striking differences. Primarily it was that neither 
atrocity nor spy stories were driven by a need for comfort, whereas this was a 
significant vein in the supernatural. While there were other considerations that 
certainly contributed to the adoption of this genre, one of the main underlying 
themes was that it offered hope and comfort to the population that they would 
survive the war, be victorious, and that loved ones would be protected at the 
front.  
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Conclusion 
There was a strong historical tradition of the supernatural in warfare. Stories of 
divine intervention, the return of fallen comrades, and of omens, were not an 
innovation of World War I. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, 
with the advent of a more scientific world view, stories that linked the 
supernatural with war became rather less popular than in previous centuries. 
Between 1914 and 1918, however, the extreme stresses of fighting a Total War 
caused a remarkable revival of the tradition.  
The common theme of all three rumour types of the supernatural genre 
was the interpretation of phenomena under the pressures of war. Hallucinations 
experienced under conditions of extreme duress by soldiers were commonly 
interpreted as incidents of divine intervention. Sunsets, cloud formations, and 
seemingly innocuous incidents were interpreted, sometimes retrospectively, as 
signs of impending doom or certain victory. On the home front, worried 
relatives sought comfort in stories and beliefs that confirmed the existence of an 
after-life. 
All of these were examples of people seeking order and consolation in a 
disordered and uncertain world. The ways in which the phenomena were 
interpreted seemed dependent on the individuals own presuppositions of reality. 
Christian clergymen tended to promulgate stories of divine intervention as they 
matched their own beliefs, and used them to promote further religious devotion. 
The return of the dead was encouraged by the spiritualists whose outlook 
indicated this was possible and whose beliefs were not constrained by orthodox 
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religious values. Omens were an age old phenomena that offered meaning 
through the interpretation of simple events.  
Within the category of the supernatural the rumours and myths were 
exceptionally diverse, but they all contributed to the creation of discourses. The 
Discourse on Divine Favour and the Discourse on Survival after Death 
exhibited the search for meaning and explanation that could be ascribed to the 
war, and to alleviate their own feelings of helplessness. That they were 
predominantly faith based myths, but still gained such popularity shows just 
how much of an impact the war had on Britain, and just how much the 
population was in need of some kind of reassurance that their cause, and 
sacrifices, were not being made in vain.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
An examination of the myths and rumours circulating on the British home front 
in the First World War suggests that these stories were a form of discourse that 
people used to explain their involvement in the war. Vera Brittain recalled in 
her memoirs how the myths were viewed: 
 
They sounded ludicrous enough now, these rumours, these 
optimisms, these assurances, to us who still wonder why, in spite 
of all our incompetence, we managed to “win” the War. But at 
the time they helped us to live. I cannot, indeed, imagine how 
long we should have succeeded in living without them.462 
 
These rumours did not exist in a vacuum, nor did they result purely 
from a fevered popular imagination. They were linked to historical traditions in 
which people accused enemy troops of brutal atrocities and reported 
supernatural intervention on behalf of their troops. They were also linked to 
developments in the pre-war decades: to the spread of the spiritualist belief that 
contact was possible between the living and the dead; and to the growing 
international tension, which contributed to the fear of spies and traitors.   
However, these developments and traditions did not in themselves 
ensure that so many myths and rumours would emerge during the war.  In 
countless minor conflicts over the previous century there had been no rumours 
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of divine intervention at all. Moreover, the fact that other countries had accused 
their enemies of bestial atrocities did not necessarily dictate the British would 
do the same, for the British and Germans had a history of mutual, amicable 
regard.  Indeed, the British newspapers were initially sceptical of the reports of 
German atrocities.    
In order to explain the prevalence of myths and rumours, we need to 
take into account the fact that World War I was a conflict on an unprecedented 
scale between opponents that were relatively evenly matched.  It was also the 
first Total War.  These facts imposed unprecedented stresses on the British 
population, creating an environment in which people were tempted to suspend 
their disbelief. In the words of Dorothy Peel, a British civilian, ‘the state of 
tense excitement in which we existed upset our judgment and made any event 
seem possible […] war stories [myths and rumours] were a feature of our 
life’.463  
The experience of a massive conflict involving Total War was very 
different from the British experience of war over the previous hundred years.  
Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, Britain had not been seriously 
threatened, and had been engaged largely in small-scale colonial wars on distant 
frontiers. In World War I, by contrast, millions of men volunteered – or were 
conscripted – for service in an army that suffered horrific casualties just across 
the Channel. The reality of a devastating war was right on Britain’s doorstep. 
Its people feared that German victories could eventually see their country 
engaged in a struggle to defend its own soil against German invaders. 
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The scale of the war also indicated that the victory would not be gained 
exclusively by military strength. Economic strength was important in a war that 
showed increasingly that supply capabilities were just as essential as men. This 
produced a potentially deadly threat to civilians as the belligerents increasingly 
considered their respective home fronts legitimate targets. While Britain was 
spared the worst examples of German brutality, the Zeppelin raids were a 
constant reminder to civilians that they were no longer immune to the cruelties 
of war. Civilians began to suffer more than in earlier wars, where they were not 
directly targeted. 
For the most part, the rumours that flourished during World War I were 
popularly driven. Press reports drew on myths and rumours that had their origin 
in word-of-mouth stories circulating in the community, and the press reports in 
turn inspired more such stories.  Only in the case of atrocity stories did the 
government, through the Bryce report, give direct support to the rumours. 
Indeed, although the government’s own concern to root out spies encouraged 
public reports of suspicious activity, these reports ended up being a bane for the 
government, because the British population held it immediately responsible for 
any continuing espionage. It probably also recognised that the rumours were 
socially divisive. However, there were obvious patriotic advantages in allowing 
even the stories of spies to circulate, and the government did nothing to stop 
them. Moreover, few people in official circles minded if pacifists, conscientious 
objectors and striking workers were identified as having ‘pro-German’ elements 
in their midst.   
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During the war, there was specific legislation in place which made it 
illegal to ‘spread false reports or make false statements’.464 Technically, this 
encompassed rumour, but the law was applied only to those who spread stories 
detrimental to the British cause.  The myths and rumours that are the subject of 
this thesis rarely fell into this category, and the government was happy to let 
them flourish.  They were clearly manifestations of popular patriotism with the 
potential to rally many ordinary people behind the Allied cause. 
If the myths and rumours were useful and the government did noting to 
discourage them, it nevertheless studiously refrained from endorsing one 
important category of them: stories of a supernatural character.  Why? Here, we 
must remember that the primary targets of British propaganda until 1917 were 
allied and neutral countries. In a secularising age, most diplomats would have 
reacted with incredulity if spokesmen for the government had endorsed stories 
of divine intercession and of visitations by spirits of the dead.  Such 
endorsements would have brought the government’s veracity into dispute.  In a 
secularising age, most diplomats would have reacted with incredulity.   
It is difficult to judge just how well myths and rumours with 
supernatural themes were received amongst the British public, but the 
government’s failure to endorse them suggests that opinion was divided. The 
impression was confirmed by the fact that The Times, the premier voice of the 
British Establishment, completely ignored them. This suggests that in most 
intellectual circles, and amongst the British upper classes more generally, there 
was considerable scepticism. The negative conclusions reached by 
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investigations into the reports conducted by people like Machen and the Society 
for Psychical Research tend to confirm this. By contrast, the fact that the more 
‘popular’ newspapers carried such reports implies that they had greater 
credibility lower down the social scale, at least amongst a section of the 
population. Devout Christians were strongly represented in that group, if 
sermons by some of the Christian clergy and the views expressed in religious 
publications are any guide.    
What about the claim that the spirits of dead soldiers had in some 
circumstances communicated with their loved ones? This belief was clearly 
accepted amongst spiritualists, and in the wider community it probably had a 
receptive audience amongst at least some of the bereaved. However, the 
reservations of the Christian clergy about spiritualism no doubt helped to limit 
its influence, as did the fact that some people had a more general suspicion 
about spiritual claims.   
No doubt the most widely believed rumours were those about spies and 
atrocities, for it was almost impossible to deny rationally that they had at least 
some basis in fact.  Judging by newspaper copy and mentions in memoirs alone 
there would have been few people untouched by these two classes of stories.  
Some must have suspected that a good deal of the spy talk was paranoia, but it 
was difficult to say this without seeming unpatriotic.  Similarly, there were 
some who doubted the more lurid atrocity stories, but we do not know how 
many because those who spoke up were condemned.  Both Jerome K. Jerome 
and Keir Hardie were attacked in letters to the editor of the Daily Express for 
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questioning the extent of German atrocities, particularly reports of sadism and 
mutilation.  
The myths and rumours in circulation on the home front constituted a 
mutually supporting series of discourses that had both social and political 
significance. Myths of German atrocities and sexual-sadism created a Discourse 
on the Bestial Hun; rumours of enemy agents, espionage and traitors 
constructed a Discourse on Hidden Spies; stories of divine intercession formed 
a Discourse on Divine Favour; and stories about the return of spirits of dead 
comrades contributed to a Discourse on Survival after Death.  
These discourses did not simply fill the void created by censorship and 
the restrictions on news from the front. They provided hope, reassurance, 
inspiration and comfort, and they gave the war a wider meaning. The Discourse 
on the Bestial Hun justified British involvement in the war and made sense of it 
by suggesting that the British cause was to protect the weak, the innocent and 
the defenceless – women and children especially – from a cruel and despotic 
enemy. The Discourse on Divine Favour enlisted God in the allied cause with 
its stories of divine intervention on the field of battle, and by implication it put 
the Germans on the side of the devil.  Moreover, since God and his allies were 
assured of victory, the discourse gave hope and comfort as well as a sense of 
moral righteousness.    
Hope and comfort of a different sort were provided by the Discourse on 
Survival after Death.  It offered consolation to those with friends and relatives 
at the front, and to those who had lost loved ones in the war.  Moreover, when it 
  
190 
told of ghostly soldiers who returned to assist their comrades, it boosted morale 
with its message of support and assistance from beyond the grave.   
The Discourse on Hidden Spies gave every Briton the satisfaction of 
contributing to the war effort by assisting in the detection of enemy agents.  It 
was also used to marginalise pacifists, striking workers and other troublemakers 
who in the eyes of patriots seemed bent on undermining the war effort.  Such 
people, it seemed, had placed themselves in opposition to their country and 
God’s cause, supplying witting or unwitting aid to the Bestial Hun.   
To see the myths and rumours simply as irrational and unfounded gossip 
would be to diminish the importance they had for the people who circulated 
them. Through myth and rumour, many ordinary Britons participated in the 
wartime experience, justifying and explaining the conflict to themselves and 
their neighbours.  As they did so, they produced and circulated a type of 
people’s patriotic propaganda that ran parallel with the official propaganda 
sponsored by the state.  At times, the two streams of propaganda joined and fed 
off each other, as happened in the case of atrocity rumours at the time of the 
Bryce Report.  However, for the most part they remained separate, while still 
moving in the same direction.  It was because they moved in the same direction, 
serving the purposes of the state, that the government left them alone to 
flourish.  As a result, millions of ordinary British people were left free to make 
sense of a terrible conflict in their own way, through myth and rumour.   
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